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Introduction 
 
This section is devoted to present the structure of thesis. First, we briefly review the 
existing literature on IPO and family business and derive our research questions. 
Second, we summarize each chapter with its framework, sample and main findings. 
 
 
1.1 Research field and research questions 
Over the past few decades, research on firms engaged in initial public offerings 
(IPO) has turned up as a prominent topic in entrepreneurship and management 
research (Certo et al., 2009). IPOs take place when firms move from private to public 
ownership by issuing liquid shares that are subsequently traded on a stock market.  
An ongoing debate in the family business field involves the extent to which the 
uniqueness of family firms hinder or promote performance (Pindado and Requejo, 
2014) and entrepreneurial behaviour (Habbershon and Pistrui, 2002). By definition, the 
uniqueness of family firms relies on the interaction between the business entity, the 
family unit, and its individual members (Habbershon and Williams, 1999). Such 
interaction creates unique systemic conditions and constituencies that may affect firms’ 
outcomes. Although, the above uniqueness catalysed scholars’ attention over the last 
research decades, family business literature still calls new works to add new insights and 
better understand family firms behaviours. On one hand, academics have not reached 
consensus as to whether family uniqueness has a positive or negative effect on overall 
firm value. This lack of consensus is even more pronounced when it comes to assessing 
family impact in the context of IPO (Chahine, 2007). On the other hand, in the 
entrepreneurial setting of IPO (Certo et al., 2009) the family role on strategic decision 
is an underdeveloped topic. Unsurprising, the effect of family uniqueness on IPO has 
thus far been rarely addressed since “the determination of family control in IPOs is 
difficult, time consuming and somewhat subjective” (Astrachan and McConaughy, 
2001, p.310).  
The relationship between family involvement and performance is one of the most 
controversial questions in the literature about family businesses. Within this research 
line, an ample body of literature recognizes that ownership structure influences IPO 
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value (e.g. Field and Sheehan, 2004; Chahine and Goergen, 2013). However, previous 
researches have mainly focused on the role of managerial ownership (e.g. Bonardo et al., 
2007; Chahine and Goergen, 2013) or on the role of ownership concentration (e.g. 
Rigamonti, 2008). As a result, a clear picture of how family and its uniqueness affect 
IPO performance is still lacking. A few studies have undertaken this challenge 
(Giovannini, 2010; Leitterstorf and Rau, 2014) but the results are far from univocal. 
Knowledge about how family owned or controlled firms shape IPO value remains 
embryonic (Leitterstorf and Rau, 2014). 
Nordqvist and Melin (2010) argue that studies of entrepreneurship and family 
business developed independently in last decades, but there are some indications that 
they are now moving closer to each other (Anderson et al.,2005). That is, according to 
Habbershon and Pistrui (2002), much family business research has emphasized how 
families achieve continuity and ensure survival. IPO represents undoubtedly an 
entrepreneurial setting (Lester et al., 2006) where studying the role of family may help 
to understand how its involvement affects entrepreneurship outcomes. On one hand, 
some studies claim that family firms tend to survive longer than their non-family 
counterparts (e.g. Wilson et al., 2013), due to survivability capital (Sirmon and Hitt, 
2003) (e.g. the pooled personal resources that family members are willing to loan, 
contribute, or share for the benefit of the family business). On the other hand, a 
conspicuous body of literature reveal that family firms are less incline to entrepreneurial 
behaviours and reluctant to changes (Naldi et al., 2007) due to: risk-adverse (Hiebl, 
2013) and Top Management Team (TMT) diversity (Auh and Menguc, 2005). The 
greater family involvement at upper echelon levels may yield more risk- adverse 
decisions: this attitude may undermine the survivability of the company (Zellweger et 
al., 2013). As results, our understating of post-IPO survival of family firms is still 
incomplete. 
Keeping in mind the scarcity of researches on the above-mentioned topics, literature 
on family business and IPO does not offer univocal findings. These contradictory 
evidences may not only be due to methodological issues such as the samples and 
definitions of family business (Miller et al., 2007), but also the different empirical 
constructs of independent variables (Basco, 2013) and the different measures used to 
proxy for IPO value (Certo et al., 2009) or IPO survival (Pour, 2015). 
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To address the aforementioned research gaps, this thesis aims to shed light on the 
relationship between family firms and IPO value as well as between such firms and post-
IPO survival (defined as the condition of being still listed on equity market within three 
years after went public). We investigate the scope of our inquiry by investigating the 
population (170) of firms that went public on Milan Stock exchange. The Italian capital 
market represents an ideal setting to scrutiny the influence of family involvement in 
management and ownership for publicly listed firms because of its unique feature of a 
large number of listed family firms (Cascino et al., 2010). For historical reasons, family 
firms represent a higher portion of companies traded on the Italian Stock Exchange. 
Similar to other countries with poor financial infrastructures, the control of a large 
fraction of the economy is delegated to wealthy and well-established families (Pagano et 
al., 1998). Controlling families are usually very much involved in the activities of the 
firm as revealed by the regular appointment of family members in the governance 
positions (Prencipe et al., 2008). Our analysis considers the period 2000-2011. The 
choice to start our analysis from 2000 was dictated by two main reasons. First, the 
introduction of the Code of Corporate Governance, issued by the Italian Stock 
Exchange in 1999. The logic behind this is straightforward: the recommendations of the 
Code profoundly influence board composition and manager nomination including 
family members. Moreover, we selected this observation period to avoid any potential 
bias due to the good stock market index trend and the increasing public incentives (e.g. 
tax benefit granted by the Tremonti law) in the period 1995-1999 (Bonardo et al., 
2007). We end our analysis in 2011 because we track the IPOs in the next triennium 
(until 31 December 2014) to determine whether they were delisted or not. 
Going one-step further, we address three research questions. In chapter one, we 
study a particular aspect of family-run businesses, namely, the impact of family and its 
involvement on IPO value. The research question is the following: does family 
involvement foster IPO value? In chapter two, we shift our attention on individual 
leadership and we examine how and if powerful CEO affect IPO value in family firms. 
The research question associated with this chapter is: does CEO power affects investor 
evaluations at IPO stage? In the last chapter, we investigate the role of Top 
Management Team (TMT) on post-IPO survival. The associated research question is as 
follow: is it detrimental the TMT diversity in family IPO after went public? 
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Another fundamental issue that this thesis disentangle is the classification of family 
firms. Despite the various number of definitions stated in the literature, none is widely 
accepted (Klein et al., 2005). Pindado and Requejo (2014) stress the paradox that when 
considering family impact on performance the great variation in results depends on the 
different definitions of family business used. That is, we adopt a multiple definition to 
assure the robustness of our results. We define as family firms those where two 
conditions exist simultaneously. First, one or more members of the family must control 
at last 30% of voting rights and second, one or more members of the family must be 
involved in the top management team. Not focusing only on ownership concentration 
allows us to examine family-owned and family-influenced firms (Cascino et al., 2010). 
We rely upon this threshold because according to the Italian “Decreto Legislativo 
58/1998”, a level of 30% is required for a tender offer (Minichilli et al., 2010). Rather, 
among the most recent contributions, Chrisman et al. (2005) claim that this 
operationalization, due to its dichotomous outcome, does not capture “family strength”. 
In response to this issue, we adopt the F-PEC scale. Astrachan et al. (2002) introduced 
this definition of family firms and several studies applied, tested and validate this 
measure in the IPO context (e.g., Jaskiewicz et al. 2005; Leitterstorf and Rau, 2014). 
The F-PEC has the advantage of being constituted on a multidimensional scale. Indeed, 
the principal contribution is to not offer “a precise or all-encompassing definition of 
family business” (Astrachan et al. 2002, p. 51) but to concentrate it into a different 
index dimension (family ownership and family involvement into top management) as 
suggested in literature. 
 
1.2 Chapter 1: IPO value and family involvement 
The process of going public is characterized by a sense of uncertain, Certo (2003) 
refers to this as the liability of market newness. In the course of going public, several 
factors can influence investor’s reaction such as ownership structure and corporate 
governance (Certo et al., 2009). Baker and Gompers (2003) argue that the choice and 
effectiveness of governance mechanisms are key success factors in new environments 
such as equity markets.  Different owners (e.g. family ownership), as well as different 
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management configuration (e.g. presence of family managers), may serve as protective 
shield for the firm during the IPO process.  
The aforementioned reasoning broaden our thinking by allowing us to investigate the 
impact of family involvement on IPO value.  
Based on a unique hand-collected dataset, we make inference on 113 IPOs of 
companies went public in the period 2000-2011 on the Milan Stock Exchange. We 
employ a set of variables, as suggested by the demographic approach (e.g. family 
ownership, family involvement and family generation), to take into account different 
levels of family governance. Due to the altruistic nature of family firms, we investigate 
this phenomenon in a stewardship framework.  In line with prior literature on IPO 
performance (e.g. Chahine and Filatotchev, 2008), we estimate ordinary least-squares 
regressions to examine the relationship between IPO firm value and family demographic 
variables. As suggested by Leitterstorf and Rau (2014), we use a hierarchical approach 
(separately regressing each variable of interest) as our variables measure different 
aspects of the same phenomenon (being a family-owned IPO) and jointly disentangle 
family firm heterogeneity. 
With these premises, we investigate two different issues. First, we address how and 
whether family-owned IPOs differ from their non-family counterparts. We find that 
family firm status (e.g. family ownership) positively affects how external investors 
evaluate the firm at listing. Second, we address family firm heterogeneity (e.g. family 
involvement in: board of directors, TMT and overall firm level) by showing the 
differences across family-owned IPOs. Our results show that family involvement is a 
positive factor for IPO value; however, as intergenerational control increases (e.g. 
multiple generation involved), the positive impact on value is attenuated.  
 
1.3 Chapter 2: IPO value and personal leadership (CEO) 
Prior literature has demonstrated the existence of a relationship between top 
executive characteristics and IPO value (e.g., Lester et al., 2006; Zimmerman, 2008), 
yet scholars still debate the impact of CEO characteristics on investor evaluations at the 
IPO stage (Yang et al., 2011). Literature has flourished on the topic of CEO founders 
and their impact on IPO value but rarely questions whether and how other CEO 
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characteristics affect investor valuations. Moreover, the lens of CEO power has rarely 
been used to assess IPO evaluations of family firms. 
Whether or not a powerful CEO should lead a family firm through the IPO process is 
a relatively new issue in governance literature. There is still a gap in our understanding 
of how CEO leadership affects investor evaluations at a transitional stage such as going 
public. We bridge this gap by responding to the following research question: are 
powerful CEOs beneficial to investor evaluations of family IPOs?  
In a stewardship framework, we argue that a powerful leader could foster trust among 
potential outside investors and reduce uncertainty. We use a sample of 77 family firms 
that went public on the Milan Stock Exchange between 2000 and 2011. In our study, 
CEO power refers to a multidimensional construct (Finkelstein et al., 2009). Using an 
exploratory factor analysis, we consider three types of power: ownership, structural and 
expert. Since CEO power is not directly observable (Liu and Jiraporn, 2010), we employ 
structural equation modeling to infer our conclusions. Our results suggest that a 
powerful CEO fosters IPO value, that the positive effect is stronger when a family 
member manages the firm and when leadership is not shared (e.g., absence of co-
leadership). Moreover, the presence of a family CEO without a co-CEO strengthens the 
positive relationship between CEO power and investor evaluations. 
 
1.4 Chapter 3: IPO survival, the role of family managers and family generations 
In entrepreneurial context, TMT provides valuable contribution to find new financial 
resources and sustain firm growth (Kamm et al. 1990). The composition of TMT may 
impact on firm outcomes. Finkelstein and Hambrick, (1996) define TMT diversity as a 
double-edged sword (involving in opposite forces that differently affect firm outcomes. 
Ling and Kellermanns (2010) argue that family firms are an ideal setting to study TMT 
diversity. Therefore, the integration of family and non-family members in the TMT 
creates additional challenges and a greater source of diversity. As Minichilli et al. (2010) 
state, TMT diversity in family firms is still an underdeveloped topic despite of its crucial 
importance in strategic process and choices (Kellermanns and Eddleston, 2007). 
Carpenter (2011) maintains that the principal task of TMT is the strategic management 
of organization in order to assure the survival of the firm. Additionally, management 
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literature stresses that TMT heterogeneity may affect entrepreneurial activities and, as 
reflection, survivability. 
The existing literature fails to resolve how TMT demography influences the survival 
of firm in capital market (post-IPO success). In post-IPO phase, firms face transitional 
changes such as liability of adolescence. Within this line of research, scholars 
investigated several characteristics of apical key managers (Liu et al., 2012) but to date, 
there is no study about TMT diversity and post-IPO survival in family firms.  
This chapter aims to understand if and to what extent family TMT diversity affect 
post-IPO failure (e.g. the condition of being delisted). We employ a sample of 77 family 
owned firms that went public on Milano Stock Exchange in 2000-2011 timeframe. In 
line with Kraiczy et al., (2014), we rely on two family firm-specific sources of TMT 
diversity: namely, the ratio of family members in the TMT and the number of 
generations involved in TMT. Previous literature on upper echelon theory and family 
business (e.g. Ling and Kellermans, 2010) claim that each source of family firm-specific 
TMT diversity may have a different impact and needs separate consideration. We 
embrace this suggestion and separately assess their impact on post-IPO survival. First, 
we look at the presence of both family and nonfamily members as a major source of 
family TMT diversity (Naldi et al., 2007). In this light, we rely upon the ratio of family 
managers in TMT: the findings unequivocally suggest that this source of diversity is 
detrimental for post-IPO survival. Second, the vertical distance among family members 
can be a source of TMT diversity. That is, we consider the number of generations 
involved in TMT and verify that the higher the intergenerational involvement is, the 
lower likelihood of post-IPO survival would be. Moreover, we focus on the impact of 
single and multiple generations in charge: results reveals that having only one 
generation involved in TMT increases the likelihood of post-IPO survival. Empirically 
our results are robust to two different techniques: logistic regression and Cox hazard 
model. 
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Chapter 1. Does family involvement foster IPO value? 
Empirical analysis on Italian Stock Market.1 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper aims to shed light on the relationship between family involvement and 
IPO value in the Italian context.  
Based on a unique hand-collected dataset, we test our hypotheses on companies that 
went public between 2000 and 2011, making inference on 113 firms using OLS 
hierarchical regressions. We quantify the IPO value from an outside investors’ 
perspective with two measures to proxy for IPO value in the short-term and apply 
robustness checks for long-run performance. In a stewardship framework, we examine 
demographic variables including family firm status, family involvement in managerial 
positions and family generations 
Our results suggest that family firm status positively influences IPO value, that 
greater family involvement corresponds to higher IPO value and lastly, that the 
beneficial effect of family control is mainly attributable to the first generation. Our 
results are robust to alternative specifications of each phenomenon. 
As a single-country study, the results refer exclusively to the Italian context and thus 
the evidence provided may not automatically be generalized to IPOs of comparable 
equity markets. 
This study expands current knowledge by showing how investors ‘price’ family 
ownership in an IPO; furthermore we assess how certain characteristics of family firms 
affect the IPOs (e.g family involvement and inter-generational). 
 
 
                                                          
1 Please note that a similar version of this chapter (with the same title) has been accepted for publication in 
“Management Decision” journal (ISSN: 0025-1747). I am grateful to my co-authors, Prof. Mauro Romano 
and Dr. Otello Ardovino, for their help. However all the errors within the chapter are my own 
responsibility. 
Chapter 1 - Does family involvement foster IPO value? Empirical analysis on Italian Stock Market 
 
15 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Although the topic of family firms and performance has been widely investigated in 
the last decade, scholars have not reached consensus as to whether family ownership has 
a positive or negative effect on overall firm value. This lack of consensus is even more 
pronounced when it comes to assessing family ownership in the context of Initial Public 
Offering (IPOs) (Chahine, 2007). In the course of going public, several factors can 
influence investor’s reaction such as ownership structure and corporate governance 
(Certo et al., 2009). Baker and Gompers (2003) argue that the choice and effectiveness 
of governance mechanisms are key success factors in new environments such as equity 
markets.   
Our paper aims to shed light on the relationship between family firms and IPO value. 
Recently, scholars have called for more research to examine the family dynamics that 
affect family firm performance (Gedajlovic et al., 2012). Yet, some important issues and 
topics in relation to family firms have only been marginally studied including the role of 
the family and its involvement at the listing stage (Leitterstorf and Rau, 2014). Given 
the complexity of this phenomenon, the scarce research on family firm IPOs is 
unsurprising. The topic of this paper has thus far been rarely addressed since “the 
determination of family control in IPOs is difficult, time consuming and somewhat 
subjective” (Astrachan and McConaughy, 2001, p.310). To overcome this gap, our 
research intends to answer the following questions. First, does family involvement affect 
IPO valuation? Second, if this is the case, how do family involvement and 
intergenerational family control shape this relation? 
Literature on family business and IPO does not offer univocal findings. These 
contradictory evidences may not only be due to methodological issues such as the 
samples and definitions of family business (Miller et al., 2007), but also the different 
empirical constructs of independent variables (Basco, 2013) and the different measures 
used to proxy for IPO value (Certo et al., 2009).  
Keeping in mind these contradictions, we adopt multiple variables to measure each 
aspect. Based on a unique hand-collected dataset, we make inference on 113 IPOs of 
companies went public in the period 2000-2011 on the Milan Stock Exchange. We 
employ a set of variables, as suggested by the demographic approach (e.g. family 
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ownership, family involvement and family generation), to take into account different 
levels of family governance. Due to the altruistic nature of family firms, we investigate 
this phenomenon in a stewardship framework.  
In line with prior literature (Mousa et al., 2013), we define the IPO premium, which 
uses the offering stock price relating to the firm’s equity book value per share. This 
measure has the merit of considering both accounting-based and stock price 
information (Nelson, 2003). Moreover, we perform sensitivity analysis by using the 
same ratio calculated with the closing price. We use the Market to Book ratio as second 
measure. In the robustness check, we also control for family-owned IPO performance in 
the long run through the ROA. 
Second, we define an IPO as family-owned when two conditions exists 
simultaneously: first, one or more members of the family (related through blood or 
marriage) must control at least 30% of voting rights and second, one or more members 
of the family must be involved in the top management team. We use an alternative 
definition in the robustness check controlling for a continuous variable (F-PEC score).  
Third, we use three ratios to account for family involvement. Family involvement at 
board level, at top management level and at firm overall level are considered. Moreover, 
we investigate how intergenerational control shapes IPO value by distinguish between 
first, second and last generations.  
With these premises, our article intends to study a particular aspect of family-run 
businesses, namely, the impact of family and its involvement on IPO value. In a 
stewardship framework, we use a demographic approach to infer our conclusions and we 
can state that, in the Italian market, family firms positively affect IPO value. In addition, 
greater family involvement (however defined) leads to greater value at listing. Finally, 
this positive effect is mainly attributable to the first family generation as subsequent 
generations face greater family conflicts. 
Our paper extends the existing literature, on management and family business, in 
two ways. First, we contribute to expand the current knowledge in management 
literature. While ownership structure has been found to be a determinant of long-term 
IPO performance (Bruton et al., 2010), we advance previous studies by showing how 
family ownership and involvement foster valuation of outside investors at listing stage. 
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to address the short-term 
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performance (we consider measures based on first-day trading price) of Italian family 
IPOs: previous literature devotes significant attention to long-run performance (e.g. 
Jaskiewicz et al., 2005). However, family behaviour could differ over time with changes 
in stock market performance (Wennberg et al., 2011). It is also known that differences 
exist between listed and private family firms (De Massis et al., 2014): the present study 
seeks to understand how family involvement impacts in the transition period from 
private to public ownership by adding new insights. Considering that our results are 
robust to different proxies of IPO value, we also offer a deeper understanding of the 
value dynamics: our results take into account the entire market valuation (e.g. 
institutional and single investors) and do not suffer of underpricing influence (Certo et 
al., 2009). 
Second, our results allows us to contribute to family business literature. In the so-
called family firm heterogeneity debate, Chrisman and Patel (2012) stress that 
subgroups of family firms differ from each other and call for further investigations. 
Chua et al. (2012) caution that differences among sub-groups of family firms are 
potentially greater than differences between family and non-family counterparts. To 
better understand heterogeneity of family IPOs we first operationalized family 
involvement in management and ownership; we also differentiate firms based on family 
involvement in the board of directors, in the top management team as well as in the 
entire organization. Our evidences offer a more fine-grained understanding of the 
implication of family involvement on IPO value. In addition, we add new indications for 
intergenerational family involvement on IPO performance.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers an overview of our 
theoretical framework and structuring our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the 
methodology. Section 4 shows and discusses the results. In the Section 5 we provide 
robustness checks to corroborate the previous findings. The last Section summarizes our 
work and identifies future research lines. 
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2.2 Theoretical framework and hypotheses development 
2.2.1 Theoretical framework 
To sustain and explain the relationship between family behaviours and performance, 
scholars have developed two approaches: the demographic and the essence approach. 
The former considers family involvement as a sufficient condition to analyse family 
effect on performance; the latter consider that the family may affect “the way an 
organization is governed and managed which subsequently affects family firm 
performance” (Basco, 2013, p. 42). 
The demographic approach is rooted in the assumption that family involvement can 
proxy for family behaviours and the impact on performance (Mazzi, 2011). This 
approach has dual valence: it is useful to distinguish between family and non-family 
firms but also helps scholars disentangle family impact on performance (Molly et al., 
2012). In terms of measurement, the demographic approach has rarely been 
operationalized and the greater part of studies considers three elements: ownership, 
managerial involvement and intergenerational control.  
The demographic approach has the merit of addressing what the essence approach 
implicitly assumes: making explicit that family behaviour and resources are not equal 
across families (Basco, 2013) and that family firms are a heterogeneous group (Dekker 
et al., 2013). By addressing family diversity, this also contributes to the so-called family 
firm heterogeneity debate (Chrisman and Patel, 2012). 
In family business literature, two core theories, namely agency and stewardship, have 
dominated the last decade of research. These theories are directly contrasting (Miller 
and Le Breton-Miller, 2006) but both concern managers acting to achieve firm 
objectives (Wasserman, 2006). 
Stewardship theory highlights the possibility of goal congruence between owners and 
managers. In this case, managers are seen as stewards of the firm who do not pursue 
individual goals as their interests are aligned with those of the organization (Davis et al., 
1997).  
In case of differing interests, higher value is placed on cooperative behaviour, which 
is considered rational as this type of behaviour serves greater utility (Davis et al., 1997). 
Stewardship behaviour is created through a long-term orientation and the “other-
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regarding” perspective; Hernandez (2012) also suggests an affective sense of 
connection with others as determining such behaviour. 
In this approach, family firms and family members value financial and non-financial 
outcomes (Berrone et al., 2010). Stewardship theory, and particularly its altruism 
perspective (Schulze et al., 2003), has the advantage of capturing the financial and non-
financial goals pursued by firms and family members (Mazzi, 2011). Corbetta and 
Salvato (2004) advocate that stewardship theory may be a particularly suitable vantage 
point in analysing family involvement and firm performance. 
Following on from the preceding discussion, we sustain the relationship between 
demographic variables and family firm performance at the IPO stage by using 
stewardship theory. According to Corbetta and Salvato (2004), this theory helps explain 
behaviours aimed at maximizing present and future firm performance. We predict, in 
coherence with the demographic approach, a positive impact of family on IPO value. 
 
2.2.2 Ownership structure and IPO value 
For the purposes of this analysis, a shortcoming of literature on IPO value and 
ownership structure is that it fails to disentangle the specific impact of familism on value 
and this issue has therefore only been marginally studied in family firms (Jaskiewicz et 
al., 2005; Leitterstorf and Rau, 2014). 
An ample body of literature recognizes that ownership structure influences IPO value 
(e.g. Field and Sheehan, 2004; Chahine and Goergen, 2013). In this stream of research, 
scholars define firm value at the IPO stage in different ways to depict and infer 
advantages of specific ownership structures. One of the most used proxies is 
underpricing (e.g., the stock price on the first/second day of trading. See: Beatty and 
Ritter, 1986). The concept of underpricing is rooted in information asymmetry between 
the offering shareholders and the market investors2 (Brennan and Franks, 1997) and is 
particularly suitable under the assumption of separation of ownership and control (Yu 
and Zheng, 2012). In this measure, Jaskiewicz et al. (2005) indicate a potential paradox: 
                                                          
2 Literature offers two other theoretical explanations for underpriced offers, namely, signalling theory 
(Ritter, 1991) and litigation risk (Lowry and Shu, 2002). 
 
Chapter 1 - Does family involvement foster IPO value? Empirical analysis on Italian Stock Market 
 
20 
 
family firms seem to underperform in the short-run while they show superior 
performance in the long-run. They maintain that it is necessary to assess the overall 
phenomenon since underpricing could be misleading if evaluating only the first day (or 
the second or seventh). With regard to this issue, Hill (2006) concludes that IPO 
underpricing, in the UK market, cannot be explained by the post-listing ownership 
structure, but he argues that shareholder composition could influence value, if 
differently measured.  
Following Ritter (1991), IPO value is also operationalized as buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns, BHAR (e.g., “the change in a company’s market valuation measured by its daily 
stock price over a period of 36 months in comparison to the benchmark return” 
Jaskiewicz et al. 2005, p.189) and typically indicates long-run performance (Aggarwal 
and Rivoli, 1990). This measure is valid in different contexts because its assumptions 
(e.g., market efficiency) can be easily generalized (Caselli and Gatti, 2006).  
Other studies primarily focus on the use of ratios to define IPO performance 
(Roosenboom and van der Goot, 2005). Nelson (2003) and Chahine and Goergen 
(2013) measure firm value using the IPO premium: “the ratio of the difference between 
the offer price and the book value per share over the offer price” (Chahine and Goergen 
2013, p.157). Roosenboom and van der Goot (2003) proxy IPO performance with the 
market to book ratio (e.g., the ratio of first-day market capitalization to post-issue book 
value of equity) or with price to book ratio (e.g., ratio of offer and the post-issue book 
values of equity. See: Roosenboom and van der Goot, 2005). The above measures rely 
on short-term performance and inferences with these variables may benefit from the use 
of long-run value proxies (Bartov et al., 2002). IPO performance is sensitive to the way 
it is measured: different proxies lead to different conclusions and as a result, the 
findings can hardly be generalized (Certo et al., 2009). 
Literature has mainly focused on the role of managerial ownership (e.g. Bonardo et 
al., 2007; Chahine and Goergen, 2013) or on the role of ownership concentration (e.g. 
Rigamonti, 2008). As a result, a clear picture of how family affects IPO performance is 
still lacking. A few studies have undertaken this challenge (Giovannini, 2010; 
Leitterstorf and Rau, 2014) but the results are far from univocal. In addition, there is 
much disagreement on what constitutes a family business, which adds complexity to the 
overall phenomenon (Holt et al., 2010). Most of previous studies in our research context 
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have measure only one dimension of family involvement. That is, several researches 
employ a dummy variable based only on ownership involvement (Chahine, 2007; 
Leitterstorf and Rau, 2014). Mazzola and Marchisio (2002) describe family firms as 
those where one or more families own enough shares to ensure either an absolute or a 
relative majority. These definitions may offer an incomplete picture: Block et al., (2011) 
argue that the jointly effect of family involvement in ownership and in management 
could lead to different results compared to the separate consideration of each aspects. 
Taken together, differences in measurement (for IPO performance) and in definition 
(for family business) contribute to the research gap that we address.  With regard to 
measurement, we adopt two proxies to account for short-term IPO value. We ensure the 
reliability of results by using a relative measure (IPO premium) and a market-based 
ratio (market to book value); moreover, we rely on long-term performance (ROA) to 
account for any differences between short-term and long-run performance. With 
respect to family IPO definition, we overcome any potential bias by operationalized a 
dummy variable that account for both involvement (ownership and management). We 
also acknowledge that a definition based on a dichotomous variable may not allow us to 
distinguish among different level of family strength: to test the validity of our results, we 
employ a continuous measure, the F-PEC score (Astrachan et al., 2002).  
 
2.2.3 Family firms and IPO value 
The topic of family impact on IPO value has flourished in recent years. Jaskiewicz et 
al. (2005) examine the long-run stock market performance of German and Spanish 
IPOs over the period 1990-2000 using the BHAR methodology. The findings show that 
family-owned IPOs underperform when compared with non-family IPOs, but there is 
“[…] no significant differences between the distributions of abnormal returns of the 
family and nonfamily business sample” (Jaskiewicz et al., 2005, p.192). 
Giovannini (2010) verifies a negative impact of family firm status on performance. 
He analyses 56 firms whose listing took place during 1999-2005 on the Milan Stock 
Exchange and it is to date one of the few empirical paper considering the family aspect 
of Italian IPOs. His investigation considers the BHAR, calculated 12 months after the 
IPO, as a dependent variable but in doing so fails to address the impact on short-term 
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performance. However, the small sample size affects the overall validity of his results. 
Caselli and Gatti (2006) also make inference on a sample of Italian IPOs. They analyse 
firms that went public in the period 1990-2005 and obtained a final sample of 73 family 
and 29 non-family IPOs. In line with Jaskiewicz et al. (2005), their results show that 
family firms, evaluated in the long-run (36 months), perform worse than the overall 
market (BHAR) but, at same time, non-family IPOs perform slightly, albeit not 
significantly, better than their counterparts.  
Chahine (2007) points out that the relationship between family ownership and IPO 
value is cubic. He uses a sample of 163 French IPOs during the period 1996-2000 and 
proxies IPO performance with the BHAR calculated within a year after listing. He finds 
that if family ownership is between 0% and 30.7% or is greater than 77% there is a 
negative relationship with performance, while if ownership ranges from 30.7% to 67.1% 
the relationship turns positive.  
Leitterstorf and Rau (2014) study the underpricing of German IPOs over the period 
2004-2011 distinguishing between family and non-family firms. Their results suggest 
sell their shares at a lower price compared to non-family firms leading to the sacrifice of 
part of their economic wealth.  
However, finance literature suggests that families regularly use IPO underpricing to 
maintain control and avoid the formation of outside blockholders (Field and Sheehan, 
2004). From a governance standpoint, Yu and Zheng (2012) confirm this result. They 
find that firms controlled by family trusts are less exposed to IPO underpricing, 
suggesting that family trusts and underpricing are alternative methods to retain family 
control over the firm during the listing process. 
Mazzola and Marchisio (2002) focus on the long-term performance (3 years) of 
Italian family IPOs. They find that family-owned businesses show a higher level of ROI 
when compared with non-family businesses. On one hand, this study has the advantage 
of using both qualitative and quantitative data in accordance with the two-step 
approach; on the other hand, the results suffer from small sample size (26 family IPOs 
and 10 non-family IPOs). 
We note that all the above-mentioned studies use different measures to define family 
businesses, which makes it difficult to generalize the results. Moreover, as shown earlier, 
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the lack of measurement clarity may be one of the reasons for the scarcity of studies 
with a clear focus on IPO value and family ownership.  
As such, and in line with stewardship theory, we predict a positive effect of family 
ownership on IPO valuation. Thus, we test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1. Family firm status is positively related to IPO value. 
 
2.2.4 Family involvement and IPO value 
To narrow the scope of our inquiry, we consider the impact of family involvement (as 
part of the demographic approach) on firm value at listing.  
According to Jaskiewicz et al. (2005), while family ownership alone has no significant 
impact on equity prices, strong family involvement is positively related with IPO long-
run performance. This outcome supports the interest-convergence theory of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). The results of Hearn (2011) support the view that increased 
participation of family members at board level plays a central role in mitigating 
underpricing. Caselli and Gatti (2006) show that strong family involvement has a 
positive impact on long-term stock market performance in Italian IPOs (BHAR, 
calculated 36 months after listing). 
Taken together, these evidences enable us to predict the following relationship: 
 
Hypothesis 2. Family involvement is positively related to IPO value. 
 
2.2.5 Family generation and IPO value 
Complementing these two aspects of family-owned IPOs, we also examine the 
impact of family generation on IPO value. Family business scholars argue that with the 
entering of new generations in the business, the ownership becomes dispersed and the 
interactions of family members turn into a complex dynamic (Kellermanns and 
Eddleston, 2004). Under stewardship assumptions, scholars emphasize that the desire 
to pass the business onto the subsequent generations guarantees a long-term 
orientation and a strong commitment to firm goals (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2005).  
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The setting under scrutiny has a unique characteristic: family owners continue to 
retain control even after the listing process as our data show. IPO does not represent an 
entrepreneurial exit for family owners. This is in line with the idea that one of the main 
aims of IPOs is to ensure long-lasting generational control. First family generations 
often attempt to strengthen the business for their family successors (Miller and Le 
Breton-Miller, 2006), which results in a lower level of conflict and thus superior 
financial performance. Davis and Harveston (2001) observe that one of the principal 
reason why family members’ views and opinions “may diverge is differences in familial 
distance” (p.15) that is more likely to occur in later generations. However, as the 
number of generations involved in management increases, the conflicts increase too. 
Sonfield and Lussie (2004) empirically show that the second, as well as subsequent, 
generations are more likely, than the first, to have conflicts and divergences among 
family members. First generations are, by definition, entrepreneurial (e.g. creation of 
new business opportunities) (Aldrich and Cliff, 2003).  Moreover, these generations 
exhibit greater entrepreneurial orientation (Gómez-Mejía et al, 2007) that implies an 
improvement in productivity and the opportunity to achieve superior gains (Scholes et 
al, 2010). Later generations are more inclined to include outside managers in the 
governance (managerial involvement) with unclear effects on corporate performance 
(Sonfield and Lussie, 2004). That is, Chung and Yuen (2003) emphasize that family 
managers in second generation face greater difficulties and have to deal with a lower 
stewardship attitude by family members. As reflection of this problem, outside 
managers may enter the firm and nullify stewardship benefits. Scholars (e.g. Villalonga 
and Amit, 2006) have also demonstrated that companies run by the founder generation 
outperform those run by subsequent family generations. Along the same research line, 
Basu et al. (2009) suggest that since a firm going public does not have built its own 
reputation, the founder’s reputation can help attract new equity capital. In their 
comparison of German and Spanish family IPOs, Jaskiewicz et al. (2005) advocate that 
aside from the first generation, family conflicts may become more severe resulting in 
lower performance. They find a negative relationship between the age of family IPOs 
and long-run performance, which supports the assumption of generational conflicts. 
Moreover, the greater entrepreneurial orientation of first generation could help the 
firm in a transition stage such as IPO. These arguments lead to our next hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 3. The positive effect of family involvement is stronger in the first 
generation of family IPOs. 
 
2.3. Data and sample 
2.3.1 Dataset 
To test our hypotheses, this study includes all firms that went public for the first time 
on the Milan Stock Exchange via an IPO in the period 2000-2011. The choice to start 
our analysis from 2000 was dictated by two main reasons. First, the introduction of the 
Code of Corporate Governance, issued by the Italian Stock Exchange in 1999. The logic 
behind this is straightforward: the recommendations of the Code profoundly influence 
board composition and manager nomination including family members. Moreover, we 
selected this observation period to avoid any potential bias due to the good stock market 
index trend and the increasing public incentives3 (e.g. tax benefit granted by the 
Tremonti law) in the period 1995-1999 (Bonardo et al., 2007). 
The sample includes 170 firms. Following prior studies conducted in our research 
context (e.g. Chahine and Filatotchev, 2008), we excluded firms in the financial sector 
(SIC code: 6000 - 6799, for 23 observations). The sample is also purified of foreign 
firms (3 observations) as we intend to investigate the IPO value of Italian firms. We also 
excluded 31 observations, as we were unable to obtain the IPO prospectuses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 Italy underwent several reforms during this period. In the corporate governance regime, the most 
important is the “Draghi reform” introduced in 1998. This legal intervention fosters minority protection 
and improves the overall quality of corporate governance. For a complete analysis of these legal changes, see 
Mengoli et al. (2009). 
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TABLE I. Sample selection process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As shown in Table I, our final sample consists of 113 observations and accounts for 
77% of total IPOs issued in the selected period. All data were hand-collected via the 
IPO prospectus of each firm available on the Italian stock Exchange website. 
 
2.3.2 Dependent variables 
Certo et al. (2009) highlight the variety of measures used to proxy IPO value. We 
measure IPO value with the IPO premium (Mousa et al., 2013), which is the offering 
stock price in relation to firm book value per share. This measure has the merit of 
considering both accounting-based and stock price information (Nelson, 2003) 
including how much investors are inclined to pay over (or above) the accounting value 
of equity. In line with Mousa et al. (2013), we compute it (IPO_PRM) as follow:  
 
𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚1 =  (𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ) 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒⁄                         (1) 
 
Where Book Value is the book value (per share) of equity from the last audited pre-
IPO financial statement divided by the pre-IPO shares (resulting from the IPO 
prospectus). We also perform a sensitivity test4, unreported, by using closing price 
rather than offering price. 
By separately considering offer price and closing price (not jointly as in 
underpricing), we are able to capture different investor valuations (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995). With respect to the offer price, we assess the perceptions of pre-IPO 
investors as well as institutional investors. With respect to closing price, we consider the 
                                                          
4 Please see Appendix, Table A.IX, to check for results of sensitivity tests conducted with closing price.  
IPOs in the period (2000-2011) 170 
Financial Industry Firms (SIC 60-67) (23) 
Foreign Firms (3) 
Firms with Missing Data (31) 
Final Sample 113 
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perceptions of the stock market as a whole. These measures have the advantage of 
incorporating an objective measure of a firm’s asset base as they both consider the book 
value of equity.  
Certo et al. (2009) caution researchers to also consider other proxies to capture 
short-term performance. We embrace this suggestion and employ a third measure to 
account for IPO value. As in prior literature, we use the Market to Book value 
(Astrachan and McConaughy, 2001; Roosenboom and Van Der Goot, 2003). This 
measure captures relative value: higher quality IPOs are expected to have higher values. 
The ratio (M/B) is operationalized as follow: 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1𝑠𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑦) (𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)⁄           (2) 
 
Where the first-day market capitalization is equal to the number of post-IPO shares 
multiplied by the closing price on the first trading day. The equity book value is the 
post-issue value of equity and sums the book value of the last audited pre-IPO financial 
statement with the primary offering proceeds. This measure has previously been used to 
analyse Italian IPOs (Mazzola and Marchisio, 2002). 
 
2.3.3 Independent variables 
2.3.3.1 Family firm definition 
To address our research question, the definition of family-owned IPO is essential. 
Pindado and Requejo (2014) stress the paradox that when considering family impact on 
performance the great variation in results depends on the different definitions of family 
business used. We define as family firms those where two conditions exist 
simultaneously. First, one or more members of the family must control at last 30% of 
voting rights and second, one or more members of the family must be involved in the 
top management team. If both conditions take place simultaneously, the variable 
(FAM_30) is equal to one, zero otherwise. Not focusing only on ownership 
concentration allows us to examine family-owned and family-influenced firms. Firms 
that go public must disclose the presence of key figures and strategic managers (such as 
sales managers, managing directors and assurance managers) together with a short 
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version of their CV. We define the top management team (hereafter TMT) as the board 
of directors plus key figures and managers and thus carefully identify family members 
(related through blood or marriage). Previous international literature generally 
considers a threshold of 20%. Bearing in mind the massive block holding presence in 
Italy, scholars suggest that 50% ownership is required to achieve control in private firms 
while 25% ownership is required for listed companies (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 
2000). Following this criteria, Cascino et al. (2010) define family-owned companies as 
those where the family holds 50% of the voting rights or outstanding shares. However, 
according to the Italian “Decreto Legislativo 58/1998”, a level of 30% is required for a 
tender offer. Minichilli et al. (2010) rely on this threshold to define family firms. In 
response to these different interpretations, we conceptualize family firm status by using 
a threshold of 30% but we also perform different sensitivity tests considering a 
threshold of 20% and 50%5.  
2.3.3.2 Family involvement definition 
We use several measure to capture family involvement. First, as demographic 
approach suggests (e.g. Basco, 2013) we define FAM_BOARD as the ratio of family 
members who sit on the board of directors over total board members. Second, we 
expand the above measure using FAM_TMT: this is a continuous variable equal to the 
number of family members who serve as top managers over the total number of top 
managers (Minichilli et al., 2010). On one hand, stewardship theorists highlight that the 
participation of family managers in the firm’s activities has a positive impact on 
performance and fosters shared objectives (Chirico et al., 2011). On the other hand, we 
recognize that a part of literature suggests that the appointment of family managers 
could be detrimental and constitutes a cost for other shareholders (Kotlar and De 
Massis, 2013) leading to opportunistic behaviours determining how family managers 
use firm resources (Miller et al., 2008). In light of this, we use a third variable, 
FAM_EMP: this is the ratio of family managers (considering TMT) over the number of 
total family members employed at all levels in the firm (Campopiano et al., 2014). In 
accordance with Stark and Falk (1998), under the stewardship framework it is plausible 
                                                          
5 Please see Appendix, Table A.IX, to check for empirical results of sensitivity tests. 
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to assume that each family employer acts as a de facto owner of the firm (in spite of 
having a residual claim on the family’s estate rather than a salary). 
 
2.3.3.3 Family generation 
In order to test Hypothesis 3, we capture the generation involved in management 
through three variables. FAM_GEN1 is a dummy variable equals to one only if the first 
and founding generation of the family runs the company. FAM_GEN2 is a binary 
variable that assumes the value of one if the family business is in hands of the second 
generation. FAM_GEN3 takes on the value one if the third, or the forth and so on, 
generation of family members is involved in the management and governance of the 
firm and zero otherwise.  
 
2.3.3.4 Control variables 
First, we use the standard controls of size, leverage and age. Size (SIZE) is equal to 
the sales logarithm. In line with Leitterstorf and Rau (2014), we expect a negative 
association between this variable and our proxies of IPO value. Leverage (LEV) is equal 
to book value of non equity-liabilities on book value of total asset. Since leverage could 
reduce managerial discretion, we assume a positive sign. Both variables use data 
referring to the last audited pre-IPO financial statement. Age (AGE) is a continuous 
variable computed as the difference between the IPO date and the founding year6 in the 
prospectus; this variable is an ex-ante proxy for risk.  
Following prior studies (e.g. Chahine and Goergen, 2013), we use a High-Tech 
dummy (HIGH_TECH) to control for industry sectors and define the “technology 
sector” - in line Kim et al. (2008) - using SIC codes (283, 357,366, 367, 318, 382, 384, 
48, 737). The binary variable is equal to one if the firm belongs to the technology sector, 
zero otherwise. Chahine and Goergen (2013) emphasize that high technology firms are 
typically identified as those with great growth potential and tend to receive higher 
market valuations. We thus predict a positive sign. 
                                                          
6 We compute days and months as a fraction of the year. In the analysis, we use the natural logarithm of 
(AGE). 
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Accounting literature recognizes the influence of auditor reputation on IPO price 
(Beatty, 1989). We codify the audit dummy (BIG5_AUDIT), which takes value one if 
the Auditor is one of the Big 5 (KMPG; Deloitte; PriceWaterHouseCoopers; Ernst & 
Young; Arthur Andersen), zero otherwise. Auditor reputation should reassure investors 
about their investments and we thus assume a positive association with IPO value.   
In Italy, the shares offered at listing may originate from a capital increase (OPS, 
Offerta Pubblica di Sottoscrizione) or may be existing shares sold by existing 
shareholders (OPV, Offerta Pubblica di Vendita) or both (OPVS, Offerta Pubblica di 
Vendita e di Sottoscrizione). In order to consider this diversity, we define IPO_SELL as 
a dummy variable that is equal to one if the IPO is an OPS, zero otherwise. We do not 
predict any signs for this variable.  
Krishnan et al. (2011) acknowledges a fundamental role to venture capitalists: we 
employ a dichotomous variable that is VC. It equals one if the firm is venture-backed, 
zero otherwise. The market positively evaluate their presence by assigning a positive 
value to venture backed IPOs (Astrachan and McConaughy, 2001). We predict a 
positive sign for this variable.  
We also include the ratio of independent directors (INDEP_DIR) to total board size. 
We use the concept of independent director given in the Italian Code of Governance 
(Codice di Autodisciplina) provided by the Milan Stock Exchange. This code explicitly 
indicates evaluating form over substance when defining independent directors. We 
expect a positive relation between this ratio and IPO value.  
Furthermore, we codify CEO_DUAL as a dichotomous variable equal to one if the 
Chairman is also the CEO, zero otherwise. In accordance with stewardship theory, we 
predict a positive sign. 
Table II provides the descriptive statistics for the selected variables for the entire 
sample. 
Panel A shows the overall distribution of IPOs during the period we consider7, it 
shows the firms’ descriptive statistics. By applying our definition of family firms, we 
                                                          
7 We also take into account the potential effect of different economic cycles in three ways. First, we add year 
dummies with no changes on our results. Second, considered the period of our analysis (2000-2011) we 
perform an additional test to account for financial crisis (2007-2008). Such crisis had profoundly influenced 
corporate governance and firm value (Liu, Uchida and Yang, 2012). In line with Ivashina and Scharfstein 
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make inference on 77 family owned IPOs and 36 non-family counterparts. 64 IPOs 
belong to the technological sector (HIGH_TECH). As this is easily observable, the 
quota of shares offered at listing is always a minority stake. Panel B and Panel C offer 
the sample breakdown by ownership type. Non-family IPOs are larger than family 
counterparts and they tend to sell a larger part of shares. 
Table III describes the sample in all the variables used. These statistics reveal that 
the big five audit firms advise approximately 82% of IPOs. We also recognize a low 
presence of venture capitalists. Among other things, of interest is that 50 out of 113 
firms adopted a dual CEO structure before going public; at the same time, we note a low 
presence of independent directors, which is mainly due to the strict definition that we 
adopt. We perform t-test for difference in mean of firm characteristics: the results 
indicate that there are not statistically significant differences.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(2010), we consider that financial crisis started in august 2007: looking at our sample, we can notice that 
around 83% of IPOs were issued before that date; only nineteen firms went public after financial crisis. We 
create a dummy variable (T_CRISIS) equals to one if the IPOs were launched before crisis, zero otherwise. 
Our results are robust again this variable. Finally, in line with prior researches (e.g. Leitterstorf and Rau, 
2014), in an unreported regression we also adopt a dummy variable equal to 1 if the IPO was held in 2000. 
We use this variable to account for overly optimistic investors (Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002). We did not 
register any changes and this analysis is qualitatively similar to those reported in the article. Please see the 
appendix, Tables A. X, A.XI and A.XII for empirical results. 
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TABLE II.A Yearly distribution of IPOs 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Yearly distribution of IPOs, entire sample 
Year 
# 
IPO 
Family 
 Non 
Family 
 High 
Tech 
MVE €/000 
 
FLOATING EQUITY 
     Mean Median Percentiles  Mean Median Percentiles 
       
25th 75th  
  
25th 75th 
2000 25 80% 20% 72,0% 382.438,441  200.000,000  146.919,600  411.400,000   24,5% 24,1% 20,9% 28,0% 
2001 13 46% 54% 69,2% 764.821,925  373.559,666  230.070,000  544.000,000   34,1% 33,2% 25,0% 41,9% 
2002 3 67% 33% 33,3% 231.455,730  247.500,000  194.625,000  276.308,595   36,0% 36,4% 34,2% 37,9% 
2003 4 50% 50% 50,0% 360.271,928  193.435,557  74.717,029  478.990,455   39,8% 40,7% 35,9% 44,6% 
2004 6 83% 17% 33,3% 864.856,620  243.836,880  115.105,410  954.825,000   34,3% 32,9% 26,9% 41,1% 
2005 9 56% 44% 33,3% 325.714,382  82.977,933  62.562,500  439.368,160   40,2% 40,0% 35,0% 48,6% 
2006 18 72% 28% 77,8% 593.352,621  305.307,000  72.164,282  393.987,000   33,1% 33,0% 31,1% 36,6% 
2007 20 75% 25% 55,0% 470.954,649  278.065,614  125.850,856  490.625,000   33,7% 32,3% 30,3% 36,4% 
2008 4 75% 25% 50,0% 79.750,357  33.547,821  30.446,731  82.851,447   25,6% 25,1% 21,3% 29,4% 
2009 2 0% 100% 50,0% 150.197,210  150.197,210  120.886,130  179.508,289   28,5% 28,5% 17,6% 39,3% 
2010 6 67% 33% 16,7% 1.363.861,641  43.072,724  18.717,227  69.453,933   24,2% 21,7% 11,6% 30,4% 
2011 3 67% 33% 0,0% 515.910,000  24.480,000  16.020,000  770.085,000   26,4% 22,7% 19,7% 31,2% 
TOTAL 113 68% 32% 56,6% 532.826,601  224.964,000  74.958,800  446.900,000   31,3% 31,7% 25,0% 36,7% 
Notes: The Table reports the number of IPOs, the percentage of family and non-family firms, the percentage of high technology firms, the market 
capitalization and the flotation capital.  We define family firms if two conditions take place simultaneously: first, one or more members of family 
(people related through blood or marriage) must control, at last, 30% of voting rights and second, one or more members of family must be involved in 
the top management team. The high technology firms belong to a sector with following SIC code: 283, 357,366, 367, 318, 382, 384, 48, 737. The 
market value of equity (MVE) is the capitalization of firm at IPO price. All data are corrected for inflation (basis year 2011). The flotation is the quota 
of shares offered in subscription at IPO stage. 
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TABLE II.B Yearly distribution of IPOs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Yearly distribution of IPOs, family firms 
Year # IPO High_tech MVE €/000  FLOATING EQUITY 
   
Mean Median Percentiles  Mean Median Percentiles 
  25th 75th    25th 75th 
2000 20 75,0% 384.251,915  212.482,000  164.035,350  402.465,625   24,4% 23,4% 21,1% 26,1% 
2001 6 50,0% 450.211,963  390.212,200  268.147,034   519.862,100   34,9% 33,5% 30,5% 41,6% 
2002 2 50,0% 223.433,595  223.433,595  182.591,798  264.275,393   34,2% 34,2% 33,2% 35,3% 
2003 2 50,0% 72.674,058  72.674,058  70.631,088  74.717,029   46,5% 46,5% 44,6% 48,3% 
2004 5 40,0% 357.827,944  235.673,760  74.915,960  252.000,000   32,5% 32,0% 25,2% 33,9% 
2005 5 20,0% 497.105,527  439.368,160  62.562,500  560.070,000   35,0% 35,0% 25,8% 40,0% 
2006 13 69,2% 695.068,815  294.000,000  81.702,128  381.684,000   30,3% 32,3% 25,9% 35,1% 
2007 15 60,0% 310.381,167  225.731,228  119.050,004   443.543,133   33,9% 32,1% 30,8% 35,7% 
2008 3 33,3% 31.465,214  31.495,642  29.397,821  33.547,821   25,8% 25,2% 17,7% 33,7% 
2009 0 0,0% -    -      -      -    0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
2010 4 25,0% 43.747,961  43.072,724  28.376,488   58.444,198   21,4% 12,8% 10,5% 23,7% 
2011 2 0,0% 770.085,000  770.085,000  397.282,500  1.142.887,500   19,7% 19,7% 18,2% 21,2% 
TOTAL 77 55,8% 399.407,303  224.964,000  74.958,800  439.368,160   29,9% 30,4% 24,1% 35,0% 
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TABLE II.C Yearly distribution of IPOs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Yearly distribution of IPOs, non- family firms 
Year # IPO High_tech MVE €/000  FLOATING EQUITY 
   Mean Median Percentiles  Mean Median Percentiles 
   
  25th 75th    25th 75th 
2000 5 60,0%   375.184,545  173.751,500  119.600,000  600.000,000   24,9% 26,7% 20,0% 29,4% 
2001 7 85,7% 1.034.487,606  373.559,666  70.963,038  594.613,750   33,4% 33,2% 25,0% 38,4% 
2002 1 0,0% 247.500,000  247.500,000  247.500,000  247.500,000   39,4% 39,4% 39,4% 39,4% 
2003 2 50,0% 647.869,798  647.869,798  478.990,455  816.749,140   33,1% 33,1% 30,3% 35,9% 
2004 1 0,0% 3.400.000,000  3.400.000,000  3.400.000,000  3.400.000,000   43,5% 43,5% 43,5% 43,5% 
2005 4 50,0% 111.475,450  73.151,970  52.963,255  131.664,165   46,6% 47,5% 43,8% 50,3% 
2006 5 100,0% 328.890,514  337.379,570  68.985,000  398.088,000   40,2% 40,0% 36,7% 40,6% 
2007 5 40,0% 952.675,095  766.665,975  137.700,000  1.039.906,100   33,1% 35,4% 26,3% 40,0% 
2008 1 100,0% 224.605,787  224.605,787  224.605,787  224.605,787   25,0% 25,0% 25,0% 25,0% 
2009 2 50,0% 150.197,210  150.197,210  120.886,130  179.508,289   28,5% 28,5% 17,6% 39,3% 
2010 2 0,0% 4.004.089,000  4.004.089,000  2.006.133,500  6.002.044,500   29,7% 29,7% 29,0% 30,4% 
2011 1 0,0% 7.560,000  7.560,000  7.560,000  7.560,000   39,7% 39,7% 39,7% 39,7% 
TOTAL 36 58,3% 818.195,656  236.052,894  73.621,307  769.999,481   34,5% 35,4% 26,6% 40,9% 
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TABLE III. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total sample, n=113  Family firms, n=77  Non-family firms, n=36  Mean 
T-Test  
 
 Mean Median Percentiles S.D.  Mean Median Percentiles S.D.  Mean Median Percentiles S.D. 
 
 
  25 th 75 th 
 
   25 th 75 th 
 
   25 th 75 th 
 
 p-value 
FIRM 
CHARACTERISTICHS   
   
 
     
 
     
 
 
SIZE 11,37 11,55 10,20 12,35 1,72  11,30 11,36 10,42 12,24 1,49  11,52 11,77 9,91 12,91 2,14  0,64 
LEVERAGE 0,70 0,72 0,59 0,82 0,18  0,71 0,73 0,62 0,84 0,18  0,66 0,69 0,55 0,77 0,18  0,16 
AGE 2,27 2,57 1,61 3,00 1,10  2,40 2,64 1,79 3,00 1,02  1,99 2,30 1,00 2,86 1,23  0,09 
HIGH_TECH  0,57 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,50  0,56 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,50  0,58 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,50  0,81 
BIG5_AUDIT 0,82 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,38  0,82 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,39  0,83 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,38  0,84 
IPO_SELL 0,88 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,33  0,90 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,30  0,83 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,39  0,39 
VC  0,32 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,47  0,32 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,47  0,33 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,23  0,93 
INDEP_DIR 0,26 0,25 0,18 0,33 0,17  0,26 0,25 0,20 0,33 0,14  0,25 0,27 0,08 0,40 0,22  0,74 
CEO_DUAL 0,44 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,50  0,47 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,50  0,39 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,49  0,44 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES      
 
     
 
     
 
 
IPO_PRM 0,723 0,79 0,63 0,91 0,25  0,77 0,84 0,67 0,93 0,21  0,63 0,70 0,53 0,83 0,30  0,01 
M/B 4,26 2,67 1,98 4,69 5,74  4,85 3,05 2,06 5,18 6,61  2,99 2,38 1,86 3,20 2,65  0,03 
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TABLE III. Descriptive statistics. Continued 
 
Total sample, n=113  Family firms, n=77  Non-family firms, n=36  Mean 
T-Test  
 
 Mean Median Percentiles S.D.  Mean Median Percentiles S.D.  Mean Median Percentiles S.D. 
 
 
  25 th 75 th 
 
   25 th 75 th 
 
   25 th 75 th 
 
 p-value 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES      
 
     
 
     
 
 
FAM_30  0,68 1,00 0,00 1,00 0,47  
     
 
    
  
 
FAM_BOARD 0,20 0,18 0,00 0,33 0,19  
     
 
    
  
 
FAM_TMT 0,22 0,20 0,00 0,38 0,22  
     
 
    
  
 
FAM_EMP 0,23 0,22 0,00 0,39 0,20  
     
 
    
  
 
FAM_GEN1  0,32 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,47  
     
 
    
  
 
FAM_GEN2  0,30 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,46  
     
 
    
  
 
FAM_GEN3  0,11 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,31  
 
 
   
 
     
 
 Notes: SIZE is the natural logarithm of sales; LEVERAGE is the ratio of Book Value of non-Equity Liabilities on book value of Total Asset; Both SIZE and LEVERAGE refer 
to last pre-IPO financial (audited) statement. AGE is difference between the IPO year and the founding year in the prospectus: in the analyses we employ the natural 
logarithm. HIGH_TECH is a binary variable equals to one if the firm belong to a sector with following SIC code (283, 357, 365, 366, 367, 376, 382, 384, 48, 737, and 8731; 
zero otherwise. BIG5_AUDIT is a binary variable equals to one if IPO advisor is one of Big 5 (KMPG; Deloitte; PriceWaterHouseCoopers; Ernst&Young; Arthur Andersen); 
zero otherwise. IPO_SELL is a dichotomous variable that take value 1 if the shares offered in subscription are originate from a capital increase (Offerta Pubblica di 
Sottoscrizione). VC is a dummy variable: it assumes value 1 if the firm is Venture-backed. INDEP_DIR is the ratio of independent directors to number of total directors. We 
do not develop this ratio upon the concept of “outside” or “not affiliated” directors: we identify “independent directors” in accordance with strictly definition of Italian Law; 
we are able to following this criterion because firms are obligated to disclose this information in IPO prospectus.  IPO_PRM  is the offering price minus the book value of 
equity over the offering price. The book value of equity is per shares; data are from last (pre-IPO) audited financial statement. M/B is the first day market capitalization over 
book value of equity. Where the first-day market capitalization is equals to the number of post-IPO shares multiplied by the closing price on the first trading day; the equity 
book value is the post-issue value of equity: it sums the book value of last audited pre-IPO financial statement with the primary offering proceeds. This measure has already 
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been used to analyse Italian IPOs (Mazzola and Marchisio, 2002). 
In line with prior literature, we maintain that family ownership is not sufficient to classify a firm as family owned (e.g. Jaskiewicz et al., 2005); in response to this issue we 
evaluate also family involvement in managerial positions (FAM_30). We define family firms if two conditions take place simultaneously: first, one or more members of family 
(people related through blood or marriage) must control, at last, 30% of voting rights and second, one or more members of family must be involved in the top management 
team. FAM_BOARD is the ratio of family members who seat in the board, over total board members. FAM_TMT is the ratio of family managers from TMT over TMT size. 
We delineate the TMT as board of directors plus key figures and managers: by this way, we are able to carefully identify family members (people related through blood or 
marriage). Our choice is related to the fact that firms that go public must disclose the presence of key figures and strategic managers (such as sales manager, administrative 
director, quality and assurance manager) reporting also a short version of their Curriculum Vitae. FAM_EMP is defined in accordance with Campopiano et al. (2014). It is the 
ratio of family managers (considering TMT) over the number of total family members employed, at all levels, in the firm. This variable is particularly meaningful over 
stewardship assumptions. FAM_GEN1 is a binary variable equals to one if the founding generation runs the firm. FAM_GEN2 is a binary variable that assumes the value of 
one if the family business is in the second generation; FAM_GEN3 is equals to one if latter generations are involved. 
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Family participation shows that family managers account for less than 25% of total 
family involvement (this result does not change if we consider board level, top 
management level or employee level). However, we observe a lower level of family 
involvement when we consider the board of directors, which may suggest that families 
exercise their power not only at the top level. In the last set of demographic variables, 
we find that 36 IPOs are managed by the founding generation (FAM_GEN1), 34 
family-owned firms are in the second generation (FAM_GEN2) while the rest of the 
family IPOs are governed by subsequent generations (FAM_GEN3).  
In Table IV we report the correlation among variables. The Pearson (Spearman) 
correlation coefficients do not evidence serious multicollinearity problems. We also 
control, in an unreported analysis, for spurious relationships. A covariance provides 
explanation of how one variable may change in relation to another one. We run an 
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to test if the variance in the dependent variable may 
be explained by other variables than familism. The test of parallelism is not significant; 
we therefore accept the hypothesis of parallelism and conclude that we have no evidence 
of an interaction between FAM_30 and other factors and covariate. 
In line with prior literature on IPO performance (e.g. Chahine and Filatotchev, 
2008), we estimate ordinary least-squares regressions to examine the relationship 
between IPO firm value and family demographic variables. The model reads as: 
 
𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽4𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻_𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑃𝑂_𝑇𝑌𝑃𝐸 +
𝛽7𝑉𝐶 +  𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑃_𝐷𝐼𝑅 + 𝛽9𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 + 𝛽10𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖                             (3)
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TABLE IV. Correlation matrix 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
IPO_PRM (1) 
1 
            
M/B (2) 
0.3212* 
(0.8008*) 
1 
          
SIZE (3) 
-0.2813* 
(-0.3931*) 
0.0297 
-(0.2291*) 
1 
         
LEVERAGE (4) 
0.3457* 
(0.4056*) 
0.2344* 
(0.2398*) 
0.0280 
(-0.0008) 
1 
        
AGE (5) 
-0.0414 
(-0.1484) 
-0.0980 
(-0.0497) 
0.1956* 
(0.1396) 
-0.0150 
(-0.0026) 
1 
       
HIGH_TECH (6) 
0.0503 
(0.1071) 
-0.0284 
(0.0591) 
-0.0882 
(-0.1215) 
0.0337 
(0.0753) 
-0.0135 
(-0.0252) 
1 
      
BIG5_AUDIT (7) 
0.0212 
(0.0818) 
0.0342 
(0.0100) 
0.2256* 
(0.2744*) 
0.0150 
(0.0238) 
0.0951 
(0.1241) 
0.0153 
(0.0153) 
1 
     
IPO_SELL (8) 
0.1029 
(0.1285) 
-0.0809 
(-0.1565) 
-0.2432* 
(-0.2783*) 
0.1289 
(0.1561) 
0.0411 
(0.0536) 
0.1046 
(0.1046) 
-0.0336 
(-0.0336) 
1 
    
VC (9) 
-0.1359 
(-0.2111*) 
0.0008 
(-0.1353) 
0.0545 
(0.0330) 
0.0442 
(0.0173) 
0.0751 
(0.0599) 
-0.0744 
(-0.0744) 
0.0271 
(0.0271) 
-0.0238 
(-0.0238) 
1 
   
INDEP_DIR (10) 
0.1634 
(0.2927*) 
0.0999 
(0.1746) 
-0.1045 
(-0.1424) 
0.1286 
(0.1750) 
-0.0049 
(-0.0551) 
0.1522 
(0.1711) 
0.1430 
(0.1969*) 
0.1542 
(0.1764) 
0.0345 
(0.0432) 
1 
  
CEO_DUAL (11) 
0.1198 
(0.1445) 
0.0717 
(0.0273) 
-0.2339* 
(-0.2463*) 
0.0316 
(0.0702) 
-0.2366* 
(-0.2485*) 
-0.1553 
(-0.1553) 
0.0397 
(0.0397) 
0.1728 
(0.1728) 
-0.0900 
(-0.0900) 
-0.0315 
(-0.0444) 
1 
 
FAM_30 (12) 
0.2684* 
(0.2554*) 
0.1621 
(0.2568*) 
0.0544 
(-0.0437) 
0.1331 
(0.1512) 
0.1689 
(0.1527) 
-0.0234 
(-0.0234) 
-0.0185 
(-0.0185) 
0.0888 
(0.0888) 
-0.0086 
(-0.0086) 
0.0372 
(0.0644) 
0.0738 
(0.0738) 
1 
FAM_BOARD (13) 
0.2798* 
(0.2705*) 
0.0703 
(0.2959*) 
0.0621 
(-0.0144) 
0.1323 
(0.1962*) 
0.1685 
(0.1756) 
0.0658 
(0.0707) 
-0.1234 
(-0.1170) 
0.1219 
(0.1155) 
-0.1271 
(-0.1119) 
-0.0471 
(0.0043) 
0.0838 
(0.1005) 
0.6305* 
(0.7006*) 
FAM_TMT (14) 0.2504* 0.1064 0.0438 0.1291 0.1634 0.0112 -0.1071 0.0953 -0.1252 -0.0416 0.0919 0.7493* 
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(0.2313*) (0.2755*) (-0.0364) (0.1650) (0.1651) (-0.0076) (-0.1048) (0.0936) (-0.1001) (0.0052) (0.0934) (0.8266*) 
FAM_EMP (15) 
0.2476* 
(0.2198*) 
0.1029 
(0.2711*) 
0.0624 
(-0.0128) 
0.1029 
(0.1372) 
0.1693 
(0.1691) 
-0.0008 
(-0.0143) 
-0.1037 
(-0.1054) 
0.0902 
(0.0866) 
-0.1184 
(-0.0955) 
-0.0366 
(-0.0061) 
0.0853 
(0.0897) 
0.7883* 
(0.8279*) 
FAM_GEN1 (16) 
0.3464* 
(0.3841*) 
0.1680 
(0.2626*) 
-0.2053* 
(-0.3319*) 
0.0504 
(0.1005) 
-0.1280 
(-0.1891*) 
0.1001 
(0.1001) 
0.0185 
(0.0185) 
0.0842 
(0.0842) 
-0.0724 
(-0.0724) 
0.1206 
(0.1700) 
0.1557 
(0.1557) 
0.3045* 
(0.3045*) 
FAM_GEN2 (17) 
0.0574 
(0.0050) 
0.0296 
(0.1041) 
0.0846 
(0.0822) 
0.1325 
(0.1257) 
0.2207* 
(0.2697*) 
0.0289 
(0.0289) 
-0.1002 
(-0.1002) 
0.0124 
(0.0124) 
0.0357 
(0.0357) 
-0.0351 
(-0.0633) 
-0.0794 
(-0.0794) 
0.4072* 
(0.4072*) 
FAM_GEN3 (18) 
-0.1280 
(-0.1229) 
-0.07778 
(0.1294) 
0.2721* 
(0.3003*) 
-0.0946 
(-0.0806) 
0.1661 
(0.1688) 
-0.1041 
(-0.1041) 
0.1598 
(0.1598) 
0.0424 
(0.0424) 
-0.0569 
(-0.0569) 
-0.0415 
(-0.0181) 
-0.0179 
(-0.0179) 
0.2357* 
(0.2357*) 
Notes: This table provides Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients. * denotes statistically significant coefficients at 5% level of significance. See Table III for variable definitions.  
 
TABLE IV. Continued 
 
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
FAM_BOARD (13) 
 
1 
     
FAM_TMT (14) 
0.9435* 
(0.9229*) 
1 
    
FAM_EMP (15) 
0.9259* 
(0.9171*) 
0.9792* 
(0.9821*) 
1 
   
FAM_GEN1 (16) 
-0.0750 
(0.0136) 
-0.0493 
(0.0036) 
-0.0226 
(0.0021) 
1 
  
FAM_GEN2 (17) 
0.5841* 
(0.5807*) 
0.5421* 
(0.5526*) 
0.5337* 
(0.5413*) 
-0.4486* 
-0.4486* 
1 
 
FAM_GEN3 (18) 
0.1917* 
(0.1969*) 
0.2433* 
(0.2485*) 
0.2663* 
(0.2692*) 
-0.2357* 
-0.2357* 
-0.2261* 
(-0.2261*) 
1 
Notes: This table provides Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients. * denotes statistically significant 
coefficients at 5% level of significance. See Table III for variable definitions. See Table III for variable definitions 
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We estimate equation (3) using White’s heteroskedasticity consistent estimator 
(Greene, 2003). IPO value is alternatively measured by IPO_PRM or M/B. Family 
demographic is the set of variables we use to test our three hypotheses. In line with 
Leitterstorf and Rau (2014), we use a hierarchical approach (separately regressing each 
variable of interest) as our variables measure different aspects of the same phenomenon 
(being a family-owned IPO) and jointly disentangle family firm heterogeneity. In order 
to test Hypothesis 1, we regress the IPO value on FAM_30 and shed light on the impact 
of family involvement on IPO value (Hypothesis 2) by using FAM_BOARD, 
FAM_TMT and FAM_EMP. Finally, we investigate hypothesis 3 with FAM_GEN1, 
FAM_GEN2 and FAM_GEN3, used in the same regression. All other control variables 
are as defined above. 
 
2.4 Results and discussion 
In Table V (columns I and II), we regress IPO value solely on the control variables: 
the first model (1a) provides evidences obtained from using IPO_PRM, the second (1b) 
concerns the M/B as a dependent variable. In terms of the predicted signs, all 
independent variables show the same results, when statistically significant, in the 
different IPO values.  
Table V shows a negative association between size (-.050, p<0.01 model 1a; .361, 
p<0.01 model 1b) and IPO value, in line with Roosenboom and van der Goot (2003) 
and Leitterstorf and Rau (2014). Regarding this variable, Baron (1982) shows that 
larger firms are more difficult to market: size negatively influences investor perceptions. 
The level of debt is positively associated with our dependent variable (.375 p<0.01 
model 1a; 1.772, p<0.05 model 1b), as previous findings suggest (Chahine and 
Goergen, 2013; Yu and Zheng, 2012; Hearn, 2011, Kim et al., 2008). In the IPO 
context, Bruton et al. (2010) show that a higher level of debt mitigates possible 
managerial opportunisms. As predicted, Age enters the equation with a negative sign 
(only for models 1a), but with no statistical significance. This implies that the market 
does not distinguish between young and old firms. In line with prior literature (e.g. 
Chahine and Filatotchev, 2008), we find that the high-tech dummy positively affects 
IPO value. However, this variable is not statistically significant.  
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TABLE V. Regression estimates of the relationship between IPO value and Family Firm 
status 
 
  
Model 1a 
(I) 
Model 1b 
(II) 
Model 2a 
(III) 
Model 2b 
(IV) 
Variable Predicted Sign y= IPO_PRM y= M/B y= IPO_PRM y= M/B 
INTERCEPT  
1.024*** 
(0.131) 
5.215*** 
(1.298) 
1.005*** 
(0.122) 
4.804*** 
(1.300) 
SIZE - 
-0.050*** 
(0.010) 
-0.361*** 
(0.102) 
-0.043*** 
(0.009) 
-0.343*** 
(0.102) 
LEVERAGE + 
0.375*** 
(0.085) 
1.772** 
(0.846) 
0.276*** 
(0.079) 
1.527* 
(0.851) 
AGE - 
-0.021 
(0.016) 
0.101 
(0.157) 
-0.030** 
(0.015) 
0.054 
(0.159) 
HIGH_TECH + 
0.008 
(0.032) 
0.265 
(0.318) 
0.009 
(0.030) 
0.302 
(0.318) 
BIG5_AUDIT + 
0.085** 
(0.043) 
0.747* 
(0.424) 
0.085** 
(0.040) 
0.731* 
(0.423) 
IPO_SELL +/- 
0.063 
(0.049) 
1.250** 
(0.490) 
0.048 
(0.046) 
1.289*** 
(0.490) 
VC + 
-0.086*** 
(0.033) 
-0.583* 
(0.327) 
-0.096*** 
(0.030) 
-0.604* 
(0.326) 
INDEP_DIR + 
0.187** 
(0.093) 
-0.718 
(0.513) 
0.171* 
(0.087) 
-0.585 
(0.514) 
CEO_DUAL + 
0.0040 
(0.034) 
-0.278 
(0.337) 
-0.004 
(0.031) 
-0.307 
(0.337) 
FAM_30    
0.068** 
(0.032) 
0.663* 
(0.338) 
R2  0.374 0.193 0.380 0.213 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistically significant coefficients at 1, 5 and 10% level of 
significance.  White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in 
parentheses. N=113. 
In column I we regress IPO_PRM on: Size, Leverage, Age, High technology status, Audit 
quality, typology of IPO, Venture Capitalists’ presence, Independent board members and 
CEO duality. In column II we use M/B to proxy IPO value. In columns III and IV, we 
present the results about first hypothesis. We regress two proxies for IPO value (namely: 
IPO_PRM and M/B) on the proxy for family firm status.  
See Table III for variable definitions. 
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We can highlight that the advisory dummy positively affects IPO value (.085, p<0.05 
model 1a; .747, p<0.1 model 1b), in line with Yu and Zheng (2012). Contrary to our 
prediction, the presence of a Venture Capitalist is negatively related to short-term IPO 
value (-.086, p<0.01 model 1a; -.583, p<0.1 model 1b). Literature (Brav and Gompers, 
1997; Florin and Simsek, 2007) recognizes the VC’s ability to monitor board outcomes: 
as a result, VC-baked IPOs are less underpriced. However, contradictory studies (Lee 
and Wahal, 2004; Bruton et al., 2010) find that VCs are willing to accept greater 
underpricing in order to raise new capital from their investors. Thus, our result may be 
interpreted according to Arthurs et al.’s (2008) findings. They maintain that VC are 
simultaneously principal and agent with conflicting objectives. On one hand, VCs could 
be considered as agents in terms of their own investors who focus on the short-term and 
exert great pressure to obtain timely results. On the other hand, VCs face long-term 
pressure due to their own post-IPO orientation. Along the same lines, Bruton et al. 
(2010) prove that VCs negatively impact IPO performance, measured as the IPO 
premium. Our result may suggest that the focus of VCs shifts from the IPO to the 
investors in their capital. Table V shows that IPO_SELL is positively related but not 
always significant (1.250, p<0.05 model 1a). This implies that the stock market 
interprets whether existing shareholders retain equity by assigning higher value to OPS. 
Model 1 enables us to confirm the positive influence of independent directors (.187, 
p<0.05 model 1a) on firm valuation at listing. We obtain similar result to Roosenboom 
and van der Goot (2005). Regarding CEO duality, we are not able to conclude that this 
role could increase IPO value.  
Table V (columns III and IV) provides support for our main analyses. Consistent 
with expectations, we find a strong positive relationship between family status and IPO 
value. Model 2 examines its impact on IPO value considered with a 30% threshold. No 
matter how we compute IPO value, our results suggest that FAM_30 has a positive 
impact (.068, p<0.05 model 2a; .663, p<0.01 model 2b). We also consider two 
additional thresholds: 20% and 50%8; we repeat the analysis including a third ratio, 
                                                          
8 If we consider IPO_PRM as dependent variable, FAM_20 (dummy variable equals to 1 if family controls at 
last 20% of voting rights and, simultaneously, one or more family member is involved in TMT) is positively 
correlated (.098, p<0.01) as well as FAM_50 (.067, p<0.05). We repeat the analysis by employing M/B as 
dependent variable: FAM_20 (.741, p<0.05) and FAM_50 (.606, p<0.1) still offer same result.  
Chapter 1 - Does family involvement foster IPO value? Empirical analysis on Italian Stock Market 
 
44 
 
computed as IPO_PRM with closing price rather than offering price. No surprises were 
found in, these sensitivity analyses: results are robust to all different specifications. 
Overall, results from our model confirm Hypothesis 1. Within this analysis, we are able 
to assess how family IPOs differ from non-family counterparts. In evaluating this aspect, 
to be kept in mind is that we consider family-owned firms as a homogeneous group. 
However, our findings contradict previous evidences on Italian IPOs. In the case of 
Giovannini (2010), his analysis considers: a) only family firms, b) family-owned IPOs 
defined according to the F-PEC scale, c) small sample size (56 firms) and finally d) 
long-run performance. These elements make the comparison with our results difficult.  
Following the hierarchical approach (Leitterstorf and Rau, 2014), in Table VI we 
substitute family dummy with our proxies of family involvement. In this case, we take a 
deeper look at the demographic variable by considering family firms as a heterogeneous 
group. Model 3 provides evidence on family involvement at board level. In line with 
expectations, as family board members increase, the IPO value also increases (.196, 
p<0.05 model 3a; 2.366, p<0.01 model 3b). Nonetheless, we go beyond the analysis of 
board of directors and take into account the entire TMT. Model 4 reinforces the 
previous results: family members involved in TMT also positively influences IPO value 
(.150, p<0.1 model 4a; 1.999 p<0.05 model 4b). However, FAM_TMT has lower 
explanatory power compared to FAM_BOARD. The aforementioned result is coherent 
with Certo (2003) who proposes that board prestige and composition could influence 
investor decisions. While board structure is important non-financial information, the 
TMT structure may constitute information that is not directly observable by the stock 
market. In the last model, we make inference by using FAM_EMP. Also in this case, 
family involvement is positively related with our proxies of IPO value (.164, p<0.05 
model 5a; 2.212, p<0.01 model 5b). Our results are also the same if we conduct the 
sensitivity tests as in the precedent model (e.g. alternative IPO_PRM). The analysis 
leaves no doubts and Hypothesis 2 is verified.  
Our results also confirm Hypothesis 3. Unsurprisingly, in Table VII we find evidence 
that the greatest impact on IPO value is ascribable to the first generation: FAM_GEN1 
is positively related with all the dependent variables (.108, p<0.01 model 6a; .878, 
p<0.05 model 6b). Looking at FAM_GEN2, the results highlight that the impact of 
second family generation on IPO value depends on how the dependent variable is 
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computed. On one hand, if we consider IPO premium it seems that the market 
positively evaluates the presence of the second family generation involved in 
management (.090, p<0.05 model 6a); on the other hand, if we measure IPO value with 
M/B there is no statistical impact on the second generation. Instead, if subsequent 
family generations (3th and following) are involved in the business, no statistical 
significance is found on firm value at listing. Our findings are in line with prior 
literature. Le Bretton-Miller et al. (2011) suggest that stewardship attitude in family 
firms decreases when subsequent generations are involved in managerial positions.
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TABLE VI. Regression estimates of the relationship between IPO value and Family Involvement 
 
Model 3a 
(I) 
Model 3b 
(II) 
Model 4a 
(III) 
Model 4b 
(IV) 
Model 5a 
(V) 
Model 5b 
(VI) 
Variable y= IPO_PRM y= M/B y= IPO_PRM y= M/B y= IPO_PRM y= M/B 
INTERCEPT 
1.021*** 
(0.129) 
5.181*** 
(1.255) 
0.995*** 
(0.130) 
4.872*** 
(1.270) 
1.000*** 
(0.127) 
4.832*** 
(1.265) 
SIZE 
-0.051*** 
(0.010) 
-0.385*** 
(0.099) 
-0.048*** 
(0.010) 
-0.356*** 
(0.100) 
-0.047*** 
(0.010) 
-0.364*** 
(0.100) 
LEVERAGE 
0.330*** 
(0.085) 
1.580* 
(0.823) 
0.329*** 
(0.085) 
1.568* 
(0.833) 
0.306*** 
(0.083) 
1.660** 
(0.827) 
AGE 
-0.027* 
(0.016) 
0.025 
(0.155) 
-0.026 
(0.016) 
0.041 
(0.157) 
-0.029* 
(0.016) 
0.036 
(0.156) 
HIGH_TECH 
0.002 
(0.032) 
0.190 
(0.309) 
0.008 
(0.032) 
0.257 
(0.311) 
0.010 
(0.031) 
0.263 
(0.310) 
BIG5_AUDIT 
0.107** 
(0.043) 
0.938** 
(0.415) 
0.101** 
(0.043) 
0.879** 
(0.418) 
0.100** 
(0.042) 
0.888** 
(0.417) 
IPO_SELL 
0.074 
(0.049) 
1.396*** 
(0.476) 
0.065 
(0.049) 
1.356*** 
(0.480) 
0.060 
(0.048) 
1.365*** 
(0.479) 
VC 
-0.079** 
(0.033) 
-0.525 
(0.318) 
-0.081** 
(0.033) 
-0.522 
(0.322) 
-0.083** 
(0.032) 
-0.526 
(0.320) 
INDEP_DIR 
0.214** 
(0.093) 
-0.588 
(0.498) 
0.208** 
(0.093) 
-0.586 
(0.503) 
0.200** 
(0.090) 
-0.561 
(0.501) 
CEO_DUAL 
-0.007 
(0.034) 
-0.430 
(0.328) 
-0.003 
(0.034) 
-0.387 
(0.332) 
-0.003 
(0.033) 
-0.383 
(0.330) 
FAM_BOARD 
0.196** 
(0.085) 
2.366*** 
(0.825) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 - Does family involvement foster IPO value? Empirical analysis on Italian Stock Market 
 
47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FAM_TMT 
 
 
 
 
0.150* 
(0.078) 
1.999** 
(0.768) 
 
 
 
 
FAM_EMP 
 
 
 
 
 
  
0.164** 
(0.076) 
2.212*** 
(0.764) 
R2 0.393 0.260 0.378 0.243 0.378 0.254 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistically significant coefficients at 1, 5 and 10% level of significance.  White (1980) heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors are in parentheses. N=113. 
This Table provides evidences on family involvement and IPO value (hypothesis 2).  
See Table III for variable definitions 
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TABLE VII. Regression estimates of the relationship between IPO value and Family 
Generation 
In the IPO research context, the presence of the founder, included in the first 
generation, is seen as a reassuring signal by the market (Nelson, 2003), that is, new 
listed firms run by founders tend to receive higher equity market valuations (Certo et 
al., 2001). The entrepreneurial involvement (typical of first generation) has a beneficial 
effect of IPO valuation. The logic behind this idea is straightforward: first, IPO is 
 
Model 6a 
(I) 
Model 6b 
(II) 
Variable y= IPO_PRM y= M/B 
INTERCEPT 
0.982*** 
(0.127) 
4.542*** 
(1.385) 
SIZE 
-0.041*** 
(0.010) 
-0.319*** 
(0.112) 
LEVERAGE 
0.278*** 
(0.080) 
1.513* 
(0.871) 
AGE 
-0.031** 
(0.015) 
0.055 
(0.167) 
HIGH_TECH 
-0.005 
(0.030) 
0.247 
(0.326) 
BIG5_AUDIT 
0.077* 
(0.040) 
0.598 
(0.436) 
IPO_SELL 
0.051 
(0.046) 
1.353*** 
(0.502) 
VC 
-0.091*** 
(0.030) 
-0.509 
(0.332) 
INDEP_DIR 
0.161* 
(0.086) 
-0.573 
(0.522) 
CEO_DUAL 
-0.009 
(0.031) 
-0.314 
(0.342) 
FAM_GEN1 
0.108*** 
(0.039) 
0.878** 
(0.421) 
FAM_GEN2 
0.090** 
(0.040) 
0.654 
(0.435) 
FAM_GEN3 
0.052 
(0.054) 
0.700 
(0.596) 
R2 0.417 0.215 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistically significant coefficients at 1, 5 and 10% level of significance.  White 
(1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. Model 6 tests our last hypothesis.   
See Table III for variable definitions 
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archetypally an entrepreneurial transition (Certo et al., 2009); second, the greater 
entrepreneurial orientation of family firms positively influences stock market 
performance. It naturally follows that potentially outside investors may evaluate 
intergenerational involvement to infer vantages and disadvantages of new listed family 
firms. 
Finally, if we consider family firms as a homogeneous group, we can conclude a 
positive market evaluation when the family is in a controlling position. Thus, family-
owned IPOs tend to receive higher valuations by outsider investors (Hypothesis 1 is 
verified). When we look at the differences among families (e.g. family firms considered 
as a heterogeneous group), we can infer two conclusions. First, strong family 
involvement, both on the board and in TMT, is positively associated with firm value at 
listing. Second, family businesses are different with respect to intergenerational 
involvement and the positive impact is mainly attributable to the first generation due 
the possible increase in family conflicts in later generations. 
 
2.5. Robustness check 
In addition to the main analysis, we address two further issues: alternative family firm 
definitions and long-term performance.  
In defining family-owned IPOs, we use a dichotomous variable. In this regard, 
scholars (e.g. Chrisman et al., 2005) claim that this operationalization does not capture 
“family strength”. In response to this issue, we adopt the F-PEC scale. We calculate the 
F-PEC as follow:  
𝐹 − 𝑃𝐸𝐶 = (𝐸𝑄𝑓𝑎𝑚/𝐸𝑄𝑡𝑜𝑡) + (𝐵𝑜𝐷𝑓𝑎𝑚/𝐵𝑜𝐷𝑡𝑜𝑡) + (𝑆𝐵𝑓𝑎𝑚/𝑆𝐵𝑡𝑜𝑡)                       (4) 
The first addend represents family equity involvement as the quota of shares owned 
by the family (EQfam) over total firm equity (EQtot); the second is equal to family 
members (related through blood or marriage) on the board of directors (BoDfam) over 
total board members (BoDtot); the last defines the quota of family members in the 
entire supervisory board. 
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TABLE VIII. Robustness check: F-PEC score and Long-run performance 
 
 
Model 7a 
(I) 
Model 7b 
(II) 
Model 8a 
(III) 
Model 8b 
(IV) 
Variable y= IPO_PRM y= M/B y= ROA y= ROA 
INTERCEPT 
1.024*** 
(0.122) 
4.888*** 
(1.262) 
0.138*** 
(0.043) 
0.110** 
(0.045) 
SIZE 
-0.049*** 
(0.010) 
-0.367*** 
(0.100) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
LEVERAGE 
0.280*** 
(0.080) 
1.482* 
(0.830) 
-0.104*** 
(0.028) 
-0.084*** 
(0.029) 
AGE 
-0.031** 
(0.015) 
0.001 
(0.157) 
0.000 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.005) 
HIGH_TECH 
0.004 
(0.030) 
0.269 
(0.310) 
0.019* 
(0.010) 
0.017 
(0.011) 
BIG5_AUDIT 
0.104** 
(0.040) 
0.874** 
(0.414) 
0.015 
(0.014) 
0.009 
(0.015) 
IPO_SELL 
0.066 
(0.046) 
1.442*** 
(0.480) 
0.029* 
(0.016) 
0.028 
(0.017) 
VC 
-0.072** 
(0.031) 
-0.451 
(0.325) 
-0.006 
(0.011) 
-0.011 
(0.011) 
INDEP_DIR 
0.190** 
(0.087) 
-0.553 
(0.500) 
-0.005 
(0.017) 
-0.003 
(0.018) 
CEO_DUAL 
-0.015 
(0.032) 
-0.395 
(0.330) 
0.009 
(0.011) 
0.008 
(0.012) 
F-PEC 
0.094*** 
(0.030) 
0.956*** 
(0.315) 
0.034*** 
(0.011) 
 
FAM_30    
0.034*** 
(0.012) 
R2 0.414 0.260 0.246 0.186 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistically significant coefficients at 1, 5 and 10% level of significance.  White 
(1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. N=113. 
This Table presents results of robustness check. We employ a non-dichotomous variable to take into 
account, contemporarily, family ownership and family involvement. Following previous researches 
conducted in our research setting (Jaskiewicz et al., 2005) we define F-PEC as (equity owned by 
family/total equity) + (family board members/total board members) + (family supervisory board 
members/total supervisory board members). 
Model 8 (a-b) is estimated with long-run IPO performance proxy. We define ROA as the ratio of Earnings 
Before Interests and Tax (EBIT) on book value of Total Asset, calculated within next year of went public.  
See Table III for variable definitions. 
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Next, we estimate the impact of family strength on IPO value. Table VIII considers 
how F-PEC affects IPO_PRM and M/B. Our results are robust to this specification of 
family definition: F-PEC is positively related with all the dependent variables we 
consider (.094, p<0.01 model 7a; .956, p<0.01 model 7b). 
Moreover, we use Return on Assets (ROA) as a measure of post-IPO operating 
performance (Chahine and Goergen, 2013): the ratio of Earnings Before Interests and 
Tax (EBIT) on the book value of Total Asset, calculated within a year of going public. 
The decision of also focusing on long-term performance is in line with stewardship 
assumptions. A stewardship orientation may also allow the firm to emphasize long-term 
financial performance rather than short-term objectives.   
The results from Table VIII corroborate our previous finding. We can state that 
family involvement (irrespective of how we measure it) is also positively related with 
long-term performance (.034, p<0.01 model 8a; .034, p<0.01 model 8b).  
 
2.6. Summary and conclusion 
At the time of IPO firms are evaluated by equity markets for the first time. Previous 
literature recognizes ownership structure as one of the determinants of IPO value. On 
this premise, our paper provides empirical evidence on the impact of family control on 
IPO valuation. We ideally respond to the increasing number of calls from family 
business literature. For example, Jaskiewicz et al. (2005, p. 198) clearly suggest that “the 
family theory development should analyse in more detail the relationship between 
family influence and stock market performance, as well as family business age and stock 
market performance”. 
Using a unique hand-collected dataset, we make inference on 113 IPOs that took 
place on the Milan Stock Exchange in the period 2000-2011. In a stewardship 
framework, we analyse demographic variables and attempt to disentangle two separate 
issues.  First, we address how and whether family-owned IPOs differ from their non-
family counterparts. We find that family firm status positively affects how external 
investors evaluate the firm at listing.  
Second, we address family firm heterogeneity by showing the differences across 
family-owned IPOs. Our results show that family involvement is a positive factor for 
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IPO value; however, as intergenerational control increases, the positive impact on value 
is attenuated.  
Our analysis is based on large sample. The length of the period we take into account 
enables us to corroborate the validity of the results. 
With our model, we test three hypotheses. First, we verify a positive impact of being 
a family controlled firm on IPO value. We define family firms in terms of both equity 
ownership and involvement in TMT. Our results are robust to all the thresholds (20%, 
30% and 50%) that we adopt. We also corroborate these results by using a continuous 
scale (F-PEC) to define family firms.  
Hypothesis 2 relies on the involvement of family managers. Also in this case, we 
adopt several measures to proxy for this involvement. We validate our results by using 
family involvement at three levels: a) board of directors; b) TMT; c) overall family 
employees. The findings suggest that the market appreciates the presence of family 
managers, which is in line with the stewardship framework we adopt.  
Hypothesis 3 investigates how intergenerational control could affect value. Due to 
the increase in generational conflicts, we find that the positive impact of family 
involvement on IPO value is mainly attributable to the first generation.  
To add relevance to our results, we adopt two measures to proxy IPO value: the 
results remain unchanged whatever value is computed. Moreover, we consider long-run 
performance as a robustness check. Family status continues to be positively associated 
with firm performance. 
However, our analyses are not without limitations. First, as a single-country study, 
the results refer exclusively to the Italian context and thus the evidence provided may 
not automatically be generalized to IPOs of comparable equity markets (e.g. German or 
Spanish). A second avenue for future research lies in the long-run evaluation of IPO 
where studies should also consider a better evaluation of the impact of family on long-
term performance.  
To enable a better comparison of family versus non family IPOs, we suggest 
expanding the sample and using, where possible, a balanced panel of firms (family-
owned and non-family owned firms). Moreover, we recognize that a cross country 
analysis would be time consuming and costly in terms of data gathering, but collectively 
consider that literature would advance thanks to such a comparison.  
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Appendix 
 
TABLE A.IX. Robustness check: Alternative definition of Family IPOs. 
 
Model 9a 
(I) 
Model 9b 
(II) 
Model 9c    
(III) 
Model 10b 
(IV) 
Model 11a 
(V) 
Model 11b 
(VI) 
Model 11c    
(VII) 
Variable y= IPO_PRM1 y= IPO_PRM2 y= M/B y= IPO_PRM2 y= IPO_PRM1 y= IPO_PRM2 y= M/B 
INTERCEPT 1.016*** 1.011*** 4.839*** 1.012*** 1.030*** 1.043*** 5.242*** 
 
(0.118) (0.132) (1.295) (0.134) (0.129) (0.137) (1.300)    
SIZE -0.045*** -0.048*** -0.347*** -0.047*** -0.050*** -0.051*** -0.380*** 
 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.101) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.103)    
LEVERAGE 0.281*** 0.301*** 1.541* 0.305*** 0.319*** 0.331*** 1.635*   
 
(0.077) (0.086) (0.846) (0.088) (0.084) (0.090) (0.850)    
AGE -0.031** -0.020 0.033 -0.019 -0.030* -0.022 0.028    
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.159) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.161)    
HIGH_TECH -0.004 -0.004 0.243 0.006 0.011 0.009 0.297    
 (0.029) (0.032) (0.317) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034) (0.319)    
BIG5_AUDIT 0.080** 0.068 0.669 0.073* 0.098** 0.081* 0.805*   
 
(0.038) (0.043) (0.421) (0.044) (0.042) (0.045) (0.425)    
IPO_SELL 0.054 0.047 1.344*** 0.042 0.055 0.044 1.274**  
 
(0.045) (0.050) (0.489) (0.050) (0.049) (0.052) (0.491)    
VC -0.089*** -0.074** -0.537 -0.081** -0.085** -0.075** -0.540    
 
(0.030) (0.033) (0.325) (0.034) (0.033) (0.035) (0.329)    
INDEP_DIR 0.170** 0.177* -0.567 0.176* 0.196** 0.190* -0.619    
 
(0.084) (0.094) (0.513) (0.096) (0.092) (0.098) (0.515)    
CEO_DUAL -0.011 -0.010 -0.312 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.305    
  (0.031) (0.034) (0.336) (0.035) (0.033) (0.036) (0.338)    
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FAM_20 0.096*** 0.101*** 0.741** 
 
  
 
                
 
(0.033) (0.037) (0.359) 
 
  
 
                
FAM_30   
  
0.072**   
 
                
 
  
  
(0.035)   
 
                
FAM_50   
   
0.067** 0.069** 0.606*   
          (0.032) (0.034) (0.323)    
R2 0.414 0.367 0.217 0.345 0.383 0.354 0.217    
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistically significant coefficients at 1, 5 and 10% level of significance.  White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 
are in parentheses. N=113. 
In this Table, we show results about sensitivity tests that we conduct. First, we employ a third dependent variable (IPO_PRM2): it is computed as the ratio of 
the difference between the closing price and the book value per share over the closing price. It differs from IPO_PRM1 because considers the closing price, 
rather than offer price, of 1st trading day. Moreover, we perform a sensitivity test by taking into account different thresholds in the definition of family IPOs. 
That is,  we outline family firms if two conditions take place simultaneously: first,  one or more members of family (people related through blood or marriage) 
must control, at last, 20%, 30% or 50% of voting rights and second, one or more members of family must be involved in the top management team. The 
decision of not focusing only on ownership concentration allows us to examine family-owned and family-influenced firms. We employ 3 different dichotomous 
variables because we focus on different thresholds: 20% is considered when we use FAM_20; 30% with FAM_30 and 50% with FAM_50. All other variables are 
defined as in Table III. In columns I, II and III (models 9), we regress our dependent variable (IPO_PRM1 in model 9a; IPO_PRM2 in model 9b; M/B in 
model 9c) on independent variables and FAM_20. In column IV (model 10b), we show the robustness of our results by employing IPO_PRM2 as dependent 
variable and FAM_30 as independent. Please note that Table V in the text reports the results about the others two (IPO_PRM1 and M/B) dependent variables 
regressed on FAM_30. As in models 9, models 11 show findings about FAM_50 as independent variable. 
As anticipated in the main test, our results are strongly robust against different proxies of family definition and dependent variables.  
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TABLE A. X. Regression estimates of the relationship between IPO value and Family Firm status: 
time 
 
Model 12a 
(I) 
Model 12b 
(II) 
Model 13a 
(III) 
Model 13b 
(IV) 
Variable y= IPO_PRM y= IPO_PRM y= M/B y= M/B 
INTERCEPT 0.549*** 
(0.154) 
0.692*** 
(0.184) 
2.469* 
(1.260) 
3.324**  
(1.294)    
SIZE -0.027** 
(0.011) 
-0.041*** 
(0.015) 
-0.077 
(0.087) 
-0.203**  
(0.092)    
LEVERAGE 0.460*** 
(0.114) 
0.444*** 
(0.128) 
1.761** 
(0.811) 
1.490    
(0.912)    
AGE 0.009 
(0.024) 
-0.001 
(0.023) 
0.107 
(0.168) 
0.021    
(0.186)    
HIGH_TECH -0.047 
(0.041) 
-0.008 
(0.039) 
0.057 
(0.320) 
0.270    
(0.347)    
BIG5_AUDIT 0.015 
(0.045) 
0.050 
(0.047) 
0.164 
(0.395) 
0.572    
(0.446)    
IPO_SELL 0.073 
(0.054) 
0.043 
(0.064) 
1.486*** 
(0.470) 
1.155**  
(0.525)    
VC -0.041 
(0.042) 
-0.071 
(0.046) 
-0.283 
(0.332) 
-0.714**  
(0.347)    
INDEP_DIR 0.189 
(0.117) 
0.125 
(0.138) 
-0.033 
(0.941) 
0.055    
(1.004)    
CEO_DUAL 0.032 
(0.041) 
0.013 
(0.040) 
-0.069 
(0.335) 
-0.200    
(0.364)    
FAM_30 0.087* 
(0.046) 
0.127** 
(0.053) 
0.516* 
(0.337) 
0.875** 
(0.359)    
T=1 0.187* 
(0.108) 
 0.634 
(0.974) 
 
T=2 0.001 
(0.119) 
 -1.412 
(1.052) 
 
T=3 -0.115 
(0.164) 
 -1.624 
(1.302) 
 
T=4 -0.213 
(0.153) 
 -2.020 
(1.224) 
 
T=5 -0.073 
(0.139) 
 -1.813 
(1.139) 
 
T=6 -0.114 
(0.151) 
 -1.581 
(1.077) 
 
T=7 0.020 
(0.114) 
 -0.746 
(1.012) 
 
T=8 0.073 
(0.114) 
 -0.384 
(1.004) 
 
T=9 0.095  -0.906  
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(0.139) (1.212) 
T=10 0.070 
(0.189) 
 0.700 
(1.532) 
 
T=11 -0.143 
(0.190) 
 -1.060 
(1.120) 
 
T_CRISIS 
 
0.053 
(0.082) 
 
-0.170    
(0.515)    
R2 0.462 0.300 0.388 0.178    
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistically significant coefficients at 1, 5 and 10% level of significance.  White (1980) 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. N=113. 
T=1 is a dummy variable equals to one if the IPO is issued in 2000, zero otherwise. T=2 refers to 2001 … T=11 refers to 
2010. T_CRISIS is binary variable. It assumes value one if the firm went public before august 2007, zero otherwise. We 
use this variable to control for any potential effect of financial crisis (2007-2008), in line with Ivashina and Scharfstein 
(2010). 
See Table III, in the manuscript, for variable definitions. 
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TABLE A.XI. Regression estimates of the relationship between IPO value and Family Involvement: time controls 
Variable 
Model 14a 
(I) 
y= IPO_PRM 
Model 14b 
(II) 
y= IPO_PRM 
Model 15a 
(III) 
y= M/B 
Model 16b 
(IV) 
y= M/B 
Model 17a 
(V) 
y= IPO_PRM 
Model 17b 
(VI) 
y= IPO_PRM 
Model 18a 
(VII) 
y= M/B 
Model 18b 
(VIII) 
y= M/B 
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
FAM_BOARD 
0.307*** 
(0.098) 
0.362*** 
(0.104) 
2.358*** 
(0.797) 
2.758*** 
(0.867)    
    
FAM_TMT 
    0.220** 
(0.088) 
0.281*** 
(0.092) 
1.667* 
(2.616) 
3.070* 
(1.937) 
T=1 0.234** 
(0.093) 
 0.934 
(0.931) 
 0.218** 
(0.100) 
 -0.112 
(1.379) 
 
T=2 0.046 
(0.108) 
 -1.056 
(1.009) 
 0.033 
(0.113) 
 -2.464 
(1.881) 
 
T=3 -0.074 
(0.151) 
 -1.301 
(1.240) 
 -0.095 
(0.153) 
 -3.616* 
(2.150) 
 
T=4 -0.180 
(0.141) 
 -1.752 
(1.165) 
 -0.202 
(0.146) 
 -4.145** 
(1.946) 
 
T=5 -0.051 
(0.129) 
 -1.727 
(1.080) 
 -0.059 
(0.134) 
 -2.164 
(2.158) 
 
T=6 -0.068 
(0.144) 
 -1.179 
(1.033) 
 -0.087 
(0.150) 
 -2.777 
(1.771) 
 
T=7 0.076 
(0.101) 
 -0.346 
(0.973) 
 0.055 
(0.107) 
 -0.033 
(1.488) 
 
T=8 0.114  -0.182  0.099  1.939  
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(0.097) (0.959) (0.104) (2.069) 
T=9 0.114 
(0.131) 
 -0.772 
(1.148) 
 0.108 
(0.133) 
 -2.347 
(1.491) 
 
T=10 0.111 
(0.174) 
 1.144 
(1.451) 
 0.078 
(0.181) 
 -1.767 
(2.464) 
 
T=11 -0.091 
(0.160) 
 -0.572 
(1.074) 
 -0.119 
(0.176) 
 -2.626 
(2.157) 
 
T_CRISIS  0.071 
(0.072) 
 -0.034    
(0.490)    
 0.072 
(0.076) 
 1.285 
(0.951) 
R2 0.483 0.314 0.439 0.237 0.466 0.295 0.189 0.105 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistically significant coefficients at 1, 5 and 10% level of significance.  White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors are in parentheses. Due to space constraints, we do not report INTERCEPT and CONTROL_VARIABLES. Control variables 
include: SIZE; LEVERAGE; AGE; HIGH_TECH; BIG5_AUDIT; IPO_SELL; VC; INDEP_DIR; CEO_DUALITY. T=1 is a dummy variable 
equals to one if the IPO is issued in 2000, zero otherwise. T=2 refers to 2001 … T=11 refers to 2010. T_CRISIS is binary variable. It assumes 
value one if the firm went public before august 2007, zero otherwise. We use this variable to control for any potential effect of financial crisis 
(2007-2008), in line with Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010). 
See Table III, in the manuscript, for variable definitions. 
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TABLE A.XI. Regression estimates of the relationship between IPO value and Family Involvement: 
time controls. Continued 
Variable 
Model 19a 
(IX) 
y= IPO_PRM 
Model 19b 
(X) 
y= IPO_PRM 
Model 20a 
(XI) 
y= M/B 
Model 20b 
(XII) 
y= M/B 
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES 
FAM_EMP 
0.233*** 
(0.087) 
0.295*** 
(0.093) 
1.941** 
(0.747) 
2.572*** 
(0.806)    
T=1 0.216** 
(0.100) 
 0.846 
(0.947) 
 
T=2 0.034 
(0.113) 
 -1.099 
(1.031) 
 
T=3 -0.091 
(0.153) 
 -1.400 
(1.264) 
 
T=4 -0.198 
(0.144) 
 -1.852 
(1.186) 
 
T=5 -0.056 
(0.133) 
 -1.718 
(1.103) 
 
T=6 -0.091 
(0.147) 
 -1.324 
(1.049) 
 
T=7 0.056 
(0.107) 
 -0.439 
(0.989) 
 
T=8 0.099 
(0.104) 
 -0.257 
(0.976) 
 
T=9 0.110 
(0.133) 
 -0.765 
(1.173) 
 
T=10 0.085 
(0.180) 
 1.020 
(1.479) 
 
T=11 -0.120 
(0.175) 
 -0.776 
(1.089) 
 
T_CRISIS  0.070 
(0.076) 
 -0.084    
(0.496)    
R2 0.470 0.300 0.422 0.229 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistically significant coefficients at 1, 5 and 10% 
level of significance.  White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 
are in parentheses. Due to space constraints, we do not report INTERCEPT and 
CONTROL_VARIABLES. Control variables include: SIZE; LEVERAGE; AGE; 
HIGH_TECH; BIG5_AUDIT; IPO_SELL; VC; INDEP_DIR; CEO_DUALITY. 
T=1 is a dummy variable equals to one if the IPO is issued in 2000, zero 
otherwise. T=2 refers to 2001 … T=11 refers to 2010. T_CRISIS is binary 
variable. It assumes value one if the firm went public before august 2007, zero 
otherwise. We use this variable to control for any potential effect of financial 
crisis (2007-2008), in line with Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010). 
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 TABLE A.XII. Regression estimates of the relationship between IPO value and Family 
Generation: time controls
Variable 
Model 21a 
(I) 
y= IPO_PRM 
Model 21b 
(II) 
y= IPO_PRM 
Model 22a 
(III) 
y= M/B 
Model 22b 
(IV) 
y= M/B 
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES 
FAM_GEN1 
0.165*** 
(0.048) 
0.216*** 
(0.058) 
2.089* 
(1.393) 
2.615* 
(1.428) 
FAM_GEN2 
0.110* 
(0.062) 
0.143** 
(0.069) 
1.181 
(1.151) 
1.649* 
(0.957) 
FAM_GEN3 
0.071 
(0.086) 
0.097 
(0.086) 
0.055 
(1.436) 
0.584 
(1.139) 
T=1 0.163 
(0.109) 
 -0.885 
(1.801) 
 
T=2 -0.019 
(0.119) 
 -3.035 
(1.957) 
 
T=3 -0.077 
(0.166) 
 -3.062* 
(1.674) 
 
T=4 -0.227 
(0.143) 
 -4.637** 
(2.323) 
 
T=5 -0.074 
(0.142) 
 -2.527 
(2.476) 
 
T=6 -0.106 
(0.148) 
 -2.971 
(1.865) 
 
T=7 0.015 
(0.115) 
 -0.578 
(1.435) 
 
T=8 0.069 
(0.116) 
 1.509 
(2.408) 
 
T=9 0.104 
(0.147) 
 -2.504 
(2.077) 
 
T=10 0.104 
(0.187) 
 -1.383 
(2.315) 
 
T=11 -0.129 
(0.184) 
 -2.663 
(2.032) 
 
T_CRISIS  0.028 
(0.083) 
 0.715 
(0.845) 
R2 0.494 0.351 0.204 0.125 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistically significant coefficients at 1, 5 and 10% level of significance.  White 
(1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. N=113. Due to space constraints, 
we do not report INTERCEPT and CONTROL_VARIABLES. Control variables include: SIZE; 
LEVERAGE; AGE; HIGH_TECH; BIG5_AUDIT; IPO_SELL; VC; INDEP_DIR; CEO_DUALITY. T=1 is 
a dummy variable equals to one if the IPO is issued in 2000, zero otherwise. T=2 refers to 2001 … T=11 
refers to 2010. T_CRISIS is binary variable. It assumes value one if the firm went public before august 2007, 
zero otherwise. We use this variable to control for any potential effect of financial crisis (2007-2008), in line 
with Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010). See Table III, in the manuscript, for variable definitions. 
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Chapter 2. All the power in two hands: the role of CEOs in family 
IPOs.9 
 
Abstract 
This paper aims to disentangle the effect of powerful CEOs on IPO valuations in family 
firms.  
In a stewardship framework, we test how powerful leadership influences external 
investor perceptions of firm value at the entrepreneurial stage of going public. Our 
analysis relies on a unique hand-collected dataset of 77 family firms that went public on 
the Milan Stock Exchange between 2000 and 2011. We define family IPOs with respect 
to family involvement in ownership and management.  Considering that CEO power is 
not directly observable, we use structural equation modeling (SEM) and operationalize 
CEO power with a multidimensional indicator: using a factor analysis, we take into 
account three types of power (structural, ownership and expert). We shed light on how 
family leadership at the apical level differs from outside CEO leadership; moreover, we 
consider the case of shared leadership (e.g., more than one CEO).  
Our findings show that outside investors positively evaluate the presence of a powerful 
CEO in the transition from private to public ownership. If a family member serves as 
CEO, the relationship is strengthened while with a co-leader in command, IPO 
evaluations are less affected. Finally, the presence of one CEO who is also part of the 
family maximizes investor evaluations.  
This study is the first to address the role of powerful CEOs in family IPOs. It 
contributes to family business literature by showing how different leadership styles 
influence investor perceptions. 
 
                                                          
9 Please note that a similar version of this chapter (with the same title) is currently under review for 
(voluntary-omitted) journal. I am grateful to my co-authors, Prof. Mauro Romano and Dr. Luca 
Pennacchio, for their help. However all the errors within the chapter are my own responsibility. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The decision to go public, even if only prospective, is a crucial step in the lifecycle of 
a firm. At the time of an initial public offering (IPO), outside potential investors make 
their financial decision based on relatively scarce information. Listing firms do not have 
performance records in public markets and may suffer from “liability of market 
newness” (Certo, 2003). As such, a sense of uncertainty characterizes the 
entrepreneurial stage of IPOs. In this scenario, corporate governance can mitigate the 
ex-ante risk and help firms build their reputations. The evaluation of governance 
mechanisms and their effectiveness is beneficial in transition periods - such as at IPO - 
rather than in calendar time (Baker and Gompers, 2003); in attempting to attract new 
equity, firms would be more inclined to choose the best board structure (Burton et al., 
2004). Equity markets have well established governance practices but as their adoption 
is voluntary for IPO firms, external investors ‘price’ firms differently according to their 
governance structure. Several studies assess the role of the board of directors (BoD 
henceforth) on corporate outcomes at the time of IPO (e.g., Mak and Roush, 2000; 
Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002; Baker and Gompers, 2003), while another stream of 
studies considers the top management team (TMT henceforth) (e.g., Cohen and Dean, 
2005; Lester et al., 2006; Zimmerman, 2008). However, although firms may have 
different BoD or TMT configurations, common across all IPOs is the presence of a 
CEO. There is an abundance of studies on the role of the founder CEO (Nelson, 2003; 
Jain and Tabak, 2008; He, 2008; Chahine et al., 2011; Johnson and Yi, 2013) while 
relatively little is known about powerful leaders (Bach and Smith, 2007). 
Whether or not a powerful CEO should lead a family firm through the IPO process is 
a relatively new issue in governance literature. There is still a gap in our understanding 
of how CEO leadership affects investor evaluations at a transitional stage such as going 
public. We bridge this gap by responding to the following research question: are 
powerful CEOs beneficial to investor evaluations of family IPOs?  
In a stewardship framework, we argue that a powerful leader could foster trust among 
potential outside investors and reduce uncertainty. We use a sample of 77 family firms 
that went public on the Milan Stock Exchange between 2000 and 2011. We take 
advantage of the institutional setting in Italy to develop our hypotheses. The massive 
presence of family ownership as well as the introduction (1999) and the implementation 
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(2002, 2006 and 2009) of the Corporate Governance Code, makes this market an ideal 
setting to investigate the CEO role in the transitional stage of IPOs. 
In our study, CEO power refers to a multidimensional construct (Finkelstein et al., 
2009). Using an exploratory factor analysis, we consider three types of power: 
ownership, structural and expert. Since CEO power is not directly observable (Liu and 
Jiraporn, 2010), we employ structural equation modeling to infer our conclusions. 
This research is designed to analyse investor response to the presence of a powerful 
CEO, namely, we operationalize IPO value in the short term using two measures: IPO 
premium and Market to Book ratio. These measures are designed to capture how 
external investors ‘price’ the firm at listing stage. We define family owned IPOs and 
evaluate family involvement in ownership and managerial positions. We also study the 
moderating effects of familiar leadership and the role of a co-leadership structure. Given 
these premises, our results suggest that a powerful CEO fosters IPO value, that the 
positive effect is stronger when a family member manages the firm and when leadership 
is not shared (e.g., absence of co-leadership). Moreover, the presence of a family CEO 
without a co-CEO strengthens the positive relationship between CEO power and 
investor evaluations. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that addresses 
the role of powerful CEOs at the entrepreneurial stage of IPOs in family owned firms. 
Our paper extends family business and strategic leadership literature in three ways. 
First, we contribute to the ongoing debate on family firm heterogeneity from a different 
standpoint and in a leadership perspective. Miller et al. (2013) highlight the tendency to 
compare family to non-family counterparts, which may lead to underestimating 
fundamental intra-family differences. By considering different configurations of family 
leadership (e.g., moderating effect of family CEO and co-leadership structure), we 
embrace the general suggestion of Melin and Nordqvist (2007) to further investigate 
heterogeneity among family firms. Moreover, we ideally respond to calls in IPO 
literature (e.g., Leitterstorf and Rau, 2014; Jaskiewicz et al., 2005) that recommend 
studying how different configurations of governance mechanisms in family businesses 
impact on investor perceptions. Collectively, our results advance our understanding of 
how family firms are differently “priced” by external investors in relation to different 
leadership styles. Second, this study provides evidence on family leadership (CEO) at 
the entrepreneurial stage of IPOs. Naldi et al. (2013) demonstrate that the impact of 
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family CEO on performance is contingent on the context and find considerable 
differences for listed and non-listed firms. Along this line of research, we shed light on 
how family leadership at the apical level affects investor evaluations in the transition 
from private to public ownership. Furthermore, our analysis contributes to strategic 
leadership literature by taking into account the effect of co-leadership on IPO value. 
Considering the moderating effect on the relationship between CEO power and 
investors enables extending the findings of Miller et al. (2014). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follow. Section 2 provides our theoretical 
framework and develops the hypotheses. In Section 3, we offer an overview of the 
database construction and explain in detail the methodology used. Section 4 shows and 
discusses the results. The last Section summarizes our work and identifies future 
research lines.  
 
3.2 Theoretical framework and hypotheses development 
3.2.1 Leadership in family firms: a stewardship perspective  
Stewardship as a theoretical perspective is rooted in psychology and sociology. It 
admits the convergence of interests between managers and shareholders. The former 
are driven by financial and non-financial motives such as job satisfaction and 
recognition. This theory interprets managers as trustworthy stewards and posits that the 
human need for responsibility and achievement will outweigh opportunistic interests 
(Davis et al., 1997). In essence, the utility obtained from acting in the interests of the 
organization offsets that obtained from acting against it. The stewardship framework 
describes organizations where stewards aim to increase shareholder wealth rather than 
seeking personal gratification (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007) with managerial intentions 
that are pro-organizational instead of self-serving (Abels and Martelli, 2013). In this 
line of research, scholars argue that an authoritative decision-making process combined 
with the strong leadership of individuals fosters higher firm performance (Donaldson 
and Davis, 1991). That is, CEO activities are facilitated when the governance 
mechanisms grant greater authority and autonomy (Sundarmurthy and Lewis, 2003). 
These circumstances are likely to manifest in family firms where family members are 
generally more inclined to sacrifice personal objectives to develop long-term strategies 
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(Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2005), which also reduces managerial myopia (Stein, 
1989). Furthermore, the family’s concern for subsequent generations may increase a 
stewardship orientation with a positive effect on corporate outcomes. As Corbetta and 
Salvato (2004) suggest, this framework could be particularly suitable in a context of 
concentrated family ownership. Advocates of stewardship theory claim that the CEO 
exerts the most powerful influence on the family firm's strategy, while Voordeckers et al. 
(2007) indicate the CEO as the dominant person among family members and outside 
managers. Prior literature focuses on powerful CEOs (e.g., duality leadership) and their 
general impact on performance (Braun and Sharma, 2007), recognizing a beneficial 
effect of strong CEO leadership in family businesses. In the family context, a powerful 
CEO may play a key role in the selection of managerial team members and may exercise 
greater influence on the board (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996).  
 
3.2.2 The role of powerful CEOs in IPOs 
Prior literature has demonstrated the existence of a relationship between top 
executive characteristics and IPO value (e.g., Lester et al., 2006; Certo, Holmes and 
Holcomb, 2007; Zimmerman, 2008), yet scholars still debate the impact of CEO 
characteristics on investor evaluations at the IPO stage (Yang et al., 2011). A sense of 
uncertainty among investors permeates the transition from closely held private 
ownership to more dispersed public ownership (Certo, 2003). In this context, Nelson 
(2003) suggests that not only the structural characteristics of the firm but also its 
behavioural aspects (e.g., managerial abilities) act as a potential signal to reduce 
scepticism on IPO future performance. Likewise, more capable management could 
serves as a “protective shield” (Yang et al., 2011) for the firm during the IPO process.  
In addition to the management role, literature offers evidence of the greater 
importance of the characteristics of the leader with respect to those of the group 
(Cannella and Holcomb, 2005). This is especially relevant in the context of family-
owned businesses where CEO leadership influences corporate outcomes (Voordeckers 
et al., 2007). Since the IPO is a crucial point in the evolution of entrepreneurial firms, it 
is reasonable to infer that CEOs play a central role in shaping the view of the firm 
(Bruton et al., 1997) and that their role is preeminent (Andrews and Welbourne, 2000). 
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Extensive focus has been placed on the role of the founder CEO at the IPO stage. 
This line of research is rooted in the idea that the founder CEO is a unique governance 
mechanism since s/he created the company and is thus more entrenched than outside 
CEOs. This phenomenon therefore calls for analyses through different economic lenses 
(Gao and Jain, 2012). Within this research stream, Jain and Tabak (2008) discuss 
whether a firm should adopt a CEO founder structure on issuing an IPO. They find that 
both governance and ownership structures are crucial in this decision: the probability of 
hiring a founder CEO is higher when the board is less independent, while the 
probability is lower when managerial ownership is higher. Moreover, literature 
disentangles the effect of the CEO figure on different corporate outcomes. Nelson 
(2003) demonstrates that founder CEOs generate positive market reactions. She shows 
a positive correlation between founder executives and IPO value (measured in the short 
term). He (2008) finds that founder CEOs lead to greater financial performance and 
help firms overcome the “liability of newness” (Nelson, 2003); founder-managed IPOs 
are thus more likely to survive. Gao and Jain (2012) look at the market for corporate 
control and suggest that founder CEO behaviours are motivated by the desire to 
maximise the acquisition premium of post-IPO firms. Fischer and Pollock (2004) 
support the idea that greater ownership concentration in the hands of the founder CEO 
will reduce the likelihood of IPO failure. 
These studies consider the founder CEO as an “asset” instead of a “liability” during 
the firm's transitional period. However, literature also offers contrasting results 
recognizing that founders may lack adequate experience or professional skills to lead 
new firms in an IPO process. Certo et al. (2001) find that founder CEOs are associated 
with a higher level of underpricing than non-founder CEOs. Chahine et al. (2011) find 
similar results where underpricing increases with founder CEO ownership. 
In view of the abundance of literature on founder CEO and IPO characteristics, one 
may conclude that this role is a good proxy for powerful CEOs. It can be argued in this 
light that founder CEOs exert greater influence on the board, on employees and on 
stakeholders due to their longer tenure and the unique knowledge of their “creature”. 
However, Finkelstein et al. (2009) suggest considering CEO power as a construct rather 
than a single factor: they maintain the need for multidimensional measures. 
Nevertheless, in management literature we note that scholars often refer to CEO power 
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using individual proxies (Lewellyn and Muller-Kahle, 2012). Entrepreneurial studies on 
IPOs examine CEO ownership (e.g., Certo et al., 2003), CEO duality (e.g., Fischer and 
Pollock 2004) and CEO tenure/experience (e.g., Brouthers et al., 2000). These studies 
rely on the concept of CEO power defined as the ability to centralize and reinforce the 
decision-making power in the hands of the CEO (Liu and Jiraporn, 2010). 
 
3.2.2.1 CEO ownership power 
Ownership is a key factor in the power building process and designates the kind of 
power exerted by CEOs and top external shareholders (Tosi et al., 1999). A CEO with 
significant ownership power may reduce the board's ability to interfere in corporate 
affairs (Finkelstein, 1992). Ownership power may also favour the appointment of board 
members whose views are more aligned with those of the CEO. Large equity ownership 
of CEOs reduces the likelihood of new firms failing (Hitt et al., 2001). Roosenboom and 
Schramade (2006) empirically demonstrate that post-IPO CEO ownership has a 
beneficial effect on firm value. In high-technology IPOs, CEO ownership power is 
positively related to after-IPO survival (Bach and Smith, 2007). Latham and Braun 
(2010) find that CEO ownership alters decision-making behaviours, namely, powerful 
CEOs are more likely to forgo IPOs in weak capital markets regardless of the interest of 
other shareholders. Roosenboom's (2005) findings are coherent with the idea that a 
dominant CEO has the power to influence board composition. He shows that the higher 
the post-IPO CEO ownership, the lower the presence of independent directors. 
Chahine and Goergen (2013) disentangle the impact of board ties on IPO value and 
find a positive effect of CEO ownership on firm value. 
 
3.2.2.2 CEO structural power 
Structural power refers to the influence that CEOs have over the board, top 
management team and, more generally, depends on their role in the firm (Daily and 
Johnson, 1997). Finkelstein et al. (2009) argue that scholars often adopt a dual 
leadership structure to proxy for structural power. On one hand, CEO duality fosters a 
clear sense of strategic direction and reinforces leadership. Mak and Roush (2000) find 
that firms with dual leadership are more likely to grow after the IPO. On the other hand, 
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Howton et al. (2001) argue that this overlap of positions (e.g., chairperson and CEO) 
may reduce board monitoring and exacerbate conflicts, but they do not find a statistical 
correlation between CEO duality and IPO value. Chahine and Tohmé (2009) show that 
CEO duality increases IPO underpricing but this turns into a positive sign when 
strategic ownership (e.g., corporations and other industry-related investors) moderates 
the relation between the duality structure and IPO performance. According to Lin and 
Chuang (2011), dual leadership in emerging economies decreases IPO value. Bach and 
Smith (2007) show a negative association between CEO duality and the likelihood of 
post-IPO survival in high-technology industries.  
 
3.2.2.3 CEO expert power 
Expert power indicates the influence on the decision-making process exercised by 
professional skills as well as by specific knowledge of the company and its sector. It also 
refers to the CEO’s ability to deal with environmental contingencies and thus contribute 
to the firm's success (Finkelstein, 1992). Several studies consider CEO tenure as a proxy 
for CEO power (Shen, 2003). Longer tenure may signal greater professionalism and 
superior skills, tenured CEOs therefore strengthen their bargaining power with the 
board (Lehn and Zhao, 2006). Zona (2014) proves that tenured CEOs exert greater 
power over boards. Yang et al. (2011) find that firms led by experienced CEOs go public 
via IPOs earlier than those with less expert CEOs. Filatotchev and Bishop (2002) 
suggest that CEO experience is pivotal in the board selection process at the IPO stage. 
This result confirms the power the CEO figure exerts on the management team. 
Chahine and Goergen (2013) obtain the opposite evidence as they find a negative 
association between IPO premium and CEO tenure. Along the same research line, 
Johnson and Yi (2013) indicate that IPOs with higher relative valuations are those with 
shorter CEO tenure. 
 
All the measures analysed capture some aspects of power. However, Finkelstein et al. 
(2009) claim that there are no theoretical foundations to sustain that one of these 
measures better captures the overall concept of CEO power. We hence define power as 
“the capacity of individual actors to exert their will” (Finkelstein, 1992, p. 506). As this 
definition does not lend itself to a natural and univocal classification of CEO power, we 
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adopt a multidimensional construct that encompasses three sources of power: 
ownership, structural and expert. 
Literature has flourished on the topic of CEO founders and their impact on IPO 
value but rarely questions whether and how other CEO characteristics affect investor 
valuations. Moreover, the lens of CEO power has rarely been used to assess IPO 
evaluations of family firms. A shortcoming of the reviewed literature is that it fails to 
disentangle the influence of CEO leadership on investor investment decisions in family 
owned IPOs.  
 
3.2.3 Powerful CEOs and IPO value 
CEOs potentially have the power to influence and determine the strategy and the 
performance of their businesses. On one hand, the presence of a powerful CEO is 
beneficial in terms of reducing conflicts, fostering strong trust between directors and 
clarifying decision-making authority (Daily and Dalton, 1993). One the other hand, 
diluting CEO power can be costly as it reduces the probability of superior firm 
performance (Adam et al., 2005).  
Powerful CEOs are more inclined to be subject to what Hayward et al. (2004) define 
as “CEO celebrity”. It is the tendency of the press (e.g., journalists) to assert that the 
firm’s positive performance is a direct result of the CEO’s actions. The benefit of such 
celebrity status in the IPO process is in greater media coverage. Dutton et al. (1994) 
argue that media reports are crucial to the way stakeholders evaluate firms and build 
their reputations.  
From a stewardship perspective, a powerful CEO guarantees “a sense of direction for 
his firm that will both help him make difficult day-to-day decisions and reduce 
uncertainty” (Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1984, p. 244). In the context of an IPO, the 
reduction of uncertainty may have a positive effect on stakeholder evaluations since this 
implies a less risky investment. Powerful CEOs are less subject to removal, less inclined 
to hide information on their behaviour and the firm's real status, and provide more 
transparent information (Armstrong et al., 2012). At the IPO transition stage, this could 
imply that in addition to the IPO prospectus, investors find a reliable and alternative 
source of data in the figure of the CEO. Moreover, the communication to equity 
markets of strong firm leadership would allow the firm to attract more capital (Daily et 
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al., 2002). In this sense, CEO structural power helps establish strong decision-making 
authority and unity of command. Expert power provides CEOs with rich knowledge and 
helpful tools for strategic decision-making. Pitcher and Smith (2001) demonstrate that 
the strategic actions of less experienced CEOs lead to a rapid decline in performance. 
On the board side, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue that the equilibrium level of 
monitoring decreases as CEO expert power increases since board members are aware of 
the CEO’s competences and tend to allow greater flexibility and independence in 
decision-making. Combining these two sources of power (structural and expert) enables 
CEOs to make timely and optimal decisions (Brickley et al., 1997). Timely decisions are 
crucial to success in the context of environmental uncertainty, as in the case of IPOs 
(Lester et al., 2006). Moreover, ownership power encourages CEOs to focus on long-
term objectives. Managers with significant ownership are more likely to accept a lower 
salary (Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987) so their wealth strictly depends on the firm’s 
performance. Negative performance could inhibit their wealth increase. 
Given this logic, we hypothesise: 
 
Hypothesis 1. The presence of a powerful CEO has a positive effect on IPO value. 
 
3.2.4 Family CEOs: the power in their hands  
Family CEOs are assumed to have stronger psychological attachment and 
commitment to the company than outside CEOs. CEO power and dominance in the 
management team is higher for family CEOs than for outside managers (Minichilli et 
al., 2010). Miller et al. (2013) show that in the case of concentrated ownership, firms 
managed by family CEOs outperform those managed by outside CEOs. Literature offers 
considerable evidence supporting the idea of the superior performance achieved by 
family leaders (e.g., Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Moreover, family CEOs also have the 
power to engage easier and faster in potential business relationships (e.g., without 
formal or written agreements) compared to non-family outside professionals (Naldi et 
al., 2013). Closeness and familiarity with the firm may also increase the family CEO 
stewardship attitude towards the business (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). Altruism among 
family members fosters greater goal alignment and inhibits the opportunism (if any) of 
family CEOs. Drawing on stewardship theory, Braun and Sharma (2007) state that in 
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family controlled firms, outside investors may benefit from clear and unambiguous 
leadership. 
In the Italian market, family firms tend to go public to expand the capital base with 
lower costs than external financing rather than to attract potential successors 
(Rigamonti, 2008). Family CEOs will pay more attention to preparing the IPO process 
as its success could be crucial to the family firm's survival in the long-term. Being part of 
the controlling family is a great incentive for CEOs as they are strongly motivated to 
accomplish future investor requirements. Families may also achieve the objective of 
increasing reputational and social capital through the IPO (Marchisio and Ravasi, 2001) 
and are therefore more concerned about potential investor evaluations. A powerful CEO 
who is also a family member may be able to lead the transition with a clear focus on 
value. From the market perspective, family IPOs come under pressure to demonstrate 
the economic validity of their strategies; the appointment of a family CEO could act as a 
mechanism to ensure the long-term orientation of new firms. 
In view of the differences between family and outside CEOs, we maintain the 
importance of considering family leadership and study the moderating effect of family 
CEOs.  
Based on the aforementioned arguments, we predict: 
 
Hypothesis 2. The positive effect of a powerful CEO on IPO value becomes stronger in 
the presence of a family CEO.  
 
3.2.5 Co-leadership structure and powerful CEOs  
The concept of co-leadership may appear counterintuitive as leadership is by 
definition an individual trait (O’Toole et al., 2002). However, in the context of family 
businesses, it is not unusual for a firm to have more than one CEO (Miller et al., 2014). 
This can be particularly the case when there is more than one generation involved in 
firm governance. In the stewardship framework, a co-leadership structure violates the 
“unity of command” (Fayol, 1949) and may be detrimental to the decision-making 
process that would be less timely and efficient. The direct effect of such leadership is 
weakening CEO power (Worrell et al., 1997). Shared leadership generates confusion 
among stakeholders on the lines of authority (Galbraith, 1977). During the IPO 
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process, the lack of clear leadership could potentially outweigh the benefits of having a 
powerful CEO. The co-leader could also contend the power of the other CEO with 
negative consequences on performance. Hambrick and Cannella (2004) note that a 
shared leadership structure is less likely to occur with a powerful CEO. It is also 
arguable that the co-presence of more powerful managers may reduce any individual 
CEO’s efforts (Aghion and Tirole, 1997). The competition that may occur between co-
leaders is also detrimental for the board as it could reduce the monitoring function 
(Zhang, 2006) from higher to lower levels (e.g., monitoring of the CEO by other 
executives). These arguments lead us to formulate the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 3.The positive effect of a powerful CEO on IPO value becomes stronger in 
the absence of a co-leadership structure.  
 
Figure 1. CEO Power and IPO value: summary of hypotheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 summarizes our hypotheses and the postulated relationships between CEO 
power, moderating factors and IPO value. 
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3.3 Data and sample 
3.3.1 Dataset 
The starting sample consisted of 170 firms that conducted IPOs on the Milan Stock 
Exchange in the period 2000-2011. We purposefully began our analysis from 2000 due 
to the introduction of the Code of Corporate Governance issued by the Italian Stock 
Exchange in 1999. 
We excluded firms in the financial industry (SIC code 6000 - 6799, for 23 
observations). The sample was also purified of foreign firms (3 observations) as we 
intend to investigate the IPO value of Italian firms. A further 31 observations were 
excluded as we were unable to obtain their IPO prospectuses. 
The considerable presence of block-holders is characteristic of the Italian market. 
When defining family firms, both equity and managerial involvement must be 
considered. Following Cascino et al., (2010), we identify family firms when two 
conditions exist simultaneously. First, one or more members of the family must control 
at last 30% of voting rights and second, one or more members of the family must be 
involved in the top management team. We focus on this threshold because Italian Law 
“Decreto Legislativo 58/1998” requires a level of 30% for a public tender offer and 
Minichilli et al. (2010) use this threshold to define family firms. We thus make 
inferences on 77 family owned IPOs10.  
Data were collected from the IPO prospectuses. This source has been widely used in 
previous literature (e.g., Lester et al., 2006) as it discloses information that is freely 
accessible to investors and other parties (Beatty and Zajac, 1994) and perfectly fits our 
research question.  
 
3.3.2 Dependent variables 
In coherence with our research question, we quantify IPO value from the external 
investors’ perspective. We refer to short-term IPO performance, which enables us to 
                                                          
10 However, we also control for a different definition of family business. In line with prior literature on IPOs 
(Leitterstorf and Rau, 2014), we define family firms using the F-PEC score (Astrachan et al., 2002), which 
computes family involvement in both ownership and managerial positions in a continuous variable. With 
this definition, we obtain a final sample of 75 family owned IPOs. Our results are robust to this proxy. 
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consider only measures based on the first-day trading price (e.g., offering or closing 
price). In our analysis, we employ two proxies. First, we rely upon market perceived 
value: to assess investors' valuation of IPO we use IPO Premium (IPO_PRM). Certo et 
al. (2009) claim that conventional measures fail to account for book value of equity or 
asset and they may offer a distorted representation of real value. We tackle this issue by 
considering a relative measure: IPO Premium captures the premium that investors place 
on firm’s assets. In line with prior literature (Certo et al., 2003; Lester et al., 2006), we 
calculate percent premium as follow: 
 
𝐼𝑃𝑂 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 =  (𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ) 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒⁄                         (1) 
 
where Book Value is the book value (per share) of equity from the last audited pre-
IPO financial statement divided by the pre-IPO shares (resulting from the IPO 
prospectus). This measure weighs both accounting and stock market information 
(Welbourne and Andrews, 1996). Compared to only stock price, IPO Premium offers a 
more robust estimation of how investors reward future value. We also perform a 
sensitivity (unreported) test using the firm's closing price on the first day of trading 
rather than the offering price as in the above formula. This enables us to capture the 
entire market evaluation and to control for underpricing (Certo et al., 2003). 
Our second measure is Market to Book value (M/B) (Astrachan and McConaughy, 
2001):   
 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = (𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛1𝑠𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑦) (𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)⁄           (2) 
 
where market capitalization is equal to the number of post-IPO shares times the 
closing market price of the first trading day. Equity book value is determined as the sum 
of primary offering proceeds and book value of equity from the last audited pre-IPO 
financial statement. Mazzola and Marchisio (2002) use this measure to value Italian 
IPOs as it is useful to capture future managerial performance. 
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3.3.3 CEO Power 
On the one hand, top executive leadership may have multiple sources (Combs et al., 
2007), on the other, CEO power is not directly observable (Liu and Jiraporn, 2010) and 
therefore requires a multidimensional construct rather than a single variable that can 
capture CEO dominance. In line with Finkelstein (1992), we consider four types of 
power: ownership, structural, expert and prestige. Power can be defined as formal 
(ownership and structural) or informal (expert and prestige) (Adams et al., 2005). The 
first relates to factors that directly affect CEO influence over the decision-making 
process, while the latter does not directly depend on the formal role of the CEO in the 
organizational hierarchy. However, even if from a theoretical perspective these forms of 
power are directly observable, it is empirically difficult to distinguish between the 
effects of different sources and infer conclusions.  
We thus use a factor analysis to build the multidimensional construct and rely on 
previous literature to select the variables of interest. First, we proxy ownership power 
with two continuous variables: the equity owned by outside board members 
(OUT_BOARD_VR) (Lewellyn and Muller-Kahle, 2012) and the voting rights held by 
the CEO (CEO_VR) (Bach and Smith, 2007). Second, we operationalize structural 
power using two variables: the first is a dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is also 
the chairperson of the board (CEO_DUALITY) and zero otherwise (Adams et al., 
2005), while the latter is the ratio of independent directors (INDEP_DIR) (Lewellyn 
and Muller-Kahle, 2012). Third, we employ two variables to account for expert power: 
CEO board tenure (CEO_TENURE) (Combs et al., 2007) and CEO age (CEO_AGE) 
(Yang et al., 2011). Lastly, we disentangle prestige power with the help of two variables: 
the number of outside directorates that the CEO holds (CEO_INTERLOCK) (Oler et 
al., 2010) and CEO education (CEO_EDU). This equals one if at the IPO the CEO had 
a university degree. 
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TABLE I. Rotated factor loadings and communalities 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Communality 
CEO_DUALITY 0.889 0.180 0.853 
CEO_VR 0.849 -0.237 0.816 
CEO_TENURE 0.844 -0.129 0.815 
CEO_AGE 0.000 0.191 0.729 
CEO_EDU -0.109 0.022 0.756 
CEO_INTERLOCK 0.148 0.755 0.732 
INDEP_DIR 0.204 -0.279 0.618 
OUT_BOARD_VR -0.274 -0.283 0.595 
Eigenvalue 4.36 1.55 5.91 
Note:  To build our indicator (CEO_POWER) we rely on four types of power: ownership, structural, expert 
and prestige (Finkelstein, 1992). OUT_BOARD_VR is equal to the voting rights owned by outside (e.g. 
non-family affiliated) board members; CEO_VR refers to the voting rights held by CEO. Both variables 
proxy ownership power. 
CEO_DUALITY is a dichotomous variable equals to one if the CEO is also the chairperson, zero otherwise. 
INDEP_DIR is the ratio of independent directors over the total board members. We use the concept of 
independent director given in the Italian Code of Governance (Codice di Autodisciplina) provided by the 
Milan Stock Exchange. This code explicitly indicates evaluating form over substance when defining 
independent directors. Taken together, these variables proxy structural power.  
We proxy expert power with the subsequent variables. CEO_TENURE is equals to the numbers of years 
(months are computed as fraction of years) that manager servers as CEO in the firm. CEO_AGE is the age 
of CEO (computed in years).  
Finally, we rely on the following two variables to account for prestige power. CEO_INTERLOCK is the 
number of outside directorates that CEO holds at IPO time. CEO_EDU is a binary variable equals to one if 
CEO had obtained a university degree.  
 
To identify the most relevant measures of CEO power, we run an exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA), a widely used methodology for data reduction. The concept is to obtain 
a small set of variables from the large set of variables described above that are 
subsequently used to build the latent endogenous variable CEO power. The factor 
analysis shows that two of the eight factors have Eigenvalues greater than one. Taken 
together, the two factors explain around 74% (5.91/8) of the total variance of variables 
considered in the analysis. The first factor accounts for 54.5% of the total variance and 
the second for the remaining 19.5%. Table I summarizes the values of factor loadings 
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after orthogonal rotation. CEO_DUALITY, CEO_VR and CEO_TENURE have the 
highest loads in factor 1 and CEO_INTERLOCK in factor 2. The first factor can be 
considered a broad measure of CEO power including ownership, structural and expert 
power; the second factor primarily measures CEO power in terms of prestige power.  
The values of communalities are reasonably high, indicating that the results are quite 
reliable. Thus, the EFA suggests that the most pertinent measures of CEO power in our 
sample are CEO_DUALITY, CEO_VR, CEO_TENURE and CEO_INTERLOCK. 
However, the last variable, as we will explain further on, appears to be a very weak 
indicator of CEO power and will not be considered in constructing the endogenous 
latent variable. 
Based on the arguments presented, we consider only three measures of power, 
namely, CEO voting rights (ownership power), CEO duality (structural power) and 
CEO board tenure (expert power). Our factor analysis also confirms the results of 
Combs et al. (2007) who use these variables to measure CEO power. Our indicator 
(CEO_POWER) allows us to disregard prestige power.  
 
3.3.4 Moderating Variables 
To test our second hypothesis, we define FAM_CEO as a dichotomous variable equal 
to one if the CEO is a family member, zero otherwise. We use the IPO prospectus to 
carefully identify family members (related through blood or marriage). In line with 
Miller et al. (2014), we employ a binary variable to account for a co-leadership structure 
(CO_LEADER), which assumes the value of one if the firm is managed by two or more 
co-CEOs, zero otherwise. 
 
3.3.5 Control Variables 
We employ several control variables. First, we use a standard control for size, 
leverage and age. We operationalize size (SIZE) with a natural logarithm of market 
capitalization computed at offer price (Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002). Leverage (LEV) 
is equal to the book value of non equity-liabilities on the book value of total asset. We 
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use data referring to the last audited pre-IPO financial statement. Age (AGE) is the 
difference between IPO date and firm founding date11.  
In line with Chahine et al. (2011), we control for firms belonging to the AIM market: 
we set a dummy variable (MARKET) equal to one if the firm is listed on this market, 
zero otherwise. Finally, we also control for board size (BOARD_SIZE) using the natural 
logarithm of the total board members. We assume that CEO power will decrease if a 
higher number of executives is involved in decision-making. 
  
3.3.6 Data analysis  
In Table II, we report the summary statistics of our sample. The data show that a 
family member (FAM_CEO) serves as CEO in 43 cases: family leadership is widely used 
in the IPO transition stage. Of interest among other things is that 21 out of 77 firm 
IPOs adopted a co-leadership structure (CO_LEADER).  
Table II provides the correlation among variables. The Pearson correlation 
coefficients do not evidence serious multicollinearity problems.  
The conceptual model shown in Figure 1 contains not only the observed variables but 
also the latent endogenous variable CEO power. Latent variables refer to phenomena 
that cannot be directly observed but can be measured through the observed variables. 
As mentioned earlier, CEO power is not directly observable as it is a multidimensional 
concept measured in a different and competing way. Thus, in order to test our 
theoretical hypotheses we rely on Structural Equation Modeling, a methodology that 
allows the simultaneous use of both latent and observed variables (Bollen, 1998). This 
method has been widely used in management researches (e.g. Ouakouak et al., 2014) as 
well as in family business literature (e.g. Marko Sarstedt et al., 2014). In addition, 
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) offers several advantages (Hoyle, 2012): i) under 
given conditions, this is a robust method to deal with small samples; ii) it is a powerful 
tool for the confirmatory analysis of theoretical predictions, iii) it allows reliably 
defining latent variables by using the observable variables.  
                                                          
11 We compute days and months as a fraction of the year. In the analysis, we use the natural logarithm of 
(AGE). 
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 TABLE II. Descriptive statistics & correlation matrix
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent Variables              
(1) M/B 1.24 0.73 -0.47 3.93 1.00         
(2) IPO_PRM 0.77 0.21 -.073 0.99 0.64    1.00        
Control Variables              
(3) SIZE 11.37 1.45 8.38 14.30 -0.11   -0.34    1.00       
(4) LEV 0.71 0.18 0.03 0.99 0.26    0.41    0.03   1.00      
(5) AGE 2.40 1.02 -0.69 4.29 -0.08   -0.16    0.17    -0.01    1.00     
(6) MARKET 0.23 0.43 0 1.00 0.14    0.42   -0.47   0.13   -0.15    1.00    
(7) BOARD_SIZE 1.98 0.40 0.69 2.77 -0.00    0.02    0.37    -0.02    0.28   -0.03    1.00   
Moderating Variables              
(8) FAM_CEO 0.56 0.50 0 1.00 0.05    0.13   -0.01 0.13   -0.13    -0.16    0.22 1.00  
(9) CO_LEADER 0.27 0.44 0 1.00 -0.06    0.13   -0.21    0.00    0.13    0.03   0.27 -0.07    1.00 
Note:  M/B is the first day market capitalization over book value of equity. Where the first-day market capitalization is equals to the number of post-IPO shares multiplied by 
the closing price on the first trading day; the equity book value is the post-issue value of equity: it sums the book value of last audited pre-IPO financial statement with the 
primary offering proceeds. In the analyses, we employ the natural logarithm. This measure has already been used to analyse Italian IPOs (Mazzola and Marchisio, 2002). 
IPO_PRM  is the offering price minus the book value of equity over the offering price (Certo et al., 2003). The book value of equity is per shares; data are from last (pre-IPO) 
audited financial statement. SIZE is natural logarithm of market capitalization computed at offer price (Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002). LEV is the ratio of Book Value of non-
Equity Liabilities on book value of Total Asset, it refers to last pre-IPO financial (audited) statement. AGE is difference between the IPO year and the founding year in the 
prospectus: in the analyses, we employ the natural logarithm. MARKET is a dummy variable equals to one if the firms will be listed on AIM Market, zero otherwise (Chahine 
et al., 2011). BOARD_SIZE is the natural logarithm of total board of directors’ members. FAM_CEO takes value one if the CEO is a family member (person related through 
blood or marriage), zero otherwise. CO_LEADER is a dummy variable equals to one if there is more than one CEO (Miller et al., 2014). 
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Our SEM consists of two components: the measurement model that relates the latent 
variable CEO power to its indicators and the structural model that tests the hypotheses 
drawn from theoretical literature. Some variables included in the model are 
dichotomous and others are non-normally distributed. In such a situation, the maximum 
likelihood estimator, which we rely on, may lead to distorted coefficient estimates and to 
incorrect standard errors (Satorra and Muthén, 1995). To avoid such problems, we 
estimate a Generalized Structural Equation Model, by means of the GSEM command 
provided by the STATA (version 13) statistical software package.12  
As regards the measurement model, initially we considered as indicators of CEO 
power CEO_DUALITY, CEO_VR, CEO_TENURE and CEO_INTERLOCK, that is, 
the variables identified with ECA. However, the estimates (not reported due to lack of 
space) show that CEO_INTERLOCK is not statistically significant. The variable is 
therefore excluded from the analysis and the final measurement model only includes 
measures of power related to the ownership, structural and expert dimensions.  
 
3.4 Results and discussion 
Panel A of Table III presents the estimates of our base structural model. We test our 
first hypothesis using two proxies for IPO value. In model 1, we consider the Market to 
Book value (M/B) as the dependent variable: in this case, powerful CEOs increase 
external investor evaluations (.280, p<0.01). We obtain similar results when using IPO 
premium (IPO_PRM) as a dependent variable (.066, p<0.05 model 2). Our results 
confirm that CEO power is useful to reduce self-serving CEO behaviours. Given the 
prominent role of a CEO during the IPO transitional stage (Andrews and Welbourne, 
2000), our analysis suggests concentrating power in the CEO's hands to reassure 
potential investors and obtain a better evaluation at the time of going public. This 
finding indicates that investors view powerful leaders positively in such uncertain 
                                                          
12 A major drawback of the GSEM command is that it does not provide goodness of fit statistics for the 
estimated models. However, in order to provide some information on the accuracy of our empirical model, 
we have estimated the base structural model also with the SEM command which is able to calculate some 
diagnostic tests. The overall goodness-of-fit statistics seem to be satisfactory (Comparative Fit Index 
is=0.97; Root mean squared error of approximation= 0.055; Standardized root mean squared residual= 
0.038). 
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environments. Both models show the same relationship between the dependent variable 
and the control factors. Size (SIZE) is positively related with IPO value (.207, p<0.01 
model 1; .041, p<0.05 model 2), larger firms are less risky (Giudici and Roosenboom, 
2006). Leverage (LEV) enters the equation with a positive sign (.951, p<0.01 model 1; 
.398, p<0.01 model 2). As Bruton et al. (2010) show, a high level of debt may reduce 
managerial discretion. Age (AGE) is not significant in our models. The choice to list on 
the AIM market (MARKET) is positively evaluated by external investors (.322, p>0.1 
model 1; .204, p<0.01 model 2). As expected, a greater number of managers involved in 
the decision-making process may be detrimental to CEO power, consequently, board 
size (BOARD_SIZE) is negatively associated with IPO value but no significance 
emerges. There is no doubt that the first hypothesis is verified: CEO power is positively 
associated with IPO value, irrespective of how this is measured13. With regard to the 
measurement model, Panel B of Table III shows that all coefficients are statistically 
significant at the usual levels.14 
Table IV shows the results concerning our second and third hypotheses. Models 3a 
and 3b, as well as 5a and 5b, support the second hypothesis. When a family member 
serves as CEO, the positive effect of powerful leadership becomes stronger. That is, the 
CEO_POWER coefficient in model 3a (.499, p<0.05 model 3a) is higher than the 
coefficient in the previous models (.280, p<0.01 model 1) while the coefficient in model 
3b is lower than in the previous models (.230, p<0.05 model 3b). These results suggest 
that potential investors positively evaluate the strong commitment of family leaders to 
their businesses. 
Our empirical evidence is coherent with the research line that empirically 
demonstrates that familiness, at leadership level, has a positive impact on firm 
performance (e.g., Minichilli et al., 2010). Our results are the same when we consider 
                                                          
13  We also perform the analysis using a third proxy for IPO value: we compute IPO premium 2 
(IPO_PRM2) using the closing price rather than the offer price in the formula (1). We indicate this as 
model 3. We obtain similar results (.079, p<0.01 model 3). Moreover, we also ran the analysis with a 
different definition of family firms: F-PEC scale (Astrachan et al., 2002). This leaves us with 75 
observations but the results remain unchanged (.307, p<0.01 model 1; .062, p<0.05 model 2; .081, p<0.01 
model 3). 
14 Due to space constraints, we do not report the estimates of the measurement model for the subsequent 
models. 
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IPO premium as a dependent variable (models 5a and 5b): the CEO_POWER 
coefficient in the presence of a family CEO (.089, p<0.1 model 5a) is higher than in the 
previous models (.066, p<0.05 model 2; .062, p<0.01 model 5b). We also test the 
moderating effect of a co-leadership structure (models 4a, 4b, 6a and 6c). 
 
TABLE III. CEO Power and IPO value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
Model 1 
(I) 
y=M/B 
Model 2 
(II) 
y=IPO_PRM 
Panel A: Structural model 
CEO_POWER 0.280*** 
(0.099) 
0.066** 
(0.030) 
SIZE 0.207*** 
(0.069) 
0.041** 
(0.016) 
LEV 0.951*** 
(0.331) 
0.398*** 
(0.129) 
AGE 0.044 
(0.090) 
-0.002 
(0.020) 
MARKET 0.322 
(0.209) 
0.204*** 
(0.042) 
BOARD_SIZE -0.192 
(0.194) 
-0.001 
(0.060) 
Industry controls YES YES 
Panel B: Measurement model 
CEO_DUALITY 0.059*** 
(0.021) 
CEO_VR 0.040*** 
(0.015) 
CEO_TENURE 9.980*** 
(3.824) 
N 77 
Note: ***, ** and * denote statistically significant coefficients at 1, 5 
and 10% level of significance. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Models 1 and 2 present the results about first hypothesis. 
In column I we regress M/B on: CEO Power, Size, Leverage, Age, 
Market and Board of Directors size.  
In column II we use IPO_PRM to proxy IPO value 
See Table II for variable definitions 
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 Our last hypothesis is also supported: in line with stewardship theory, we find that 
the ‘unity of command’ is beneficial for family IPOs. Our findings indicate that the 
impact of powerful CEOs is magnified when they do not share leadership: the presence 
of at least one other CEO is detrimental for external investors who may be confused by 
multiple leadership roles. In model 4a, the CEO_POWER coefficient is higher than in 
the other models (.462, p<0.01 model 4a; .087, p<0.01 model 4b; .280, p<0.01 model 
1) and the same results can be observed when IPO premium is a dependent variable 
(.109, p<0.05 model 6a; .031, p<0.01 model 6b; .066, p<0.05 model 2). 
To assess whether the estimated CEO power coefficients in the model with a 
moderating effect of CEO family (CEO_FAM) are higher than those in the base models 
(models 1 and 2), we rely on the Welch-Satterthwaite (WS) test, the two-sample t-test 
with unequal variance. The t-statistics reported in Table III (model 3a and 5a) show 
that the differences are statistically significant at the usual levels. Thus, we can conclude 
that the stronger effect of CEO power for IPOs with CEO family has robust statistical 
significance. We also perform the WS Test for the CO_LEADER moderating effect 
(models 4a and 6a): our results confirm the hypothesis. 
Finally, we consider the case of powerful family CEOs who do not share leadership 
(32 observations). We empirically test this with unsurprising results: there is a stronger 
effect of CEO_POWER on investor evaluations at IPO stage. A co-leadership structure 
would seem crucial to the effectiveness of a family CEO. The case under scrutiny can be 
interpreted as an extreme form of hierarchical structure: it may well be that individuals 
prefer hierarchical settings where leadership power is clearly defined (Tiedens, Unzueta 
& Young, 2007). Moreover, a powerful CEO may also affect employee behaviour: Jost 
and Banaji (1994) show that people are inclined to disempower themselves to create or 
sustain a hierarchical structure, which is particularly true among family members.  
The WS Test confirms the statistical significance of the differences between the CEO 
power coefficients obtained in the last models (models 7a and 8a) and those obtained in 
the base models (models 1 and 2). 
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TABLE IV. CEO Power and moderating effects 
 Model 3a 
(I) 
Model 3b 
(II) 
Model 4a 
(III) 
Model 4b 
(IV) 
 Model 5a  
(V) 
Model 5b 
(VI) 
Model 6a  
(VII) 
Model 6b 
(VIII) 
 FAM_CEO=1 FAM_CEO=0 CO_LEADER=0 CO_LEADER=1  FAM_CEO=1 FAM_CEO=0 CO_LEADER=0 CO_LEADER=1 
Variable y=M/B  y=IPO_PRM 
CEO_POWER 0.499** 
(0.233) 
0.230** 
(0.112) 
0.462*** 
(0.105) 
0.087*** 
(0.022) 
 0.089* 
(0.050) 
0.062** 
(0.031) 
0.109** 
(0.049) 
0.031*** 
(0.006) 
SIZE 0.223** 
(0.095) 
0.229** 
(0.114) 
0.246*** 
(0.078) 
-0.120 
(0.154) 
 0.034** 
(0.014) 
0.070* 
(0.042) 
0.057*** 
(0.019) 
-0.015 
(0.033) 
LEV 0.562 
(0.424) 
1.545*** 
(0.578) 
0.961*** 
(0.337) 
1.159 
(1.291) 
 0.193** 
(0.080) 
0.623*** 
(0.194) 
0.379*** 
(0.145) 
0.666** 
(0.293) 
AGE -0.011 
(0.122) 
0.070 
(0.136) 
-0.009 
(0.087) 
0.400 
(0.365) 
 -0.009 
(0.024) 
0.009 
(0.048) 
-0.003 
(0.020) 
0.042 
(0.118) 
MARKET 0.308 
(0.252) 
0.369 
(0.312) 
0.327 
(0.255) 
0.836** 
(0.427) 
 0.172*** 
(0.037) 
0.163 
(0.113) 
0.237*** 
(0.055) 
0.146 
(0.102) 
BOARD_SIZE -0.284 
(0.265) 
-0.270 
(0.339) 
-0.194 
(0.236) 
0.113 
(0.303) 
 -0.046 
(0.047) 
0.005*** 
(0.147) 
-0.074 
(0.072) 
0.073 
(0.092) 
Industry controls YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
N 43 34 56 21  43 34 56 21 
Welch-Satterthwhite 
Test (t-statistics) 
5.87  10.12   2.75  5.82  
Note: ***, ** and * denote statistically significant coefficients at 1, 5 and 10% level of significance. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Models 3a, 3b and 5a, 5b provide evidences about the moderating effect of Family CEO on the base relationship between CEO Power and IPO value (hypothesis 2). Columns 
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I and II show the results obtained by using M/B to proxy IPO value; in columns V and VI IPO value is measured by IPO_PRM. 
Models 4a, 4b and 6a, 6b tests our last hypothesis (the moderating effect of co-leadership structure). In columns III and IV we employ M/B to account for IPO value; in 
columns VII and VIII we rely on IPO_PRM.  
We perform Welch-Satterthwaite test, the two-sample t-test with unequal variance, to assess wheatear or not the coefficient of CEO_POWER in the above models are higher 
those in the base models (Table III). We compare, one by one, the coefficient of CEO_POWER of models 3a, 4a, with that of model; while we compare the coefficient of 
models 5a and 6a with that of model 2.  
See Table II for variable definitions 
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TABLE V. CEO Power, Family CEO and co-leadership structure: joint moderating 
effects 
 
3.5 Conclusions  
In the transition from private to public ownership, the link between CEO power and 
investor evaluations in the context of family firms has remained an unexplored area. The 
goal of this research is to better understand whether, how and why a powerful CEO has 
an effect on IPO value. 
We argue, in line with Finkelstein et al. (2009), that CEO power must be analysed as 
a construct rather than multiple variables. Thus, by using an exploratory factor analysis 
 Model 7a 
(IX) 
Model 7b 
(X) 
 Model 8a 
(XI) 
Model 8b 
(XII) 
 FAM_CEO=1 & 
CO_LEADER=0 
FAM_CEO=0 & 
CO_LEADER=1 
 FAM_CEO=1 & 
CO_LEADER=0 
FAM_CEO=0 & 
CO_LEADER=1 
Variable y=M/B  y=IPO_PRM 
CEO_POWER 0.573*** 
(0.120) 
0.077*** 
(0.032) 
 0.118*** 
(0.018) 
0.026*** 
(0.009) 
SIZE 0.254** 
(0.103) 
-0.270 
(1.310) 
 0.049*** 
(0.016) 
-0.059 
(0.395) 
LEV 0.799* 
(0.455) 
1.265 
(2.265) 
 0.221** 
(0.079) 
0.870** 
(0.401) 
AGE 0.007 
(0.174) 
0.350 
(0.747) 
 -0.007 
(0.030) 
0.044 
(0.248) 
MARKET 0.136 
(0.354) 
0.572 
(1.306) 
 0.188*** 
(0.047) 
-0.099 
(0.166) 
BOARD_SIZE -0.403 
(0.385) 
0.636 
(4.936) 
 -0.126** 
(0.063) 
0.624 
(1.644) 
Industry controls YES YES  YES YES 
N 32 11  32 11 
Welch-
Satterthwhite Test 
(t-statistics) 
12.19   11.13  
Note: ***, ** and * denote statistically significant coefficients at 1, 5 and 10% level of significance. Standard 
errors in parentheses. 
Models 7a and 8a consider the joint effect of having a family member as CEO without shared leadership. In 
columns IX and X we proxy IPO value with M/B; in columns XI and XII we rely on IPO_PRM. 
We perform Welch-Satterthwaite test, the two-sample t-test with unequal variance, to confirm the 
statistical significance of the differences between the coefficients of CEO_POWER obtained in models 7a 
and 8a with those obtained in the models 1 and 2. 
See Table II for variable definitions 
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(EFA), we empirical build an indicator for CEO power. Considering Finkelstein's 
(1992) framework, we take into account three types of power through a factor analysis: 
ownership, structural and expert. Using a unique hand-collected dataset, we make 
inference on 77 family owned IPOs that took place on the Milan Stock Exchange in the 
period 2000-2011. In a stewardship framework, we confirm that a powerful leader can 
reduce uncertainty and foster trust among new potential investors. Our results suggest 
that outside investors positively evaluate family IPOs managed by powerful CEOs.   
Further, broader family business literature has generally assumed that IPO firms 
belong to a homogenous group. We introduce two moderating factors that allow us to 
distinguish between different familiar leadership styles: we find differences in powerful 
family and non-family leaders as well as between a co-leadership structure and the case 
of ‘one man in command’. The presence of a powerful family CEO strengthens the 
relationship between leader power and IPO value. Considering the second moderating 
factor, the presence of a co-leadership structure, we can state that IPO value will benefit 
from unity of command (e.g., absence of co-leaders). Moreover, we analyse the case of 
powerful family CEOs who are the only leaders (e.g., no co-leadership structure) of the 
board and unsurprisingly find that this leads to superior performance of family IPOs.   
Our results are robust to different proxies: we employ two different measure of IPO, 
short term and value. We define family owned firms by evaluating family involvement in 
both equity and managerial positions, and perform a sensitivity test using an alternative 
definition (e.g., F-PEC score).  
However, we must point out three limitations of our study. First, we focus on a single 
country. On one hand, as in Chahine (2007), we are able to avoid any endogeneity 
problems between family ownership and country-specific characteristics, but on the 
other, this may limit the overall validity of the results. Future studies, where possible, 
should attempt to replicate our analysis in other countries and consider institutional or 
cultural conditions that affect the relationship between CEO power and IPO value in 
family firms. Second, we focus on short-term evaluations, we cannot exclude that in the 
long run the relationship may differ. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1989), a more 
powerful leader may exhibit stronger entrenchment behaviour, in particular with respect 
to the market for corporate control and thereby lowering firm value in the long run. 
Future studies could address the differences, if any, between the short and long term by 
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analysing how outside investors perceive powerful CEOs. Third, we consider only the 
CEO role but readily recognize that the top management team and its prestige (Lester 
et al., 2006) could also reduce uncertainty and influence IPO value. We do not take into 
account the possible interaction between powerful CEOs and top management team 
structure, which scholars may be interested in exploring further. 
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Chapter 3. A story of complicated relationship:  
family involvement in TMT and stock market.  
 Empirical evidences from IPOs survival.15 
 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this article is to analyse how and if TMT diversity affects post-IPO 
survival of publicly listed family firms. To this end, we draw upon the upper 
echelons perspective to investigate two sources of diversity: the percentage of 
family managers and the number of generations involved in TMT. We test our 
hypothesis on a data set of Italian listed family firms over the period 2000-2011. 
The results are robust to logistic regression and Cox hazard model. Our findings 
suggest that a higher presence of family members in TMT reduce the likelihood 
of post-IPO survival. Likewise, the number of generations is negatively 
correlated to survival. To corroborate such findings, we take show that when 
only one generation is in charge, survival probability increases.  
 
  
 
 
                                                          
15 Please note that a similar version of this chapter (with the same title) is currently under review for 
(voluntary-omitted) journal. I am grateful to my co-authors, Dr.sa Donata Mussolino, Prof. Mauro Romano 
and Prof. Riccardo Viganò, for their help. However all the errors within the chapter are my own 
responsibility. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Is it detrimental the Top Management Team (TMT) diversity in family Initial Public 
Offering (IPO) after went public? TMT is responsible for strategic outcomes and 
influences entrepreneurial activities as well as performance (Sciascia et al., 2013). In 
entrepreneurial context, TMT provides valuable contribution to find new financial 
resources and sustain firm growth (Kamm et al., 1990). In their seminal paper, 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) posit that organizations serve as reflections of their top 
executives. Complementing the studies of TMT, scholars broadened the focus to its 
demographic characteristics (Certo et al., 2007). Indeed, having a heterogeneous TMT 
may provide the company with a competitive advantage (Bunderson, 2003). Critics 
question this advantage (Olson et al., 2006) and define TMT diversity as a double-
edged sword (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996) involving in opposite forces that 
differently affect firm outcomes.  
In addition to previous literature, Ling and Kellermanns (2010) argue that family 
firms are an ideal setting to study TMT diversity. Therefore, the integration of family 
and non-family members in the TMT creates additional challenges and a greater source 
of diversity. 
As Minichilli et al. (2010) state, TMT diversity in family firms is still an 
underdeveloped topic despite of its crucial importance in strategic process and choices 
(Kellermanns and Eddleston, 2007). Carpenter (2011) maintains that the principal task 
of TMT is the strategic management of organization in order to assure the survival of 
the firm. Additionally, management literature stresses that TMT heterogeneity may 
affect entrepreneurial activities and, as reflection, survivability. 
IPO represents undoubtedly an entrepreneurial setting (Lester et al., 2006) where 
studying TMT demographic composition is useful to interpret and predict firm 
outcomes. Top managers of IPO firms may be particularly influential in firm 
behaviours, in fact “these individuals often joined during the early stages of 
development, the firms they lead not only reflect the strategies they enact, but may also 
embody their values, ideals, and beliefs” (Certo et al., 2009, p.1351). In the transition 
from a private to a public ownership, TMT is under scrutiny by potential investors who 
are unaware of how firm will react to the pressure of financial markets. Works in this 
Chapter 3 - A story of complicated relationship: family involvement in TMT and stock market.  
 
110 
 
area suggest that competences and composition of a firm’s top-level decision makers 
may infuse credibility to the equity market prior to IPO. Researches have flourished on 
this topic. Drawing on such works, empirical studies investigated TMT prestige and 
stakeholders’ valuation (Lester et al., 2006) as well as TMT prior managerial experience 
and IPO underpricing (Cohen and Dean, 2005).  Beckman et al., (2007) claim that 
TMT compositions impact on likelihood of firms undertaking an IPO, while the 
findings of Florin, Lubatkin and Schulze (2003) reveal an association between TMT 
social capital and the firm's ability to raise capital in the IPO process. Likewise, 
Zimmerman (2008) suggest that TMT heterogeneity allows firms to raise more capital 
at IPO.  
Going one-step further, the existing literature fails to resolve how TMT demography 
influences the survival of firm in capital market (post-IPO success). In post-IPO phase, 
firms face transitional changes such as liability of adolescence. Within this line of 
research, scholars investigated several characteristics of apical key managers (Liu et al., 
2012). Bach and Smith (2007) find that CEO’s structural power decreases, five years, 
post-IPO survival. A recent work of Kashefi Pour (2015) suggests that if CEO has 
greater power over the board (e.g. he/she is also the founder) the probability of 
delisting decreases. In the work of Yang and Zhu (2006), a U-shaped relationship 
between management insider ownership and survival time of IPOs is found. Welbourne 
and Andrews (1996) note that if top managers valued their employees as an asset, firms 
are more likely to survive post-IPO. Wilbon (2002) reveals that experienced senior 
executives enhances the chances the firm survives. Unsurprised, none of previous 
studies, to date, address the issue of post-IPO survival in family firms. Given the above 
discussion and considering that family offers a unique source of TMT heterogeneity 
(Ling and Kellermanns, 2010) we fill the gap by focusing on TMT diversity in family 
firms and post-IPO survival.  
To test if and to what extent TMT diversity affect post-IPO survival, we draw upon a 
sample of 77 family owned firms that went public on Milano Stock Exchange in 2000-
2011 timeframe. In line with Kraiczy et al., (2014), we rely on two family firm-specific 
sources of TMT diversity: namely, the ratio of family members in the TMT and the 
number of generations involved in TMT. Previous literature on upper echelon theory 
and family business (e.g. Ling and Kellermans, 2010) claim that each source of family 
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firm-specific TMT diversity may have a different impact and needs separate 
consideration. We embrace this suggestion and separately assess their impact on post-
IPO survival. First, we look at the presence of both family and nonfamily members as a 
major source of family TMT diversity (Naldi et al., 2007). In this light, we rely upon the 
ratio of family managers in TMT: the findings unequivocally suggest that this source of 
diversity is detrimental for post-IPO survival. Second, the vertical distance among 
family members can be a source of TMT diversity. That is, we consider the number of 
generations involved in TMT and verify that the higher the intergenerational 
involvement is, the lower likelihood of post-IPO survival would be. Moreover, we focus 
on the impact of single and multiple generations in charge: results reveals that having 
only one generation involved in TMT increases the likelihood of post-IPO survival. 
Empirically our results are robust to two different techniques: logistic regression and 
Cox hazard model. 
The present research aims to understand if and to what extent family TMT diversity 
affect post-IPO failure (e.g. the condition of being delisted). By integrating the upper 
echelon perspective within the family business literature, our study contributes to the 
management and entrepreneurship literature in several distinctive ways. 
First, to the best of our knowledge, this study represents the first empirical 
investigation of IPO survival of publicly listed family firms. Considering that empirical 
studies investigating IPO firms’ ability to survive are relatively limited and mainly 
concern large IPOs in the USA (Amini and Keasey, 2013), we contribute to advance 
the academic debate on IPO survival providing empirical evidence that suggests how 
family involvement in TMT influencing IPO ability to survive in the aftermarket. 
Second, our study demonstrates the importance of the TMT composition in a strategic 
and complex context. Few studies have examined attributes that capture the family 
dimension for the TMT diversity (Sciascia et al., 2013; Minichilli et al., 2010; Ling and 
Kellermanns, 2010). Yet, family firms offer a rich avenue for research on diversity, since 
the family provides an additional layer of complexity and unique sources of TMT 
diversity not found in non-family firms. Accordingly, we seek to enrich the 
understanding of TMT diversity in family firms by focusing on two important sources of 
diversity that are particularly salient to this type of business: the number of family 
managers and the number of employed generations in the TMT. Bringing the 
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dimensions into our research, we contribute to answer the question of how family 
involvement contributes to firm outcomes. We ideally respond to recent calls from 
family business literature for a deeper understanding of family heterogeneity (Melin and 
Nordqvist, 2010) and for a clearer picture of TMT diversity and entrepreneurial 
outcomes (Sciascia et al., 2013). 
Third, researchers are increasingly interested in explaining differences among family 
firms (e.g Chrisman and Patel, 2012); we contribute to this effort by developing 
arguments to explain how the influence of TMT composition on IPO survival changes 
depending on a single generation-managed family firm or multi-generation-managed 
family ﬁrms. 
With supportive empirical results, our research offers two main contributions. First, 
this study contributes to the debate on whether family involvement is conducive or not 
for IPO survival, based on the level of family member’s and of generational involvement 
in upper echelon positions. Second, we cautiously add some knowledge to the TMT 
diversity literature by proposing a negative relationship between two sources of TMT 
diversity and firm survival, thus shedding some light on previous mixed findings.  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In the next section we briefly 
present previous studies on the issue of IPO survival and on the role of TMT in the IPO 
phase. Next, we review the literature on family firms and IPO and on TMT diversity in 
family firms. Section 3 is devoted to hypotheses development. The study design, 
methods and data analysis are described in Section 4. Section 5 highlights our empirical 
results. Section 6 discusses the findings of our investigation. Section 7 exposes the main 
limitations of this study and highlight some promising avenues for future research. The 
final section presents the conclusions.  
 
4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 The issue of post-IPO survival  
Over the past few decades, research on firms engaged in initial public offerings 
(IPOs) has turned up as a prominent topic in entrepreneurship and management 
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research (Certo et al., 2009). IPOs take place when firms move from private to public 
ownership by issuing liquid shares that are subsequently traded on a stock market.  
The entrepreneurial choice of go public is a trade-off between costs (e.g. indirect 
costs: market fluctuation and underpricing; direct costs: disclosure costs and 
underwriting fees) and benefits (e.g. diversification, access to equity and outside 
monitoring) (Zingales, 1995). Dealing with such costs, Migliorati et al. (2012), for 
example, report a gross spread of 8.08% for Italian IPOs. In management literature, a 
central tenet is that a sense of uncertain permeates IPO phase (Certo et al., 2001): 
surviving in a new risky environment may depends from several factors. Post-IPO 
failure rates confirm these high risks involved in entrepreneurial IPO firms. A primary 
concern of researchers has been to individuate which are the aspect that could 
determine post-IPO success, defined as the condition of being still traded within three 
years after IPO. Among others, Jain and Kini (1999) provide a valuable contribution 
when defining the principal explanatory variables (e.g. entry barriers, firm size, research 
and development spending and underwriter prestige) that predict IPO survival. Prior 
studies have found that IPO failure may be attributable to two different subgroups of 
motivations: external conditions and intrinsic firm’s characteristics.  
Within the former group, Vismara et al. (2012) prove that there is no difference, in 
terms of probability of survival, between different types of markets but the likelihood of 
delisting is lower in Continental Europe (e.g. Germany and Italy) when compared with 
London Stock Exchange. Espenlaub (1999) argues that industry plays a pivotal role in 
predicting firm’s survival in capital markets. For example, Wilbon (2002) reports that 
high technology IPOs face greater risk and are more subject to post-IPO failure 
compared to others sectors. Amini and Keasey (2012) show that spatial proximity to 
London increases failure rate for firms operating in the financial sectors.  
In the second group of motivation, literature investigates internal characteristics of 
IPO firms: in particular, ownership (e.g. presence of venture capitalist), external 
advisors (e.g. nomad and audit firms) and management compositions and tasks. The 
finding by Carpentier and Suret (2011) reveals that venture-backed IPOs are also less 
prone to delisting. Jain and Martin (2005) empirically assess how audit quality could 
reduce post‐IPO time to failure by using proportional hazard model. Their findings 
confirm that the hazard ratio is negatively (and hence survival time is positively) related 
Chapter 3 - A story of complicated relationship: family involvement in TMT and stock market.  
 
114 
 
to auditor quality. Across a European sample, Thomsen and Vinten (2014) find that 
ownership concentration is positively associated with the likelihood of non-survival after 
IPO. Another factor that may affect IPO survival is pre-listing performance (Fama and 
French, 2004): in 2004, Peristiani and Hong test this argument and conclude that firms 
with negative pre-IPO earnings were three times more likely to be delisted compared 
with profitable listed firms. When discussing firm’s characteristics, the study of Kooli 
and Meknassi (2007) find that large IPOs have lower probability of failing relative to 
their small counterparts.  
 
4.2.2 The role of TMT in IPO phase 
Our research is in line with the academic debate that investigate internal 
characteristics of IPO firms to predict IPO success or failure. Particularly, we build on 
previous studies that have found that the influence of the Top Management Team 
(TMT) knowledge and experiences is likely to be strong in the post-IPO firm (Liu et al., 
2012). The post-IPO firm faces a bigger community of stakeholders whose demands 
may influence its strategies creating complexity and a need to manage different external 
pressures (Ritter and Welch, 2002). The demands from external stakeholders require a 
more stable organization with clearer internal divisions of labour (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984). In IPO firms, this new internal organization and external legitimacy to 
be a more professionalized firm is still yet to be developed compared to mature, publicly 
listed corporations (Filatotchev and Piesse, 2009). These unique characteristics of 
stakeholders, tasks, and internal organization require managers at the post-IPO firm to 
possess appropriate experiences and knowledge (Nelson, 2003). With the changes of the 
firm's dominant problems (Kazanjian, 1988) such as the lack of legitimacy and internal 
specialization, the composition of TMT in IPO firms provides an important solution as 
the upper echelon theory explains. 
The upper echelon perspective states that firm performance is a “reflection” of the 
characteristics and actions of the team of managers central to the firm, known as the 
TMT (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; Hambrick and Mason, 1984). The two basic 
assumptions of the upper echelon theory, that found their roots on the bounded 
rationality (Cyert and March, 1963; March and Simon, 1958), are: (1) executives act on 
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the basis of their personalized interpretations of the strategic situations they face, and 
(2) these personalized interpretations depend on the executives’ experiences, value, and 
personalities (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Therefore, “if we want to understand why 
organizations do the things they do, or why they perform the way they do, we must 
consider the biases and dispositions of their most powerful actors – their top 
executives.” (Hambrick, 2007, p.334). 
TMT members’ different experience, perspectives, values, and affiliations shape the 
ideas and opportunities that are eventually pursued (Beckman, 2006). This diversity in 
TMT influences a firm’s entrepreneurial activities, strategic behaviours and 
performance of firms (Barkema and Shvyrkov, 2007; Beckman et al., 2007). 
Prior studies have addressed the effects of TMT diversity on innovation and on 
entrepreneurial orientation (e.g. O’Reilly et al., 1993; Talke et al., 2011), as well as 
literature has widely explored characteristics and behaviours of the TMT, such as 
interaction and demography, on success of the firm (e.g. Amason, 1996; Amason and 
Sapienza, 1997).  
However, the existing literature fail to resolve the contribution of the characteristics 
of TMT on the post-IPO success (or failure), defined as the likelihood of being listed 
(delisted) after three years from IPO (Certo et al., 2007). 
TMT is responsible for strategic outcomes and influences entrepreneurial activities 
as well as performance (Sciascia et al., 2013). However, the relationship between IPO 
firms and top managers goes beyond the simple provision of strategic decisions. In fact, 
an IPO is a strategic event for firm with primary responsibility for success attributed to 
its management team (Lester et al., 2006). Certo et al., 2007 hold the view that TMT 
has a crucial role in the probability of post-IPO success or failure Indeed, the transition 
from a private to a public ownership may increase failure rates because of new 
challenges and unexperienced market pressure faced by management (Fischer and 
Pollock, 2004).  
Moreover, the study of Welbourne and Andrews (1996) about firm survival claims 
that when top managers correctly nurture employees ‘talents firms are more likely to 
survive post-IPO. By the same token, Wilbon’s (2002) findings suggest that firms with 
more experienced top managers are more likely to survive after IPO.  
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Considering that family business creates a unique setting offering “a rich avenue for 
research on diversity, since the family provides an additional layer of complexity and 
unique sources of TMT diversity not found in non-family firms.” (Ling and 
Kellermanns, 2010, p. 323) and that literature confirms that the role of upper echelon in 
family-controlled publicly listed firms in the strategic choice of going public is an 
underdeveloped topic (e.g. Leitterstorf and Rau, 2014; Jaskiewicz et al., 2005), our 
paper fills the gap in literature about the role of TMT of publicly listed family firms in 
post-IPO survival. 
4.2.3 Family firms and IPO 
The world economy is dominated by family firms (La Porta et al., 1999). Among 
different types of controlling shareholders, families represent 40% of the Fortune 500 
firms between 1994 and 2000 Villalonga and Amit (2006), one-third of the S&P 500 
firms between 1992 and 1999 (Anderson and Reeb, 2003), 85% of all the European 
firms, 27% of all the European listed companies with the market capitalization over 50 
mln €, 60% of publicly listed firms in Italy (CONSOB, 2013). 
Despite this significant proportion of family-controlled publicly listed firms, 
literature has devoted limited attention to family IPOs (Astrachan and McConaughy, 
2001) and, to the best of our knowledge, there is no study that have examined IPO 
survival of family-controlled business. 
To date, researchers provide scant evidences about why family firms go public. It is 
often said that firms whose controlling shareholder enjoys large private benefit, such as 
family owned companies, are less likely to go public (Boehmer and Ljungqvist, 2004). 
From an emotional standpoint (Dyer and Handler, 1994), family entrepreneur consider 
firm as their own creature and this may inhibit the wealth diversification premium of 
going public. Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) suggest that firms go public to enjoy 
a lower cost of credit capital.  
Within family IPOs, Mazzola and Marchisio (2002) address the relevant topic of the 
implementation of new and different governance mechanisms and change in managerial 
positions to gain benefits from the listing process. Strong family involvement has been 
found to increase long-run stock market performance of IPOs in Germany and Spain 
(Jaskiewicz et al., 2005). Contrasting these results, Giovannini (2010) reports a negative 
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relationship between family involvement and share performance within the Italian 
context. The listing process may also influence long-run strategic outcomes: the 
findings by Jain and Shao (2014) reveal that family firms underinvest in post-IPO 
liquidity. Leitterstorf and Rau (2014) underline that there is no difference among 
different family generation in charge and their impact on underpricing. Recent 
evidences by Chahine and Goergen (2013) suggest that the strength of family ties 
within TMT negatively impacts on IPO performance. Jain and Shao (2014) sustain that 
the involvement of two generations of family members in TMT fasters the dissipation of 
post-IPO cash reserves.  
However, studies on long-term performance give us very little information 
about family firms’ survival after IPO. In literature, there is a general consensus that 
family businesses present survivability capital; it is “the pooled personal resources that 
family members are willing to loan, contribute, or share for the benefit of the family 
business” (Sirmon and Hitt 2003, p. 343). One may argue that, ceteris paribus, such 
firms would exhibit higher successful likelihood. In this sense, Wilson et al., (2013) 
claim that family firms have a significantly lower failure rate than the nonfamily 
subsample, but their findings consider only private firms. On the contrary, scholars 
often refer to family firms as more risk adverse than non-family counterparts (Hiebl, 
2013): this attitude may undermine the survivability of the company (Zellweger et al., 
2013). In fact, firms do not shoulder sufficient diversification when there is a necessity 
to devote more financial resource in diversifying innovation to increase survival chances 
(Carney, 2005).  
Such reflections are unsatisfactory to predict the survival of family firms on the 
equity market, leaving open the question of family IPOs failure rate in capital markets 
(Certo et al., 2001). Considering how previous studies have underlined the role of the 
TMT for the family firms’ strategic outcomes (Minichilli et al., 2010; Naldi et al., 2013), 
we believe that the upper echelon perspective offer the theoretical framework to 
investigate the contribution of TMT of family business to the post-IPO survival.  
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4.2.4 TMT diversity in family firms  
Family business, like other organizations, is often managed by a group or team of 
individuals whose collective dynamic has a direct impact on the direction and 
performance of the firm (Minichilli et al., 2010). Upper echelon theory suggests that 
performance differences arise from the composition of the TMT (Hambrick, 2007) and 
scholars in the field of family business confirm that TMT diversity has an impact on 
family firm performance (Ling and Kellermanns, 2010). 
When exploring TMT diversity, we assume that diversity could be induced by the 
involvement of the controlling family reflected in TMT, directly or indirectly (Ensley 
and Pearson, 2005). Studies on TMT in family firms provide inconclusive results. Such 
mixed results have induced most scholars to argue that TMT diversity is a “double-
edged sword” (Milliken and Martins, 1996) in which the “effect of TMT diversity on 
innovativeness [and entrepreneurship]” is “mixed and ambiguous because of the dual 
impact of the benefits and costs associated with TMT diversity” (Auh and Menguc, 
2005, p. 250). TMT diversity apparently brings the necessary knowledge to bear on 
complex strategic issues, but it is also likely to promote dysfunctional rivalries, impair 
social integration, and restrict knowledge flows-all of which serve to inhibit 
entrepreneurial orientation. 
It is argued that TMT diversity shapes the ideas and opportunities (Beckman 2006), 
thus influencing a firm’s entrepreneurial activities and performance (Barkema and 
Shvyrkov, 2007; Beckman et al., 2007). Accordingly, a wide literature on the effects of 
TMT diversity on strategic behaviours and outcomes has been developed (Zimmerman, 
2008). Research on diversity of the TMT and its impact on performance show 
controversial findings. From one side, some authors state that heterogeneous TMTs are 
beneficial (Bunderson, 2003), even if the positive effect of TMT diversity on 
performance does not receive consistent support (Olson et al., 2006). From other side, 
agency scholars have indicated that TMT diversity, in terms of involvement of the 
family group within the upper echelon, become harmful to the financial performance 
(Minichilli et al., 2010).  
We have argued how the intertwinement of business and family introduces the 
unique sources of TMT diversity in family firms. A more diverse TMT has more 
comprehensive cognitive resources and, thus, greater potential for more thoughtful 
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decision-making (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993). Such a TMT, however, may suffer 
from problems and costs related to coordination of the various interests and behaviours 
of heterogeneous team members (Smith et al., 1994). This is why researchers (e.g. 
Simons, Pelled and Smith, 1999) emphasize that the presence of differences within the 
TMT does not necessarily mean that the firm will make effective use of those 
differences.  
The major drawback of reviewed studies is that they fail to account for different 
TMTs composition, while TMT demography as be found to be one of the crucial factor 
that affect family firms’ strategic choices (Minichilli et al., 2010). Among its strategic 
tasks, TMT is required to implement a diversification strategy (Jones et al., 2008): it 
may offer an opportunity for family firms to spread out their holdings. Risk reduction 
could potentially improve the likelihood of firm survival; however, an additional threat is 
that family may need external funds to support diversification projects. The access to 
new equity via IPO creates a link to new actors (e.g. non-family shareholders) who can 
reduce family’s power and influence (Schulze et al., 2003) thereby generating a 
dilemma: maintain control over firm’s assets hits with the aim to diversify the family's 
business risk (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). The diversification thought listing process 
involves firms entering into new environment, thereby resulting in a change in the 
firms' administrative structure, systems, and management (Ramanujam and 
Varadarajan, 1989). 
We next unpack the concept of TMT diversity and consider the impact of family 
involvement in TMT of family firms on IPO survival.  
 
4.3 Hypotheses development: team composition in publicly listed family business 
and IPO survival 
Consistent with previous studies (Sciascia et al., 2013; Ling and Kellermanns, 2010), 
we focus on TMT diversity unique to family firms that originates from two sources: the 
ratio of family members to non-family members in the TMT and the number of 
generations involved in the TMT. We then analyse the impact that TMT diversity has 
on IPO survival of family-controlled business, filling the gap of no study in literature 
that tests IPO survival for family firms. 
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4.3.1 Ratio of family members in the TMT  
In the case of family firms, the most evident TMT diversity is between family and 
non-family members. Family members share common culture, values, and norms 
inherited from their parents and relatives, along with a common pattern of education, 
and usually feel satisfied and rewarded with their occupation in the family firm (Chua et 
al., 2003). Family members have a stronger emotional attachment to the firm. 
Emotional attachment enhances the level of commitment and involvement individuals 
have towards organizations, since they identify with the organization itself (Sharma and 
Irving, 2005). This is not true for non-family managers. They share similar outside 
professional experiences as those of family members, but possess a common feeling of 
exclusion from the controlling family.  
To measure this first step of TMT diversity in family firms, we refer to the ratio of 
family members in the TMT that is the ratio of family to family-external members in the 
TMT. In this sense, we are in line with previous studies that use this measure 
(Minichilli et al., 2010), thus facilitating comparisons among research findings. 
Our most basic argument is that TMT with a higher percentage of family members 
will potentially bring disruptive behavioural dynamics including conflict and unshared 
strategic objectives. Looking to theories exploring the behavioural dynamics of teams 
(Gladstein, 1984; Goodman et al., 1987), the group dynamic perspective predicts 
behavioural and emotional disagreements and tensions among family and non-family 
members.  
A number of management scholars have reported that TMT diversity can produce 
high levels of relationship or emotional conflicts, i.e., “interpersonal incompatibilities 
among group members, which typically includes tension, animosity, and annoyance” 
(Jehn, 1995, p.263) that undermine consensus and agreement, and thereby the 
potential entrepreneurial advantages of having a group with different knowledge and 
perspectives. Recent evidences from the field of family business suggest that the 
existence of these two different groups of family and non-family top executives leads to 
behavioural disruptions that consequently hurt firm performance (Li and Hambrick 
2005).  
Minichilli et al.  (2010) follow the idea developed by Li and Hambrick (2005) and 
suggest that the presence of divides inside groups or teams, based on one or more group 
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attributes (family versus non-family managers), can provoke subgroup conflicts that 
harm the group tasks’ effectiveness (Lau and Murnighan, 1998). In fact, dissimilarities 
determined by team members’ demographic or cognitive attributes create factional 
groups (Lau and Murnighan, 1998). 
Based on these explanations, the consequences of the costs related to TMT diversity 
are well explanained by Knight et al. (1999). They found that more heterogeneous TMT 
makes less comprehensive evaluations of opportunities and threats; Hambrick et al. 
(1996, p. 664) showed that team heterogeneity is negatively related to strategic 
consensus and leads to “dispersion in the group’s perspective,” thus inhibiting or 
delaying entrepreneurial action. In this sense, several studies thus far have reported a 
negative impact of TMT diversity on entrepreneurship (e.g. Ancona and Caldwell, 
1992).  
In line with these findings, Kellermanns and Eddleston (2007) provide evidence that 
a higher number of family members facilitate the rise of emotional family issues and 
conflict, which can negatively affect organizational processes. Because of a higher 
number of family managers has been found to reduce non-family managers’ discretion 
and freedom to act (Zahra, 2005) and because of the close connection of family member 
wealth to the firm is revealed to make investments in innovations and new products 
inherently risky by creating exposure to family assets (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). A 
high ratio of family members within the TMT may yield more risk-adverse decisions 
(Kraiczy et al., 2014). 
To guarantee the survivability on the equity market, to manage the complexity 
deriving from an entrepreneurial choice such as IPO, to respond properly to the more 
numerous external pressures, TMT diversity within family firms could no longer be 
beneficial in the fast-growing exposure at the post-IPO stage. Hence:  
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between the ratio of family managers in 
TMT and the likelihood of post-IPO failure. 
 
4.3.2 The Number of Employed Generations  
Generational involvement, that is the number of family generations simultaneously 
involved in the firm TMT, has been investigated as second source of TMT diversity in 
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family firms (Kellermanns and Eddleston, 2007). The diversity depends on that 
managers, although closely related through kinship ties, differ in their perspectives, 
objectives and knowledge based on the family generation they belong to (Sciascia et al., 
2013). To be in line with previous studies, we use the vertical distance among family 
members as a source of TMT diversity to investigate the impact on IPO survival. 
Researchers and social scientists, who study the effects of population on society, use 
the term “generation” to refer to people born in the same general time period, sharing 
key historical events or social life experiences (Kupperschmidt, 2000; Smola and Sutton, 
2002). The effects of those key life experiences tend to be relatively stable over the 
course of their lives (Smola and Sutton, 2002). Due to these distinct key life 
experiences, each generation develops unique traits and personality that influences its 
feelings toward authority and organization (Kupperschmidt, 2000; Smola and Sutton, 
2002). For example, members of generations who lived in war years tend to think and 
act differently than those born and raised in peace and abundance. Indeed, generational 
personality is also likely to shape what individuals want from work, what kind of 
workplace environment they desire and how they plan to satisfy those desires. Due to 
generational differences, these wants and desires tend to vary from generation to 
generation. Therefore, people from different generations may have problems 
understanding others’ perspectives of the work, which can be stressful, confusing, and 
frustrating in a demanding workplace (Gursoy et al., 2008).  
These generational differences are expected to create conflicts in the workplace by 
dividing the workforce into an “us” vs “them” mentality (Yang and Guy, 2006). Some 
studies have shown that when multiple generations work together, there is a potential 
for disagreement involving issues of setting objectives and taking actions, as individuals’ 
interests and agendas diverge (Beckhard and Dyer, 1983). Business objectives are likely 
to become complicated. For example, previous research indicated that the founding 
generation usually desires that the business prospers, that their hard-won achievements 
are not undermined, and that their expertise is put to good use, while the younger 
generation tends to desire autonomy and recognition (Dumas, 1992). 
Davis and Harveston (2001) found that more homogenous family teams would have 
less conflict— as a result of a single vision that is more commonly shared, held, and 
communicated— than those teams with greater familial distance. Similarly, Gersick et 
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al. (1997) highlight that as familial distance increases, the values, beliefs, and consensus 
of the family may become diluted. 
Together these researches provide important insights that dysfunctional conflicts are 
likely to arise in TMT when multiple generations work together. This means that 
generational involvement offers relational obstacles due to relationship conflicts 
(Barkema and Shvyrkov, 2007), that are dysfunctional to team performance (Amason, 
1996). 
Several studies have attempted to explain that relationship conflict can become such 
a destructive force that the competitive advantages of familiness may be largely 
eliminated (e.g., Chrisman et al., 2003). In the same vein, Habbershon et al. (2003) 
suggest that relational conflict may actually reduce the positive effects of familiness, 
thus reducing the ability of the firm to be successful. Therefore, by jointly considering 
the negative effect of multiple generations working together in TMT on team 
performance and the prediction of the upper echelon perspective, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between the number of family generations 
involved in TMT and the likelihood of post-IPO failure. 
 
4.4 Study design 
4.4.1 Sample 
We tested our hypotheses on the entire population (170 IPOs) of firms that went 
public on Milano Stock Exchange in the selected period. We pared the list down to 144 
by deleting firms in the financial sector (SIC code: 6000 - 6799, for 23 observations) 
and foreign firms (3 observations). Due to missing data, we also exclude 31 
observations. 
The Italian capital market represents an ideal setting to scrutiny the influence of 
family involvement in TMT for publicly listed firms because of its unique feature of a 
large number of listed family firms (Cascino et al., 2010). 
For historical reasons, family firms represent a higher portion of companies traded 
on the Italian Stock Exchange. Similar to other countries with poor financial 
infrastructures, the control of a large fraction of the economy is delegated to wealthy 
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and well-established families (Pagano et al., 1998). Controlling families are usually very 
much involved in the activities of the firm as revealed by the regular appointment of 
family members in the governance positions (Prencipe et al., 2008). 
Our period starts in 2000: before such date, national lawmaker made significant 
changes. First, Cattaneo et al. (2015) document that the introduction of Draghi Law 
(D. Lgs. N.58/1998) had influenced the listing patterns of Italian IPOs. Second, Borsa 
Italiana promoted the adoption of the first Italian code of good governance (Codice 
Preda, 1999): it may influence board composition and manager nomination including 
family members (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). Lastly, we select this observation period to 
avoid any potential bias due to the good trend of stock market index and the increasing 
of public incentives (e.g. tax benefit granted by Tremonti law) occurred in the period 
1995-1999 (Bonardo et al., 2007). We end our analysis in 2011 because we track the 
IPOs in the next triennium (until 31 December 2014) to determine whether they were 
delisted or not. 
Reliable information on family firms are difficult to obtain. Therefore, we gathered 
information from IPO prospectus16. Lester et al. (2006) document the wide use of such 
prospectus in previous literature because it discloses data accessible to all kind of 
investors and other parties (Beatty and Zajac, 1994). By using the prospectus, we take 
an advantage: we can identify family members not only by surname affinity with that of 
dominant shareholder (relation by blood) but also by in-law relationships (e.g. 
marriage) with controlling family. Moreover, we obtain the number and kind of 
delisting from Borsa Italiana.  
 
4.4.2 Family firm definition 
Considering our research design, defining family firm is a central issue. Literature 
offers numerous definitions that rely upon being family managed or family owned 
(Astrachan and Shanker, 2003).  However, due to the considerable presence of block-
holders in Italian market we disentangle the issue from two prospective: family 
                                                          
16 Welbourne and Andrews (1996) make researchers aware of the potential for positive bias in IPO 
prospectus. Keeping in mind such bias, we double-checked all financial data with Zephyr Database (Bureau 
van Dijk).   
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involvement in ownership and managerial position (Cascino et al., 2010). We define as 
family firms those where two conditions exist simultaneously. First, one or more 
members of the family (related through blood or marriage) must control at last 30%17 of 
voting rights and second, one or more members of the family must be involved in the 
top management team (De Massis et al., 2012). In order to distinguish among family-
owned and family-influenced firms we do not focus only on ownership concentration.  
Considering such definition, the study population is limited to 7718, non-financial, 
family IPOs.  
 
4.4.3 Variables and measures 
4.4.3.1 Dependent Variable 
The present study considers as dependent variable a firm’s survival on equity market 
after IPO. In line with Welbourne and Andrews (1996), IPO failure occurs if firm has 
been delisted. In keeping with Jain and Kini (1999), we treat mergers and acquisitions 
as non-survived IPOs. Based on such post-IPO outcomes, we segment the sample into 
survivors (63 observations) and non-survivors (14 observations). Table I provides 
information about the yearly breakdown of the sample.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 “Decreto Legislativo 58/1998” (Draghi Law) requires a level of 30% a tender offer. According to this 
threshold, we define firm’s contestability.  
18 To confirm the goodness of this empirical strategy, we also perform a sensitivity test by using alternative 
definitions of family firms. Specifically, we define family IPO according to F-PEC scale introduced by 
Astrachan, Klein and Smyrnios 2002. It computes family involvement in both ownership and managerial 
positions in a continuous variable. With this definition, we obtain a final sample of 75 family owned IPOs. 
Our results are robust to this proxy. 
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TABLE I: Time series distribution of post-IPO failure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To test firm survival in post-IPO period we employ two models: Logit and Cox 
proportional Hazard models. In the first model, the dependent variable 
(DELISTED_DUMMY) is a dichotomous outcome coded one if the firm delisted 
during the sample period, zero otherwise (Kashefi Pour, 2015). In the Cox model, we 
operationalise survival time (SURVIVAL) as time interval (in years) from IPO date to 
the year of delisting or to the end of observation period (2014) for survived IPOs 
(Chancharat et al., 2012).   
 
4.4.3.2 Independent Variables 
Our independent variables serve the scope to fully inquire specific sources of TMT 
diversity (ratio of family managers over TMT size and number of employed generations 
Year IPO year Event year 
2000 20 0 
2001 6 0 
2002 2 0 
2003 2 0 
2004 5 0 
2005 5 1 
2006 13 0 
2007 15 0 
2008 3 0 
2009 0 0 
2010 4 1 
2011 2 2 
2012 - 2 
2013 - 3 
2014 - 5 
Total 77 14 
In the column “IPO year”, we disclose the number 
of new listing occurred within each year. Our 
sample ends in 2011 but our observation period 
lasts until three years after (2014). The “Event 
Year” is the year when the delisting happened. 
We track a total of 14 delisting.  
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in TMT). In line with the above hypotheses, we employ a set of variables. We 
operationalise family involvement (FAM_TMT) as the ratio of family top managers over 
the total number of TMT members (Minichilli et al., 2010; Kraiczy et al., 2014). To 
assess family generational involvement, we define a continuous variable 
(FAM_GENERATION): the number of generations (e.g. first and founding generation 
or second and so on) actively involved in the TMT (Ling and Kellermanns, 2010). 
Moreover, to corroborate our findings we investigate the effect family generations 
simultaneously in charge of the firm: FAM_GEN1 is a dummy variable equals to one if 
only one generation of the family runs the company; likewise, we set FAM_GEN2 as a 
dichotomous variable: it assumes value one if two generations are contemporarily 
involved in the TMT, zero otherwise.   
 
4.4.3.3 Control Variables  
There are different ways other than family TMT diversity that may influence IPO 
survival. To strengthen confidence in the analysis we include several control variables. 
First, we employ firm’s profitability as a potential predictor of success/failure of IPO. In 
line with Chancharat et al. (2012), we adopt Return on Assets (ROA) as a measure of 
post-IPO operating performance: it is the ratio of Earnings Before Interests and Tax 
(EBIT) on the book value of Total Asset, calculated within a year of going public. 
Second, Brealey et al. (1977) argue that the higher quota of equity retained by pre-IPO 
shareholders may serve as a certification device. Within the framework of family firms, 
we define “overhang” (FAM_OVERHANG) as shares retained by family over shares 
offered (Leitterstorf and Rau, 2014). In accordance with Espenlaub et al. (2012), we 
also control for initial returns (UNDERPRICING): the difference between the closing 
price on the first day of trading and the initial offering price expressed as a percentage 
of the initial offering price (Beatty, 1989; Jog and McConomy, 2003). Following prior 
researches (Chahine and Goergen, 2013) we use a High-Tech dummy (HIGH_TECH) 
to control for industry; we define “technology sector”, in line with Roosenboom and 
Schramade (2006), using SIC code (283, 357, 365, 366, 367, 376, 382, 384, 48, 737, and 
8731). The binary variable is equals to one if the firm belongs to the technology sector; 
zero otherwise. A corporate governance attribute is also considered: we include the ratio 
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of independent directors (INDEP_DIR). Bearing in mind the importance of the year in 
which IPOs are issued (Demers and Joos, 2007), we include a dummy variable 
(TIME_CRISIS) 19 that assumes value one if the IPO took place before the financial 
crisis, zero otherwise.  In line with Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), we consider that 
financial crisis started in august 2007. Based on previous literature on the topic, we 
control for several firm characteristics, namely: age, size and leverage. Age (AGE) is the 
logarithm of the difference between the IPO date and the founding year, as in the 
prospectus; Ho et al. (2001) use it as an ex-ante proxy for risk. Size (SIZE) is the 
logarithm of market capitalization at the offer price (Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002). 
Leverage (LEV) is the ratio of the book value of non-equity-liabilities on book value of 
total asset: we use this variable to proxy for less growth-oriented firms (Myers, 1977). 
 
4.4.4 Data Analysis 
Logit. This paper explicitly analyses the delisting of a firm. Considering the nature of 
such event, the logit regression is appropriate for estimate a binary dependent variable 
and previous literature widely uses it (Wilbon, 2002; Bach and Smith, 2007). 
Cox. One of the major drawbacks of previous method is that it is unable to discriminate 
among firms that fails three years after IPO from those that fail after few months (e.g. 
do not account for period at risk). To date, alternative methods have been developed 
and introduced to measure IPO failure. In the present study, we also employs a survival 
analysis technique. We take advantage of using Cox model: it tackles the problems of 
static models by explicitly accounting for time (Shumway, 2001). It is useful because 
allows us to handle time-varying covariates and censored observations (Chancharat et 
al., 2012).  In our research context, censored observations are firms that are still listed at 
31 December 2014 (e.g. observations that do not experienced the event during the 
                                                          
19 We also employ another time-proxy to perform our analysis. Literature often refers to “Hot issue market” 
(e.g. Espenlaub, Khurshed and Mohamed 2012) as a period when there are significantly greater numbers of 
new issues. We account for this phenomenon by using a binary variable (HOT_MARKET) equals to one if 
firm went public in 2000 (the year with major IPOs in our sample), zero otherwise. In line with Demers and 
Joos (2007), we expect a negative relation between hot issue and IPO survival. Our results, unreported, 
indicate that such variable is not significant but the overall validity of models remains unchanged. 
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observation time). Time-varying covariates refer to specific firm’s characteristics that 
may change over time (e.g. financial ratio): such variables are important predictors of 
our time event, IPO failure. The major advantage of the model is that it does not make 
assumption on the underlying statistical distribution and the baseline hazard function is 
estimated non-parametrically.  
In the Cox proportional hazards model, we employ our dependent variable 
(SURVIVAL) to generate hazard ratios of new IPOs and operationalise such ratios as a 
function of firms’ characteristics at the time of going public. Following Mehran and 
Peristiani (2010) and, Kashefi Pour and Lasfer (2013), we operationalize the length of 
time to delisting-event, after controlling for related factors, as follows: 
 
                                         ℎ(𝑡, 𝑋(𝑡)) = ℎ(𝑡, 0) exp (𝐵𝑋(𝑡))                                                 (1) 
 
where h (t, X(t)) is the hazard rate at time t for a firm with covariates (independent 
variable) X(t). Hazard ratios (exp(B)) indicate the change in the hazard for a unit 
increase in the independent variable. If the ratio is greater (less) than one, it implies 
that the non-survived companies has a shorter (greater) time to the event (delisting). 
The hazard ratio equal to one means that there is no difference between survived and 
non-survived IPOs.  
 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis  
Table II breaks down the sample by survived (e.g. firms who remain listed until the 
end of the study period) and non-survived IPOs. The two subsamples do not 
significantly differ each other. Results show that the average age is 2.43 for successful 
IPO and 2.26 for non-survived counterparts. While all others control variables do not 
diverge, it is interesting to note that firms who experienced a failure post-IPO are more 
underpriced than successful IPOs; this is consistent with the view that survivability is 
positively related to initial returns (Shultz, 1993; Hensler et al., 1997). Going further, 
we notice that survived IPOs are bigger (SIZE) compared to non-survived counterparts. 
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In fact, small IPOs tend to be the most speculative and are expected to underperform in 
the long run (Kooli and Suret, 2004). If we scrutinize the role of family, we observe that 
survived IPOs exhibit higher level of “overhang” (e.g. the ratio of shares retained to 
shares offered, FAM_OVERHANG): that is, the greater family involvement in post-IPO 
ownership, the lower probability to fail. Coherently with our predictions, the ratio of 
family top managers (FAM_TMT) is higher in IPOs who experienced a failure.
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TABLE II: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Survival IPOs n=63 
 
Non-Survival IPOs n=14 
 
Equality of means 
 
 Mean Median St.Dev. 
 
Mean Median St.Dev. 
 
t-test 
AGE  2.43 2.64 0.96 
 
2.26 2.44 1.28 
 
0.55 
SIZE  12.24 12.35 1.24 
 
11.87 11.87 0.91 
 
1.04 
LEV  0.71 0.72 0.18 
 
0.73  0.77 0.16 
 
-0.36 
HIGH_TECH  0.57 1.00 0.50  
 
0.50 0.50 0.52 
 
0.48 
ROA  0.12  0.10 0.15 
 
0.09  0.08 0.05 
 
0.69 
T_CRISIS  0.83 1.00 0.38 
 
0.93 1.00 0.27 
 
-0.96 
UNDERPRICING  0.22 0.03 1.16 
 
0.73 0.02 2.49 
 
-1.17 
FAM_OVERHANG  2.22 1.94 1.40 
 
1.75 1.57 1.03 
 
1.16 
INDEP_PERC  0.26 0.25 0.14   
 
0.28 0.26 0.09 
 
-0.51 
FAM_TMT  0.31 0.26 0.16 
 
0.40 0.39 0.16 
 
-1.97** 
FAM_GENERATION  1.71 2.00 0.73  
 
2.00 2.00 1.04 
 
-1.22 
FAM_GEN1  0.44 0.00 0.50 
 
0.29 0.00 0.47 
 
1.08 
FAM_GEN2  0.40 0.00 0.49 
 
0.57 1.00 0.51 
 
-1.19 
Note: AGE is the logarithm of the difference between IPO year and founding year, as reported in prospectus. SIZE is the logarithm of 
market capitalization at offer price. LEV is the ratio of Book Value of non-Equity Liabilities on book value of Total Asset, it refers to last 
pre-IPO financial (audited) statement. HIGH_TECH is a binary variable equals to one if the firm belongs to technology sector, zero 
otherwise. This variable is computed in line with Roosenboom and Schramade (2006), using SIC code (283, 357, 365, 366, 367, 376, 
382, 384, 48, 737, and 8731). ROA is defined scaling Earnings Before Interests and Tax (EBIT) by the Book Value of Total Assets, it 
refers to the end of IPO year. T_CRISIS is a dummy variable; it assumes value one if the IPO was issued before financial crisis, zero 
otherwise. In line with Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), we consider that financial crisis started in august 2007. UNDEPRICING is the 
percentage difference between the closing price (at the end of the first trading day) and the offer price. FAM_OVERHANG is the ratio 
of shares retained over shares offered by family. INDEP_PERC is the percentage of independent directors in the board. We do not 
develop this ratio upon the concept of “outside” or “not affiliated” directors: we identify “independent directors” in accordance with 
strictly definition of Italian Law; we are able to following this criterion because firms are obligated to disclose this information in IPO 
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 TABLE III: Correlation matrix 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 AGE 1.00 
          
2 SIZE 0.21 1.00 
         
3 LEV -0.55 -0.05 1.00 
        
4 HIGH_TECH -0.04 0.02 0.06 1.00 
       
5 ROA 0.11 0.04 -0.45** 0.16 1.00 
      
6 T_CRISIS 0.09 0.32** -0.02 0.34** 0.05 1.00 
     
7 UNDERPRICING -0.01 0.06 0.14 -0.01 -0.09 -0.14 1.00 
    
8 FAM_OVERHANG -0.11 0.23* 0.07 -0.18 -0.06 -0.37** -0.02 1.00 
   
9 INDEP_PERC -0.15 0.01 0.16 0.20 -0.18 -0.04 0.05 0.18 1.00 
  
10 FAM_TMT 0.05 -0.06 0.06 0.05 0.25* -0.08 -0.02 0.17 -0.17 1.00 
 
11 FAM_GENERATION 0.27* 0.29* -0.12 -0.06 0.076 -0.04 -0.07 -0.40 -0.15 -0.38** 1.00 
Note: This table provides Paerson correlation coefficients.  ** and * denote statistically significant coefficients at 1 and 5% level of significance. 
Please see Table 2 for variable definitions. 
prospectus. All data are corrected for inflation (basis year 2011). 
FAM_TMT is the ratio of family managers from TMT over TMT size. We delineate the TMT as board of directors plus key figures and 
managers: by this way, we are able to carefully identify family members (people related through blood or marriage). Our choice is 
related to the fact that firms that go public must disclose the presence of key figures and strategic managers (such as sales manager, 
administrative director, quality and assurance manager) reporting also a short version of their Curriculum Vitae. FAM_GENERATION 
is a continuous variable; it discloses the number of generations actively involved in the TMT. FAM_GEN1 is a binary variable; it 
assumes value one if only one generation runs, simultaneously, the company. FAM_GEN2 is equal to one if two generations are involved 
in management.  
Chapter 3 - A story of complicated relationship: family involvement in TMT and stock market. 
 
133 
 
On the same line, non-survived IPOs see the involvement of multiple family 
generations (FAM_GENERATION) compared to successful IPOs.  
In Table III, we report the correlation among variables (Pearson correlation 
coefficients). It suggests that multicollinearity is not a problem in our analysis. 
 
4.5.2 Logit and Cox results 
To examine the impact of TMT demography on post-IPO survival, first we run a 
logit regression. The findings reported in Table IV matches our hypotheses. In such 
models, the dependent variable (DELISTED_DUMMY) is a binary outcome set to one 
if a firm has not survived to the end of the sample period, and zero otherwise. To 
explore the possibility that IPO survival is influenced by other factors than TMT 
demography, we include several control variables. We can observe that firm’s age (AGE) 
negatively affect the probability of delisting, (-.52, p<0.10 model 2; -.50, p<0.10 model 
3). That is, younger firms are subject to a greater likelihood of failure (Fischer and 
Pollock, 2004). The evidence shows that size (SIZE) has a positive effect on survival 
time (-.65, p<0.05 model 1; -.94, p<0.01 model 2; -.88, p<0.05 model 3; -.66, p<0.05 
model 4), in accordance with Espenlaub et al. (2012). Among factors that enhance post-
IPO survival, we find that belonging to the high tech sector (HIGH_TECH) is 
negatively and significantly related to dependent variable (-1.46, p<0.1 model 1; -1.31, 
p<0.05 model 2; -1.17, p<0.05 model 3; -1.07, p<0.1 model 4). Findings reported in 
Table IV also reveal that firms that went public before financial crisis (T_CRISIS) are 
more incline to delist (1.87, p<0.05 model 1; 2.39, p<0.05 model 2; 1.99, p<0.1 model 
3; 1.67, p<0.1 model 4). Underpricing (UNDERPRICING), found positively correlated 
(.29, p<0.05 model 1; .35, p<0.01 model 2; .31, p<0.01 model 3; .25, p<0.05 model 4), 
may indicate the firm’s ability to acquire financial resource after IPO (Pollock et al., 
2002). A greater level of underpricing could inhibit firm’s potential growth leading to a 
higher likelihood of failure (Kooli and Meknassi, 2007). Our results are consistent with 
prior literature, in fact Dolvin and Jordan (2008) observe that the greater quota of 
shares retained by controlling shareholder (family, in our case) (FAM_OVERGHANG) 
would imply a fostering of long-term strategy and an increased survival horizon (-.62, 
p<0.05 model 1; -.46, p<0.1 model 2; -.67, p<0.1 model 3; -.59, p<0.1 model 4). The 
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distance, in terms of objective, from family ties may lead independent directors 
(INDEP_PERC) to have a negative impact on firm’s survival after went public (4.72, 
p<0.05 model 1; 3.78, p<0.05 model 2; 4.68, p<0.05 model 3; 3.77, p<0.05 model 4). 
Regarding others control variables (LEV and ROA), we find that they are not 
statistically significant. Therefore, in the interests of brevity, we do not report these 
results. 
 
 TABLE IV: TMT and post-IPO survival, logit regression 
variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
CONST 
4.90 
(4.89) 
6.79 
(5.70) 
9.79 
(6.30) 
5.93 
(5.61) 
AGE 
-0.32 
(0.34) 
-0.52* 
(0.28) 
-0.50* 
(0.28) 
-0.34 
(0.31) 
SIZE 
-0.65** 
(0.28) 
-0.94*** 
(0.34) 
-0.88** 
(0.35) 
-0.66** 
(0.31) 
LEV 
-1.00 
(2.69) 
0.84 
(3.09) 
0.11 
(3.11) 
-0.14 
(3.09) 
HIGH_TECH 
-1.46* 
(0.77) 
-1.31** 
(0.68) 
-1.17* 
(0.65) 
-1.07* 
(0.67) 
ROA 
-1.95 
(2.61) 
0.12 
(2.01) 
-0.92 
(2.16) 
-0.92 
(2.11) 
T_CRISIS 
1.87** 
(0.92) 
2.39** 
(1.14) 
1.99* 
(1.09) 
1.67* 
(1.09) 
UNDERPRICING 
0.29** 
(0.12) 
0.35*** 
(0.12) 
0.31*** 
(0.12) 
0.25** 
(0.12) 
FAM_OVERHANG 
-0.62** 
(0.32) 
-0.46* 
(0.34) 
-0.67* 
(0.40) 
-0.59* 
(0.38) 
INDEP_PERC 
4.72** 
(2.31) 
3.78** 
(2.01) 
4.68** 
(2.12) 
3.77** 
(1.96) 
FAM_TMT 
6.20*** 
(2.52) 
   
   
FAM_GENERATION  
1.14** 
(0.48) 
  
   
FAM_GEN1   
-1.93** 
(1.11) 
 
   
FAM_GEN2    
1.20* 
(0.76) 
   Pseudo R2 0.2347 0.2190 0.2125 0.1730 
Note: ***, ** and * denote statistically significant coefficients at 1, 5 and 10% level of 
significance.  Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses.  
This Table presents the results for the logit regression for the characteristics affecting 
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the post-IPO survival. The sample includes n.77 family firms that went public on 
Milano Stock Exchange in the period 2000-2011. The dependent variable 
(DELISTED_DUMMY) is a binary outcome coded one if the firm delisted during the 
sample period, zero otherwise. In model 1, we test how TMT composition 
(FAM_TMT) affects the likelihood of post-IPO survival. We investigate, in model 2, 
which is the role of family generations actively involved in TMT 
(FAM_GENERATION). Models 3 (FAM_GEN1) and 4 (FAM_GEN2) are devoted to 
test the impact of multiple family generations simultaneously in charge of the firm on 
our dependent variable.  
Please see Table 2 for variable definitions. 
  
In model 1, the results suggest that the greater family involvement in TMT 
(FAM_TMT) increases the likelihood of post-IPO delisting (6.20, p<0.01). Due to the 
robustness of our results, hypothesis 1 is strongly supported. Going further, as the 
number of actively generations involved in the TMT (FAM_GENERATION) increases, 
the likelihood of post-IPO success decreases (1.14, p<0.05). This finding allows us to 
verify also second hypothesis. The overall analysis reports a negative effect of family 
TMT diversity on IPO failure.  
Table V illustrates the results we obtain with Cox hazard model. In this model the 
dependent variable (SURVIVAL) is the time, expressed in years, from IPO date to 
delisting (failed observations) or to the end of our observational period (2014). Within 
such model, a change in independent variables does not necessarily have a proportional 
effect on failure time, but it can accelerate or decelerate the time-to failure. This model 
corroborates our previous results. Both hypotheses are verified. In particular, the 
estimated hazard ratio for variable FAM_TMT is 30.05 which indicates that the 
likelihood of delisting increases with the family involvement in TMT (3.40, p<0.05 
model 1). Our findings confirm that greater family involvement is associated with 
higher failure likelihood. Regarding family generation, we can observe that 
FAM_GENERATION (0.68, p<0.05 model 2) exhibits an hazard ratio of 1.98 meaning 
that as the number of generations actively involved in TMT increases, the probability of 
delisting increases too. Likewise, IPOs where two family generations are in charge 
(FAM_GEN2) are 4.30 times as likely to fail compared to other companies (1.46, p<0.1 
model 4). As in logit results, FAM_GEN1 has a negative estimated coefficient (-2.02, 
p<0.05 model 3) and a hazard ratio of 0.13. 
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Among control variables, SIZE and UNDERPRICING are statistically significant in 
each models. Coherently with previous results (Table IV), we find that larger IPOs 
(SIZE) are less likely to delist (-.51, p<0.05 model 1; -.82, p<0.05 model 2; -.83, 
p<0.001 model 3; -.59 p<0.05 model 4). While, UNDERPRICING increases the 
likelihood of IPO failure (.20, p<0.05 model 1; .24, p<0.01 model 2; .18, p<0.01 model 
3; .15, p<0.05 model 4). 
  
TABLE V: TMT and post-IPO survival, COX hazard model  
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
variable (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
AGE 
-0.11 
(0.27) 
0.90 
-0.31 
(0.26) 
0.73 
-0.38 
(0.25) 
0.68 
-0.26 
(0.25) 
0.77 
SIZE 
-0.51** 
(0.29) 
0.60 
-0.82** 
(0.33) 
0.44 
-0.83*** 
(0.32) 
0.43 
-0.59** 
(0.31) 
0.55 
LEV 
-0.60 
(2.02) 
0.55 
0.93 
(2.02) 
2.53 
-0.25 
(1.82) 
0.78 
-0.58 
(1.93) 
0.56 
HIGH_TECH 
-0.63 
(0.61) 
0.53 
-0.80* 
(0.62) 
0.44 
-0.52 
(0.62) 
0.59 
-0.49 
(0.63) 
0.61 
ROA 
-1.63 
(1.79) 
0.19 
-0.24 
(1.92) 
0.78 
-1.79 
(2.03) 
0.166 
-1.57 
(1.88) 
0.21 
T_CRISIS 
-0.93 
(1.27) 
0.40 
-0.64 
(1.26) 
0.53 
-1.26 
(1.24) 
0.28 
-1.57 
(1.41) 
0.21 
UNDERPRICING 
0.20** 
(0.13) 
1.23 
0.24*** 
(0.13) 
1.27 
0.18*** 
(0.13) 
1.20 
0.15** 
(0.13) 
1.17 
FAM_OVERHANG 
-0.30 
(0.33) 
0.74 
-0.34 
(0.35) 
0.71 
-0.48 
(0.36) 
0.62 
-0.47 
(0.37) 
0.62 
INDEP_PERC 
-0.05 
(0.22) 
0.95 
0.00 
(0.22) 
1.00 
0.15 
(0.23) 
1.61 
0.08 
(0.23) 
1.08 
FAM_TMT 
3.40** 
(1.81) 
30.05       
      
FAM_GENERATION   
0.68*** 
(0.29) 
1.98     
      
FAM_GEN1     
-2.02** 
(0.87) 
0.13   
      
FAM_GEN2 
      
1.46* 
(0.75) 
4.30 
Note: ***, ** and * denote statistically significant coefficients at 1, 5 and 10% level of significance. 
Columns (1) report coefficient and standard errors in parentheses, calculated with robust variance estimator (Lin 
and Wei 1989). Columns (2) display hazard ratios. For such ratios, a value greater than one implies that firm has 
a shorter time to event (delisting); a value equals to one means that there is no difference between the two 
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4.6 Discussion 
Drawing our research on the upper echelon perspective, the aim of this study is to 
examine the potential effect of diversity in TMT on the likelihood of post-IPO survival. 
It is often said that diversity at apical level in family firms could be beneficial (Minichilli 
et al., 2010). However, scholars critic this view arguing that diversity does not 
necessarily bring benefits (Ling and Kellermanns, 2010). Literature often looks at 
family firms as reluctant to changes (Naldi et al., 2007). That is, we scrutiny contexts in 
which “potential benefits of diverse teams appear to be highly vulnerable to certain 
liabilities” (Michie et al., p. 131). In fact, family business literature emphasises how 
capital markets may lead to different behaviours (Naldi et al., 2013) and change 
strategic decisions. Recent works (Wilson et al., 2013) broaden our thinking by 
incorporating the effects of two sources of diversity: the presence of family and non-
family members and vertical distance (e.g. generational involvement). We take 
advantage of an ideal entrepreneurial setting, such as IPO choice, to investigate whether 
or not TMT diversity affect the survival of firms in capital markets. Therefore, despite 
its merits to bring new sources of knowledge and experience, we point out that TMT 
heterogeneity involved in costs as well. 
Our results clearly reveal that the higher number of family members in TMT reduces 
the likelihood of post-IPO survival. On this point, literature offers controversial 
findings. From one side, TMTs with family members are likely to provide better results 
since they are more prone to develop survivability capital (Sirmon and Hitt, 2003). 
TMT diversity apparently brings the necessary knowledge to bear on complex 
environment. On the other hand, the potential entrepreneurial advantages of having a 
group with different knowledge and perspectives may be offset by behavioural 
disruptions (Li and Hambrick, 2005) or by unreached consensus agreement (Jehn, 
subgroups (survived and non-survived IPOs). 
The dependent variable is a continuous outcome (SURVIVAL): it is the time interval (in years) from IPO date to 
the year of delisting or to the end of observation period (2014) for survived IPOs. 
Model 1 investigates the impact of family top managers (FAM_TMT) on post-IPO survival. Model 2 considers 
the family generational involvement (FAM_GENERATION) while model 3 and model 4 examine the role of 
single-family generation in charge (FAM_GEN1) and the role of two family generations simultaneously involved 
in TMT (FAM_GEN2). 
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1995). In fact, one or more sub-group’s attributes (family versus non-family managers) 
can aggravate subgroup conflicts that harm the group tasks’ effectiveness (Lau and 
Murnighan, 1998). Moreover, high ratio of family members within the TMT may yield 
more risk- adverse decisions: this attitude may undermine the survivability of the 
company (Zellweger et al., 2013). Additionally, Knight et al. (1999) revel that more 
heterogeneous TMT makes less comprehensive evaluations of opportunities and threats 
and, consequently, may have less chances to survive.   
Further, we examine intergenerational diversity in TMT (hypothesis 2). Our findings 
support the idea that the involvement of multiple family generations increase the 
likelihood of post-IPO failure. Contrasting this evidence, the involvement of more than 
one generation in TMT results in greater knowledge diversity (Sciascia et al., 2013) and 
bring new expertise to TMT (Ling and Kellermanns, 2010). Such intergenerational 
involvement may result in “effective identification and assessment of opportunities as 
well as creative approaches to exploit them” (Sciascia et al., 2013, p. 5). However, Davis 
and Harveston (2001) observe that one of the principal reason why family members’ 
views and opinions “may diverge is differences in familial distance” (p.15) that is more 
likely to occur with multiple generations in charge. Likewise, Gursoy et al. (2008) argue 
that people from different generations may have problems understanding others’ 
perspectives of the work with a negative reflection on strategic outcomes. Going further, 
when generational involvement in TMT reaches high levels, conflict are more likely to 
manifest. Despite of non-univocal findings, family business literature argues that if 
multiple generations are in charge firm tend to foster routines regardless of the strategic 
challenges (Zahra, 2005). This increases the risk of turning a formula for success into a 
failure (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). 
Through the outlined scenario, our findings reinforce the idea that multiple 
generations may imply greater level of conflict and a lower attitude to entrepreneurial 
changes. To corroborate our results, we sought to establish the effect on IPO survival 
when there is only one generation in charge or when two generations run the company. 
It is somewhat unsurprising that if only one generation is involved in TMT the firm is 
more likely to survive after IPO in capital markets. 
Considering family business literature, our results can be interpreted not only in light 
of TMT diversity but they also complement the ongoing debate on family involvement 
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and firm outcomes (Ling and Kellermanns, 2010). Our findings match the view that 
family involvement, through the participation of multiple family managers or 
generations, is not always beneficial and may involve in costs as well. For example, 
Kellermanns and Eddleston (2007) provide evidence that a higher number of family 
members facilitate the rise of emotional family issues and conflict, which can negatively 
affect organizational processes. Davis and Harveston (2001) found that more 
homogenous family teams would have less conflict than those teams with greater 
familial distance, and Chrisman et al. 2003 suggest that such conflicts may become a 
destructive force rather that gain a competitive advantage. Our study also suggests that 
TMT diversity in family firms could offset advantages leading to a shorter time of post-
IPO survival. 
The evidence of detrimental effects on post-IPO survival due to family TMT 
diversity provides suggestions for practice. From the family entrepreneurs’ perspective, 
our research establishes that TMT composition may play a crucial role in the survival of 
firm after went public. We advice family owners to structure TMT by including more 
external (e.g. non-family) managers to assure a longer survival in capital market. From 
the regulator perspective, this research suggests to consider not only the composition of 
board of directors (BoD) but offers an important reflection concerning TMT. It know 
that policymakers often focus their attention on BoD, in terms of its independence and 
directors’ tasks, by emanating compulsory laws and “compulsory or explain” codes  
(Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). To date, there is no recommendation about TMT in the 
environment of equity market.  
 
4.7 Limitations and Future Research 
This research suffers from some limitations that lead to future directions for 
research. 
First, this study urges more fine-grained theorization on TMT’ contribution at the 
IPO. In particular, the issue of team dynamics and effectiveness should be integrated 
into future theoretical development on IPOs. As TMT diversity brings different 
objectives according to the different sub-groups involved in the team, a comprehensive 
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framework should shed light on the complicated situation where managers may become 
focused only on the short term at IPO.  
Second, empirically, more information about TMT diversity could be investigated. 
There is a general consensus that diversity is not a unitary construct (Phinney, 1996) 
and thus far a common metric to evaluate it hasn’t been provided. Organizational 
demography researchers note that the characteristics such as tenure, background, 
education, age, gender, race, are salient, under most circumstances, to capture the 
diversity (Williams and O’Reilly, 1998). However, in our research, we have focused our 
attention on only two sources of TMT diversity: the presence of family and non-family 
managers and the number of employed generation within the TMT. So our results may 
be biased by the choice of these metrics. Other independent variables, specific of TMT 
diversity, such as education and tenure, might be considered in future researches. 
Third, we do not measure conflicts; rather, our variables may be proxies for 
behavioural dynamics. Thus, more fine-grained measures can provide more insight into 
group consensus (Wang and Song, forthcoming), group performance, and the capacity 
of the group to perform in the future for the analysis as next steps of research. 
Particularly, we proposed that diversity in TMT in family firms brings conflicts, but we 
have no direct measure of this last variable. Thus, more survey and behavioural-based 
methods should be used in the future research.  
Fourth, we have tested our hypotheses using data collected in one country (Italy). So 
generalization of results should be made with caution, and further tests in other 
empirical settings for comparative studies are required.  
 
4.8 Conclusions 
This paper aims to shed light on the relationship between TMT diversity and post-
IPO survival in family firms. Within upper echelon theory, we test if and to what extent 
TMT diversity affect post-IPO survival. Considering that the intervening processes 
between TMT heterogeneity at IPO and post-IPO survival is an important research 
area, we test this relationship by considering a sample of 77 family firms gone public in 
the period 2000-2011.  
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Our investigation analyses two source of TMT diversity: the percentage of family 
managers and the number of generations simultaneously involved in TMT. By using 
logistic regression and Cox hazard model, the findings reveal that a higher involvement 
of family members in TMT reduces the likelihood of post-IPO survival. Likewise, the 
number of family generations in charge is positively correlated with post-IPO failure. 
However, if only one generation is in TMT, the likelihood of survival increases. 
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Conclusions 
The present thesis aims to understand if and to what extent family involvement 
(considered at group level or at individual, CEO, level) affect IPO value and post-IPO 
failure (e.g. the condition of being delisted).  
Within first chapter, we use a stewardship framework to scrutiny the impact of family 
involvement in ownership and management on IPO value. We empirically test three 
hypotheses.  
First, we verify a positive impact of being a family controlled firm on IPO value. We 
define family firms in terms of both equity ownership and involvement in TMT. Our 
results are robust to all the thresholds (20%, 30% and 50%) that we adopt. We also 
corroborate these results by using a continuous scale (F-PEC) to define family firms.  
Hypothesis 2 relies on the involvement of family managers. Also in this case, we 
adopt several measures to proxy for this involvement. We validate our results by using 
family involvement at three levels: a) board of directors; b) TMT; c) overall family 
employees. The findings suggest that the market appreciates the presence of family 
managers, which is in line with the stewardship framework we adopt.  
Hypothesis 3 investigates how intergenerational control could affect value. Due to 
the increase in generational conflicts, we find that the positive impact of family 
involvement on IPO value is mainly attributable to the first generation.  
To add relevance to our results, we adopt two measures to proxy IPO value: the 
results remain unchanged whatever value is computed. Moreover, we consider long-run 
performance as a robustness check. Family status continues to be positively associated 
with firm performance. 
The second chapter relies on the role of CEO and his/her leadership in IPO 
valuation. We argue, in line with Finkelstein et al. (2009), that CEO power must be 
analysed as a construct rather than multiple variables. Thus, by using an exploratory 
factor analysis (EFA), we empirical build an indicator for CEO power. Considering 
Finkelstein's (1992) framework, we take into account three types of power through a 
factor analysis: ownership, structural and expert. Our results suggest that outside 
investors positively evaluate family IPOs managed by powerful CEOs.   
Further, broader family business literature has generally assumed that IPO firms 
belong to a homogenous group. We introduce two moderating factors that allow us to 
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distinguish between different familiar leadership styles: we find differences in powerful 
family and non-family leaders as well as between a co-leadership structure and the case 
of ‘one man in command’. The presence of a powerful family CEO strengthens the 
relationship between leader power and IPO value. Considering the second moderating 
factor, the presence of a co-leadership structure, we can state that IPO value will benefit 
from unity of command (e.g., absence of co-leaders). Moreover, we analyse the case of 
powerful family CEOs who are the only leaders (e.g., no co-leadership structure) of the 
board and unsurprisingly find that this leads to superior performance of family IPOs.   
Our results are robust to different proxies: we employ two different measure of IPO, 
short term and value. We define family owned firms by evaluating family involvement in 
both equity and managerial positions, and perform a sensitivity test using an alternative 
definition (e.g., F-PEC score).  
Finally, in the last chapter aims to shed light on the relationship between TMT 
diversity and post-IPO survival in family firms. Within upper echelon theory, we test if 
and to what extent TMT diversity affect post-IPO survival.  
Our investigation analyses two source of TMT diversity: the percentage of family 
managers and the number of generations simultaneously involved in TMT. By using 
logistic regression and Cox hazard model, the findings reveal that a higher involvement 
of family members in TMT reduces the likelihood of post-IPO survival. Likewise, the 
number of family generations in charge is positively correlated with post-IPO failure. 
However, if only one generation is in TMT, the likelihood of survival increases. 
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